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Effective military and commercial use of Internet to conduct mission critical
and commerce oriented transactions over shared networks is increasingly
inhibited by the shortcomings of the very enabling technology of the Internet - the
TCP/IP protocol. Without network performance, security and other management
controls, TCP/IP networks can't meet the overall requirements of a network. To
complicate the network policy management issues, new applications are
exchanging increasingly larger amounts of digital data (image, audio, video, etc.),
and some of them require stringent Quality-Of-Service (QOS) measured by delay
and loss from the network. This places very diverse but demanding
requirements on the network in terms of bandwidth and data delivery
dependencies on the network. In many cases this network traffic diversity has
led to major network performance and reliability problems as well as a resultant
loss of productivity among network users. [Ref. 1]
Typical 10Mbit Ethernet LANs or even 100Mbit switched LANs running
TCP/IP are no longer adequate to handle the various types of next generation
applications being written and the existing mission critical applications. The
bottom line is that more than bandwidth is required and the existing network
infrastructure installed base make it impossible to quickly change to a new
standard such as ATM for all desktop connections. As a result there is a growing
need for management tools capable of running a new generation of applications
over existing infrastructure. These requirements have not gone unnoticed by
v







B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 6
C. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 6
BACKGROUND 9
A. INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK MANAGEMENT 9
1. Management Defined 9
2. Network Management Defined and Discussed 9
a. Functional Architecture of Network
Management 13
(1) Defining the Pieces 13
(2) Managed Objects 14
(3) Element Management Systems (EMS) 14
(4) Manager of Managers Systems (MoM) 14
(5) User Interface 15
b. Management Functional Areas (MFAs) 15
(1) Fault Management 16
(2) Configuration Management 16
(3) Accounting 17
(4) Performance Management 17
(5) Security 18
(6) Chargeback 18
(7) Systems Management 19
(8) Cost Management 19
c. Common Implementations 20
(1) Management Focus 21
(2) The Right Implementation 21
d. Business Case Requirements 21
(1) Definition 22
(2) Levels of Activity 22
(3) Today's Implementations 24
e. System Focus 26
3. Management Functional Domains (MFDs) 28
a. Introduction 28
b. Building Requirements 29
4. A New Paradigm for Network Management 33
a. The Advent of Web-Based Management 34
b. The Benefits of Web-Based Management 35
c. Two Strategies for Implementation 36
d. Emerging Standards 38
viii
e. Web-Based Management and the World Wide Web 40
5. Questions to Ask 41
a. How Much with the System Cost? 41
b. Will the Proposed System Integrate Into and
Enhance My Current MIS Support Capabilities? 41
c. Is the Proposed System Modular in Design? 42
d. Is the Product Proposed Just an Element
Management System oris it an Integrator
of Element Management Systems? 42
e. What Does the System Monitor? 42
f. Does the Proposed System Enhance the
Capabilities of the Current Support Staff or
Does It Add More Support Staff? 42
6. Conclusion 43
B. POLICY-BASED MANAGEMENT 43
1. Definition of a Network Policy 44
2. The Need for Policy Networking 49
3. Policy Networking Tree of Variables 51
MANAGING QUALITY OF SERVICE 59
A. INTRODUCTION 59
B. DIVERGENT VIEWS 63





D. APPROACHING THE QOS PROBLEM 71
E. SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS 73
1. Problems of the Past 74
2. Value of SLAs 75
F. QOS SOLUTION 76
G. INTERNET PROTOCOL QOS MECHANISMS 78
1. Integrated Services Model 79
a. Flows 79
b. Service Categories 79
c. Traffic Specification 79
d. Requested Service Specification 80
e. Path Characterization 80
f. Resource Reservations 81
g. Soft State 82
2. Delay and Jitter 84
3. Throughput 85
4. Issues with the int-serv Model 86
H. DIFFERENTIATED SERVICES MODEL EXPLORED 87
ix
I. INTERACTION WITH MPLS 92




Queuing Techniques for Congestion Management on
Outbound Traffic 95




Policy Requirements for FIFO Queuing
Interfaces 97
(2) FIFO's Relationship to Traffic Coloring 97
b. Priority Queuing (PQ): Basic Traffic Prioritization 97
(1 Policy Requirements for Priority Queuing
Interfaces 98
(2) Priority Queuing's Relationship to Traffic
Coloring 98
c. Custom Queuing (CQ): Advance Traffic Prioritization 98
(1 Policy Requirements for Custom Queuing
Interfaces 99
(2) Custom Queuing's Relationship to Traffic
Coloring 100
d. Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ): Intelligent Traffic
Prioritization 100
(1 Policy Requirements for Weighted Fair Queuing
Interfaces 101
(2) Weighted Fair Queuing's Relationship to
Traffic Coloring 101
e. Weighted Round Robin (WRR): Traffic Taking Turns .... 1 1
(1) * Modulo-N Hash 102
(2) Hash-Threshold 102
(3) Highest Random Weight (HRW) 102
2. Traffic Shaping or Traffic Limiting Techniques for Controlling
Bandwidth 103
a. Generic Traffic Shaping (GTS): Controlling Traffic on
Non-Frame Relay Interfaces 104
(1 ) Interface QoS Property Requirements for
Generic Traffic 104
b. Frame Relay Traffic Shaping (FRTS): Controlling
Traffic on Frame Relay Interfaces and Subinterfaces.... 105
(1 ) Interface Qos Property Requirements for Frame-
Relay Traffic Shaping 106
c. Limiting: Limiting Bandwidth and Optionally Coloring
Traffic 106
(1) Interface QoS Property Requirements for Rate
Limited Traffic 107
(2) QoS Policy 107
IV. NETWORK POLICY: SECURITY 109
A. OVERVIEW OF NETWORK SECURITY 109
x
B. A GROWING NEED FOR PROTECTION 110
C. SECURITY STRATEGIES 112
1. Least Privilege 112
2. Defence in Depth 113
3. Choke Point 114
4. Fail Safe Stance 114
5. Security Through Obscurity 115
6. Simplicity 116
7. Host Based Security 116
8. Network Based Security 117
D. SECURITY POLICY 117
1. Site Security Policy 118
2. Network Service Access Policy 119
3. Firewall Design Policy 120
4. System Specific Policies 121
5. Incident Handling 122
6. Disaster Recovery 122
E. THE KEY ELEMENTS OF SECURITY 123
1. Authenticity 123
2. Access Control 124
3. Integrity 124
4. Confidentiality 124
5. Security Must be Implemented in the Network 125
6. Authentication Services 125
a. Secure Access to Layer-Two Groups 127
b. Device Authentication 129
c. User Authentication 130
(1) Authentication Server 131
(2) Authentication Agent 133
(3) Authentication Client 133
F. FIREWALL SERVICES 134
1. Types of Firewalls 135
a. Packet Filtering Firewalls 135
b. Application Gateways 135
c. Circuit-level Gateways 136
d. Stateful Inspection 136
2. Switch-based Firewalls 137





3. External Firewalls 139
4. Internal Firewalls 141
5. Firewall Architecture 142
6. Switch-embedded Firewall Features 143
a. Access Control 144
(1) Authenticity—Firewall Authentication 146
(2) User Authentication 146
(3) Client Authentication 146
xi
(4) Transparent Session Authentication 147
b. Logging 147
c. Address Translation 148
(1) Dynamic Mode 149
(2) Static Mode 149
G. LOOKING AHEAD—DIRECTORY INTEGRATION 150
H. TYPES OF COMPUTER SECURITY POLICY 150
1. Program-level Policies 150
2. Program-framework Policies 151
3. Issue Specific Policies 151
4. System-specific Policies 151
I. EXAMPLES OF SECURITY POLICY 152
1. Program-Level Policy 152
a. An Example of a Program Level Policy 153
2. Program-Framework Policy 154
a. Program-Framework Policy Example 155
3. Issue-Specific Policy 156
a. Issue-Specific Policy Example 157
4. System-Specific Policy 161
a. Security Objectives 161
b. Operational Security 161
c. Policy Implementation 162
J. THE SECURITY CHALLENGE 163
V. NETWORK COST MANAGEMENT POLICY: (A CASE STUDY) 165
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 165
B. NETWORK COST PROBLEM DEFINES 166
C. BANDWIDTH ISSUES 167
D. CONFIGURATION ISSUES 168
E. DOWNTIME DILEMMA 169
F. SECURITY ISSUES 170
G. AN ORGANIZATION PLAN OF ACTION 170
1. A Single-Site Solution 172
2. The Multiple-Site Solution 182
H. A PLAN TO FOLLOW 186
VI. CONCLUSION: HIGH PERFORMANCE NETWORKING INITIATIVES 189
A. NEXT GENERATION INTERNET NETWORK POLICY
APPLICATIONS AT NASA 189
1. The Results of the Game Plan: NASA Participation at NGI 192
a. Technologies 192
b. Testbeds 193
2. Naval Postgraduate School Contribution: Server and Agent
Based Active Management (SAAM) Architecture 196
3. Other High-Performance Networking Initiatives 197
3. Networking Policy Considerations for Next-Generation
Applications 199




(3) Policy Architecture 204
B. RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
AND RESEARCH TOPICS 207
1. Gemini, an Example of the Need for Research Collaboration
Linkages 207
2. IPV6 209
LIST OF REFERENCES 211
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215




1. Network Management Growth [Ref. 16] 12
2. Levels Of Functionality [Ref. 18] 13
3. Network Management Center (each dot representing a MNC [Ref. 8] ..20
4. Distributed System [Ref. 8] 25
5. Distributed System [Ref. 8] 27
6. The Proxy Solution for WBM [Ref. 20] 37
7. The Embedded Approach to WBM [Ref. 20] 37
8. A Procedure for Continuous Archival of Logging and Check-Pointing
Data. [Ref. 17] 47
9. Policy-Based Network Management Growth Policy Networking
Building Blocks. [Ref. 12] 50
10. Network Policy Tree 52
11. Security Policy Tree 52
12. QoS Policy Tree 53
13. QoS Integrated Services 54
14. QoS Differential Services 55
15. QoS Policy Mechanisms 56
16. Cost Policy Tree 57
17. Qos Architecture [Ref. 18] 77
18. Policy Networking Architecture [Ref. 12] 95
19. QoS Policy Binding [Ref. 21] 108
20. Device Identification [Ref. 28] 130
21. User Identification [Ref. 28] 131
22. External Firewall [Ref. 28] 140
23. Internal Firewall [Ref. 28 142
24. Firewall Architecture [Ref. 27] 143
25. Corporate Enterprise 1994 [Ref. 34] 172
26. Corporate Enterprise 1997 [Ref. 34] 178
27. Bandwidth Graphs [Ref. 34] 179
28. Support Staff Ratio [Ref. 34] 183
29. Power Network 1997 [Ref. 34] 185
30. Power Network 1998 [Ref. 34] 186




1 Availability. [Ref. 19] 65
2. A Switch-Based Firewall Has Two Primary Applications: as an




The author would like to acknowledge those individuals who provided their
support throughout the information gathering phase of this thesis....Thank-You Kiersten
for being there when I needed you. Also thanks to Hank, Elvis, Virgil and Tulpen for




The management of information technology projects has long been a
significant problem for federal agencies. The government obligated more than
$23.5 billion toward information technology products and services in fiscal year
1994-about five percent of the government's total discretionary spending. Yet
the impact of this spending on agency operations and service delivery has been
mixed at best. Federal computer systems often cost millions more than
expected, take longer to complete than anticipated, and fail to significantly
improve the speed and quality of federal programs-or reduce their cost. Some
private and public sector organizations, however, have significantly improved
performance by managing their information technology resources within an
overall framework that aligns technology with business needs and priorities [Ref.
1].
There is an increasing demand, coming from the Congress and the
public, for a smaller government that works better and costs less. Having
valuable, accurate, and accessible financial and programmatic information is a
critical element for any improvement effort to succeed. Furthermore, increasing
the quality and speed of service delivery while reducing costs will require the
government to make significant investments in three fundamental assets-
personnel, knowledge, and capital property/fixed assets.
Investments in information technology (IT) projects can dramatically
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affect all three of these assets. Indeed, the government's ability to improve
performance and reduce costs in the information age will depend, to a large
degree, on how well it selects and uses information systems investments to
modernize its often-outdated operations. However, the impact of information
technology is not necessarily dependent on the amount of money spent, but
rather on how the investments are selected and managed. This, in essence, is
the challenge facing federal executives: Increasing the return on money spent on
IT projects by spending money wiser, not faster.
IT projects, however, are often poorly managed. For example, one
market research group estimates that about a third of all U.S. IT projects are
canceled, at an estimated cost in 1995 of over $81 billion [Ref. 1]. In the last 12
years, the federal government has obligated at least $200 billion for information
management with mixed results at best. Yet despite this huge investment,
government operations continue to be hampered by inaccurate data and
inadequate systems.
Too often, IT projects cost much more and produce much less than
what was originally envisioned. Even worse, often these systems do not
significantly improve mission performance or they provide only a fraction of the
expected benefits. Of 18 major federal agencies, 7 have an IT effort that has
been identified as high risk by either the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) or the Congress [Ref. 2].
Some private and public sector organizations, on the other hand, have
designed and managed IT to improve their organizational performance.
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In a 1995 report, congress analyzed the information management
practices of several leading private and state organizations [Ref. 3]. These
leading organizations were identified as such by their peers and independent
researchers because of their progress in managing information to improve
service quality, reduce costs, and increase work force productivity and
effectiveness. From this analysis, fundamental IT management practices were
identified that, when taken together, provide the basis for the successful
outcomes found in leading organizations.
One of the best practices exhibited by leading organizations was that
they manage information systems projects with clear-cut management policies
[Ref. 4].
This particular practice offers organizations great potential for gaining
better control over their IT expenditures and performance. In the short term
(within 2 years), this practice serves as a powerful tool for carefully managing
and controlling IT expenditures and better understanding the explicit costs and
projected returns for each IT project. In the long term (from 3 to 5 years), this
practice serves as an effective process for linking IT projects to organizational
goals and objectives. However, managing IT projects with specific policies works
most effectively when implemented as part of an integrated set of management
practices. For example, project management systems must also be in place,
reengineering improvements analyzed, and planning processes linked to mission
goals.
The Congress has passed several pieces of legislation that lay the
3
groundwork for agencies to establish a policy approach for managing IT. For
instance, revisions to the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (Public Law 104-13)
have put more emphasis on evaluating the operational merits of information
technology projects. The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act (Public Law 101-
576) focuses on the need to significantly improve financial management and
reporting practices of the federal government. Having accurate financial data is
critical to establishing performance measures and assessing the returns on IT
investments. Finally, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
(Public Law 103-62) requires agencies to set results-oriented goals, measure
performance, and report on their accomplishments.
In addition, the recently passed Information Technology Management
Reform Act (ITMRA) (Division E of Public Law 104-106) requires federal
agencies to focus more on the results achieved through IT investments while
streamlining the federal IT procurement process. Specifically this act, which
became effective August 8, 1998, introduces much more rigor and structure into
how agencies approach the selection and management of IT projects. Among
other things, the head of each agency is required to implement a process for
maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of the agency's IT
acquisitions.
Defense computing networks are not the only networks needing
improvement in management.
Businesses have flocked to the Internet, deployed intranets at a
dizzying rate and pushed out massive multimedia applications to
desktop users. Amid this flurry of activity, many businesses failed
to anticipate the network congestion these new applications can
cause [Ref. 5].
Typical 10Mbit Ethernet LANs or even 100Mbit switched LANs running TCP/IP
are no longer adequate to handle the various types of next generation
applications being written and the existing mission critical applications [Ref. 6].
The bottom line is that more than bandwidth is required and the existing network
infrastructure installed base make it impossible to quickly change to a new
standard such as ATM for all desktop connections. Instead of funnelling
monetary resources into creating more bandwidth "pipe", network managers
must find methodologies to optimize use of existing network resources, including
those that have been plentiful and have been taken for granted [Ref. 7]. Policy
based network management is an emergent management technology that meets
this requirement-transmission prioritization. This thesis will examine network
policy management and its uses.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to: (1) provide a review of network policies in
practice, (2) research how these network policies are enforced, (3) provide an
evaluation of DOD network policies, (4) provide an evaluation of commercial
network policies, (5) provide an overview of the structure of Management
Information Systems (6) examine network resource management methodologies,
(7) review the most current research being conducted by DoD and commercial
entities, including NASA, in computer networking and (8) explore the benefits of
this research.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What are the historical/traditional economic decision variables/parameters
used to define network policy management?
What variables are required to manage current distributed computing
networks?
What is the effect of additional/differing decision variables on network policy
management methodologies?
What are the commonly practiced computing network policies of network
administrators in academic institutions?
What are the commonly practiced computing network policies of network
administrators in military institutions?
What are the commonly practiced computing network policies of network
administrators in the business sector?
How are the commonly practiced computing network policies enforced?
How are commonly used Internet protocols related to network policy
management and how are they categorized?
What would be an appropriate way for DOD network managers to administer
their bandwidth and prioritize network usage?
C. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS
This research will assist network managers in assessing the impact of
emerging technologies that utilize prioritization mechanisms. Readers will benefit
from presentation of a clear definition of network resources, which is unavailable
from other information sources. They will be provided a snapshot of prioritization
methodologies that are in use and available. This research will explain the
prioritization and policy options, their usage, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each methodology. This thesis intends to expand on the
traditional views of network management and will show how "policy
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management" aims to reduce human intervention in networking. The reader will
understand that by giving the network a set of rules ("policies") that govern how it
will respond to certain events, then building on and maintaining that set of rules,
we can replace the case-by-case manual configuration that takes place today.
The research will also provide insight into alternatives to continued high-cost
infrastructure upgrades within DOD computing networks.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK MANAGEMENT
This chapter will provide a detailed background of network management and
policy management basic concepts. This section (A) will define basic terminology,
functional areas, and tasks included in a typical network management model. The term
"management" is defined below to build a basis for further detailed discussion of
specific network management techniques.
1. Management Defined
According to the American Heritage Dictionary (1997), to manage is:
• To direct or control the use of, to handle.
• To exert control over.
• To make submissive to one's authority, discipline, or persuasion.
• To succeed in accomplishing or achieving, especially with difficulty;
contrive or arrange.
Managing IT resources is a complicated and expensive task, which includes
many areas of responsibility. In the business sense, management has always connoted
optimizing the utility of available resources - in other words - making the most of current
assets. In effect, the IT manager's responsibility is to control the use of his or her
resources to create the greatest profit for an organization.
2. Network Management Defined and Discussed
Network Management as a term has many definitions dependent on the
operational functions in question. This chapter will illustrate and discuss today's
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most common implementations of network management systems as they apply
to actual MIS (Management Information System) form and function. It will also
illustrate a What's wrong with this picture type of scenario, then discuss what the
ideal system will look like.
Network management systems have been in operation many years
especially in their own proprietary worlds such as Tivoli's Netview, AT&T
Accumaster and Digital Equipment Corporation's DMA. With the implementation
of Simple Network Management Protocol (SMNP), local area and wide area
network components could be monitored and "managed". With the vast amount
of raw data available, most MIS Managers have no idea what they really want
because, in part, they don't know what is available [Ref. 10]. Additionally, how
does the data get into a format that actually means something? Some
communications systems are even considered non-manageable because they
are only accessible by an RS-232 port and not by Netview or SNMP. There
exists a belief that Network Management means nothing but the monitoring and
management of network architectural hardware such as Routers, bridges and
concentrators - nothing above the network layer of the OSI (Open Systems
Interconnection) model is considered manageable [Ref. 10].
It is alarming that most Senior Network Engineers tend to be resigned to
spend thousands of dollars on hardware and software BEFORE the real
requirements are gathered and defined. Consequently, MIS departments either
spend very little on network management or they "go for broke" with the huge
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hardware platforms and expensive artificial intelligence engines driving network
management for the company [Ref. 10].
In today's environment of cost cutting and productivity enhancements,
many common network management implementations call for an increase the
number of people required to support MIS functions. These new people are
senior level engineering and support types; very expensive in most cases.
Typical costs extend into the hundreds of thousands of dollars purchasing
hardware and software, not to mention the expense for additional personnel.
Network management systems have to be geared toward the workflow of
the organization in which they will be utilized [Ref. 11]. As each MIS
implementation is geared toward the business requirements, so should the
network management system. If the management functionality does not directly
or indirectly solve a business problem, it is totally useless to the overall MIS
department and to the company.
Network management does not mean one application with a database
with some huge chunk of iron running the show. It is really an integrated
conglomeration of functions that may locate on one machine, or span thousands
of miles, different support organizations and many machines and databases.
Each of these functions must be directly driven by the business case. Most
network decision makers agree that the real concern of the future is not
necessarily migrating to high-speed intranets and extranets, but reducing the
spiraling costs associated with supporting and operating the network [Ref. 11].
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Figure 1 graphically depicts an estimation of the growth of network management
market.
3
The relative growth rate of the network management
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Figure 1. Network Management Growth. [Ref. 16]
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a. Functional Architecture of Network Management
(1) Defining the Pieces. Network management systems
have four basic levels of functionality. Each level has a set of tasks defined to
provide, format, or collect data necessary to manage the objects. Figure 2





Figure 2. Levels of Functionality. [Ref. 18]
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(2) Managed Objects. Managed Objects are the devices,
systems and/or anything else that require some form of monitoring and
management. Most implementations leave out the "anything else" clause
because the implementors usually do not have the business case requirements
before the design; therefore they design as they go.
Some examples of managed objects include routers,
concentrators, hosts, servers and applications like Oracle, Microsoft
Management Systems, Lotus Notes, and Microsoft Mail. The managed object
does not have to be a piece of hardware but should rather be depicted as a
function provided on the network [Ref. 10].
(3) Element Management Systems (EMS). An EMS
manages a specific portion of the network. For example, the SunNet Manager,
an SNMP management application, produced by Sun Microsystems, is often
used to manage SNMP manageable elements. Element Managers may manage
multiplexers, Private Automatic Branch exchange (PABX's), proprietary systems
or an application [Ref. 10].
(4) Manager of Managers Systems (MoM). MoM systems
integrate together the information associated with several element management
systems, usually performing alarm correlation between EMS's. There are several
different products that fall into this category, including Boole & Babbage's
CommandPost, NyNEX 's AIILink, International Telematic's MAXM, OSI's
14
NetExpert and others.
(5) User Interface. The user interface to the alarm
information, whether real time alarms and alerts or trend analysis graphs and
reports, is the principal piece to deploying a successful network management
system. If the information gathered cannot be distributed to the whole MIS
organization to keep people informed and to enable team communications, the
real purpose of the system is lost in the implementation [Ref. 10]. Data doesn't
mean anything if it is not used to make informed decisions about the optimization
of network resource usage.
The above systems components are, in turn, mapped back
to what is called Management Functional Areas (MFAs). These MFAs are the
wish list of areas in which management applications, as a system should focus.
b. Management Functional Areas (MFAs)
The most common framework depicted in network management
designs is centered around the OSI "FCAPS" model of MFAs. Most network
management implementations do not cover all of these areas. Other less
inclusive models may not address all areas that may be important to the MIS
function and to specific business units within the company [Ref. 10].











(1) Fault Management. Fault management is the detection
of a problem, fault isolation and correction to normal operation. Most systems
poll the managed objects, search for error conditions and illustrate the problem in
either a graphic format or a textual message. Most of these types of messages
are setup by the person configuring the polling on Element Management
Systems [Ref. 10]. Some Element Management Systems collect error log data
directly from a printer output, receiving an alarm as the error occurs.
Fault management deals most commonly with events and
traps as they occur on the network [Ref. 10]. Keep in mind though, that using
data reporting mechanisms to actively report alarms or alerts is the best way to
accomplish health checks of specific managed object's performance without
having to greatly increase the amount of polling that must occur in order to
ensure accurate error data is received.
(2) Configuration Management. Configuration management
is probably the most important part of network management because a network
cannot be accurately managed unless the configuration of the network can be
managed [Ref. 10]. Changes, additions and deletions to the network
configuration need to be coordinated with the Network Management Systems
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(NMS). Dynamic updating of the configuration needs to be accomplished
periodically to ensure the configuration is correct and known to the NMS.
(3) Accounting. The accounting function is usually left out of
most implementations of NMS because LAN based systems are not known to
promote accounting type functions unless dealing with hosts such as IBM
mainframes or DEC VAX machines [Ref. 10]. Others rationalize that accounting
is a server specific function and should be managed by the system administrator.
(4) Performance Management. Performance is a key
concern to most MIS support people [Ref. 10]. Although, very important, it is
considered difficult to be factual about some LAN performance parameters
unless employing the Remote Monitoring (RMON) technology. A monitoring
system is a cohesive, integrated set of elements for collecting information,
offering the appropriate analysis and responding as needed. RMON agents can
be a key element of the monitoring system.
RMON agents gather information for analysis tools. They
are embedded in network products, such as hubs and switches, are available as
stand-alone probes and in network interface cards. RMON agents also gather
physical and data link layer data for a single LAN segment and collect data at the
network and application layers for analysis of flows between parts of the
enterprise network. Combining these agents gives detailed information about
any LAN segment as well as end-to-end traffic analysis across complex
networks. Although RMON agents are very useful, one should carefully weigh
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what is pertinent to what can be accomplished in other ways without having to
spend a bundle [Ref. 10].
Performance of Wide Area Network (WAN) links, telephone
trunk utilization, etc., are areas that must be revisited on a continuing basis as
these are easiest to optimize and realize savings.
Systems or applications performance is another area in
which optimization can be accomplished. However, most network management
applications do not address the issue in a functional manner.
(5) Security. Most network management applications only
address security applicable to network hardware such as preventing an intruder
from logging into a router or bridge [Ref. 11]. Some network management
systems have alarm detection and reporting capabilities as part of physical
security (contact closure, fire alarm interface, etc.) None really deals with system
security as a function of system administration. This thesis will explore security
policy management issues in later chapters.
(6) Chargeback. A chargeback system is intended to
function as an IT Management control system by establishing the proper balance
between controlling costs, stimulating use, and encouraging efficient use of IT
resources. By making users who consume IT resources responsible for their
costs, chargeback systems encourage more judicious use of IT resources, as
well as promote a higher quality of service from providers [Ref. 9]. Chargeback
has been done for years in the mainframe environments and will continue to be
accomplished since it is a way to charge the end user for only the specific portion
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of the service that he or she uses. Chargeback on Local Area Networks presents
new challenges in that so many services are provided. In many implementations,
chargeback is accomplished on the individual Server providing the service.
While chargeback is a challenge on broadcast based
networks such as Ethernet; it is realizable on ATM networks that dynamically
allocate bandwidth based on end users' needs. As technology associated with
monitoring LAN and WAN networks evolves, chargeback will be integrated into
more and more systems [Ref. 9].
(7) Systems Management. Systems Management is the
management and administration of services provided on the network. A lot of
implementations of NMS leave out this very crucial part. However, this is one of
the areas in which Network Management systems can show significant
capabilities, streamline business processes, and save the customer money with
just a little work [Ref. 12]. There are many good Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) products available to automate system administration functions and
these products can be integrated into the overall NMS very easily.
(8) Cost Management. Cost management is an avenue in
which the reliability, operability and maintainability of managed objects are
addressed. This function is an enabler to upgrade equipment, delete unused
services and tune the functionality of the Servers to the services provided. By
continuously monitoring Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time
To Repair (MTTR) statistics, costs associated with maintaining the network as a
system can be tuned [Ref. 16]. This area is an MFA that is driven by IT
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management to ensure the highest degree of performance is received from the
money allocated [Ref. 16].
c. Common Implementations
Most implementations of medium and large network management
systems center around a Network Management Center (NMC) of some sort [Ref.
11]. From this location, all management related data is sent and processed.
While several EMS are used to manage their specific areas, all of the data
comes back to the Manager of Managers application, which runs on the NMC.
Most fault detection, isolation and troubleshooting is accomplished in the
Network Management Center and technicians dispatched when the problem has
been analyzed and the solution devised. Several company locations may be
involved in the overall network spanning thousands of miles around the globe
(see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Network Management Center (each dot representing a MNC).
[Ref. 8]
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(1) Management Focus. The management focus for this
scenario is on the Network Management Center driving the total operation.
Detection, troubleshooting and dispatching are accomplished from the NMC.
This operational focus is a carry over from the old Netview days when the center
of the picture was a huge IBM Mainframe that did all the work. If a Network
Management Center is not utilized today, consider what it will cost not only for
the hardware and software, but the people to accomplish this and their level of
expertise [Ref. 12].
(2) The Right Implementation. If MIS Managers, are looking
at the benefits of network management to reduce downtime and overall cost,
they need to make sure that the business case requirements drive the
implementation and not the implementation drive the business cases [Ref. 12].
Systems integrators, need to make sure the requirements
are collected before any implementation. When the requirements are put in
place, it is the Systems integrators job to make sure management is informed as
to what each implementation segment will cost and what that capability brings to
the overall MIS function [Ref. 12].
d. Business Case Requirements
In today's world, any implementation must follow the business case
associated with what will be implemented [Ref. 12]. The implementation must
solve a business problem or increase efficiency of the current methods of
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accomplishing work with lower costs. If the solution does not save time and
money, it probably is not worth accomplishing.
(1) Definition. The hardest part of building a business case
is the gathering of the information. One must define the problem at hand in a
general sense and then look for specific problems that network management can
address [Ref. 12].
The developer of the business case must look at the current
way each section accomplishes its day to day work. The case for a NMS can be
definitized by documenting current work processes that may be automated by the
system.
The network manager should look for ways to save the
organization money. Keep addressing the need to get the MIS into the
organization to take advantage of the services they provide. A more efficient
organization will be the result.
(2) Levels of Activity. There are four levels of network
monitoring and management activity that one must understand before applying
management to a specific service or device [Ref. 12]. These four levels of
activity are as follows:
Inactive
This is the case when no monitoring is being done and if an alarm was
received in this area, it would be ignored.
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Reactive
The problem is reacted to after it has occurred yet no monitoring has
been applied.
Interactive
Monitor the components but interactively troubleshoot to eliminate the
side effect alarms and isolate to a root cause.
Proactive
This is where the system provides a root cause alarm for the problem
at hand and automatic restoral processes are in place where possible
to minimize downtime.
These four levels of activities outline exactly how a support
organization is dealing with problems today and where an MIS manager would
want them to be. Within the support organization are teams with different goals
and focuses (i.e. Unix support, desktop support, network support, etc.). While a
specific alarm may warrant an inactive approach by one team, it may demand a
proactive approach from another.
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(3) Today's Implementations. Of the network management
implementations done today, very few really address the needs of the business.
Most are implemented with good intentions but are focused away from increasing
efficiency [Ref. 13].
In a multiple site network, technicians, engineers and
support personnel are required at each major location. No one knows those local
environments better than the people who work with them on a daily basis. No
one knows the people of the organization better than the Help Desk staff
because they are the first lines of communication between the people and the
MIS support organization.
Network management elements are considered, among
other things, tools used for troubleshooting accomplishment. The local support
staff could benefit greatly from the use of this tool. As such, most
implementations give read-only access to these systems. The ability to focus
these tools at a local level is paramount to increasing the effectiveness to the
local support staff. In some implementations, where read/write access is
provided, it is accomplished through a (X-Windows) GUI, which does not work
very well across low speed links [Ref. 12].
Most implementations focus these tools at a global level in
that they are located in the Network Command Center. When a trouble ticket is
generated from the NCC, it reflects a problem or symptom generated by the
network management elements and/or the Manager of Managers. Sometimes,
the local technician can not relate to this symptom because he or she does not
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understand where this message came from or why. Without access to the
management element and familiarity with the product, the technician usually
starts problem isolation in a "cloud" looking for the problem [Ref. 13].
When a global problem occurs, in these scenarios, the
information is concentrated and orchestrated by the Network Command Center.
Additionally an outage can black out management of a geographic location when
centralizing the management resources. Figure 4 illustrates how this occurs.
Figure 4. Network Command Center. [Ref. 8]
As far as the Network Management Center is concerned, all
of the devices beyond the point of breakage are down. In fact, without alarm
correlation, all of the devices will be depicted as bad. Even with alarm
correlation, it can only be accomplished on one side of the link. No network




The ideal network management system should be designed and
implemented around the real work processes [Ref. 14]. It should focus the tools
toward those staff members supporting the managed area in a manner which
makes their job easier and faster. Information associated with a problem or
symptom should mean something to the support personnel. If they see the
problem at a glance, they should know which specific area the problem belongs
to and what to do to get started isolating the problem. Other personnel in the
organization should know that a technician is looking into the problem since the
problem may affect other areas.
Help Desk personnel should know what is happening and who is
working on what at a glance. If they are not familiar with the system in question,
they should have adequate information at their fingertips to guide them in what to
do, who to call, and what steps to take, even what questions to ask.
Additionally, lists of the problems that affect other sites should be
available to those personnel at a glance. The information must be at the
fingertips of the other sites' Help Desks so that they know, in near real time, what
is going on.
In summary, the focus of information should be local when it is a
local problem and global when it is a global problem. Figure 5 depicts a more
distributed system providing global information with local focus. In this system,






Figure 5. Distributed System. [Ref. 8]
In the scenario in Figure 5, if a link breaks, local tools and alarms
are still available. Alarms concerning the overall health of other links and
connectivity can be passed to other sites, even around a problem. Using a Serial
Line Interface Protocol (SLIP) or Point-to-Point Protocol [Internet] (PPP), dial up
link between management elements can be used to pass critical data about a link
outage in near real time.
Network management across low speed wide area links does not
really make sense [Ref. 8]. In this case, bandwidth is costly. Usually, there are
the monthly charges for the links. Consider also that bridges or routers
interconnect most WAN links. On the back side of these devices are networks
capable of 10 Mbps, 16 Mbps or even 100 Mbps. On the link side 1.544 Mbps,
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512kbps or even 19.2kbps links may be realized. Actual polling of network
management elements (SNMP) could consume these links, drastically reducing
the operational capabilities of the links. The question to ask is do you want to
increase the bandwidth across these links just for network management or do
you want to distribute the management polling to local area concentrations and
just pass the real alarm information?
In summary, providing global information with local focus is the key
[Ref. 8]. A more distributed system provides this while ensuring the availability of
local tools, alarms and connectivity with other sites should a link fail.
3. Management Functional Domains (MFDs)
a. Introduction
Management Functional Domains are the segmentation of the
Enterprise Network Management System into localized functional domains. The
grouping of functions within specific domains allows alarm messages to be
routed around problems especially when multiple usable paths exist.
Furthermore, automated SLIP or PPP sessions will enable alarm passing through
dial-up lines [Ref. 12].
Not just alarm messages need to be passed to other affected
MFD's. Alarm correlation information and automatic diagnostics are examples of
other information relative to a fault that provide a better picture of what is really
happening on the other end.
By having the ability to validate the alarms around a broken link,
one can quickly and efficiently determine the root cause. CPU utilization
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associated with correlating the alarms is very low compared to the Al inference
engine based alarm correlation. One simply looks for alarms that are common to
both sides.
b. Building Requirements
The following is a list of steps to take to develop a requirement
matrix associated with the management of network components and functions
[Ref. 12].
• Develop a list of information attainable from each managed object.
Describe in detail, each piece of information such as what the data
element is, average versus actual, counter, raw integer or a text
message.
• Take the list to the support organization responsible for that device
function and have them decide what's pertinent to their way of doing
business. Focus on information that will enhance their ability to
accomplish their job.
• Formulate the reporting strategy for the device.
• What elements of information are pertinent to alarm reporting?
Is there a real-time requirement for the reporting?
• Establish thresholds, e.g. three counts in a one hour time
period.
• Establish the priority of the alarm and any thresholds
associated with priority escalation of the alarm.
• Establish any diagnostic processes that could be run
automatically or the Help Desk could perform that would
make their job easier.
• Establish acceptable polling intervals (Every five minutes,
ten minutes, one-hour, etc.)
• What elements of information are pertinent to monthly reporting?
• Availability of devices and services.
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•• Usage and load.
• What elements of information are pertinent to trending and
performance tuning of network components and functions?
• Look at ways to combine data elements or perform
calculations on the data to make it more useful to the
support organization.
Interview Management to ensure the Network Management System is
managing all areas pertinent to the business unit.
• Explain the role and objectives of the Network Management
System.
• Increase productivity throughout the support organizations.
• Reduce the Mean Time to Repair times on the correction of
problems.
• Provide a proactive approach to the detection and isolation
of problems.
• Enable collaboration and the flow of information across
support departments and sites.
• Gather the requirements for the management of any function
important to the business unit.
• Do not limit these functions to only SNMP manageable
devices.
• If the devices associated with a function have no intelligence
whatsoever, go back to management later with a proposal to
upgrade the devices.
Go implement the requirements. Focus each implementation toward
each requirement while integrating the total system.
After implementation of each piece, notify the support organization
associated with the managed object or system that monitoring has
started.
At the first reporting period, go back and revisit the requirements with
each support organization and management.
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• Reestablish requirements if necessary.
• The reports and types of data will change as each support
organization becomes better informed.
During implementation, focus the alarm messages toward the Help
Desk. They are the front line of any MIS organization. Keeping them well
informed of problems is paramount to the successful deployment of the Network
Management System [Ref. 12].
Perform "Dry Runs" of alarms and the diagnostic steps associated
with getting the problem resolved in a quick and efficient manner. Have the
appropriate support organizations participate so that all diagnostic steps can be
identified and included. Train the Help Desk to input troubleshooting procedure
pertinent to their function into the diagnostics table. This can include anything
from a user calling in with an application problem (i.e. MS Word), to filling out
forms for a specific service to be provided to an end user [Ref. 12].
The skills associated with the support organizations in one MFD
may be different from another MFD. The gathering of diagnostic procedures
allows a "sharing of the wealth" of knowledge across the enterprise. The
diagnostics procedures are a knowledge base of information, by symptom, of
problems and taking and what needs to be accomplished to correct the problem.
Having the skills of Desktop Support, Unix System Support, Network Support,
etc., at the fingertips of Help Desk personnel increases their ability to logically
react to problems as their occur [Ref. 12]. Automatic diagnostics are also very
important. This does not necessarily mean the procedure will take a device out
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of service and run tests on the unit or circuit, although this may be acceptable in
some instances. Polling or the gathering of information concerning the device in
question and it's configuration can be run without taking the device off-line.
The Network Management System, as a total integrated system,
must be modular and easy to expand and contract as the needs of the business
change [Ref. 9]. Element Management Systems, whether they are third party
products such as SunNet Manager, HP Openview, Netview, NetMaster, 3M
TOPAZ, Larsecom's Integra-T, or in-house developed pollers, need to be easy to
integrate into the whole system [Ref. 13]. Recognize that in the architecture, no
EMS is really aware of another. Awareness across EMS needs to be
accomplished at a higher layer so that the EMS can focus on their area of
management within their MFD.
Functions such as Alarm Correlation, Diagnostics across EMS, etc., can be
accomplished using artificial intelligence principals within a relational database
[Ref. 9]. Almost all Manager of Manager products employ an Al inference engine
to calculate the probability that one component is so many percent more
probable to break versus another. The inclusion of the Al inference engine
drives up the cost because of the engine AND the hardware required to run these
types of calculations. These types of decisions need to be accomplished through
the support organizations within the MFD because they know the local
environment better than any machine or personnel at another site [Ref. 9]. The
overall application will serve its purpose better if it is more tightly integrated into
the business units.
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The application's of Al still needs to be applied but at a much
different level. Network General Distributed Sniffer Servers are an excellent
application of Al technology. By analyzing the relationships of protocols, traffic,
connections and LAN control mechanisms, the Decision Support System uses Al
to sort out problems at a very low level before these problems become user
identifiable and cause degradation or downtime [Ref. 9].
Additionally, Al can be used to capture the heuristics of network
behavior and help with the diagnostics. The knowledge available from past
alarms and the problems associated with the isolation and correction of the alarm
needs to be incorporated into the overall system.
4. A New Paradigm for Network Management
As increasing numbers of corporations deploy intranets for enterprise-wide
connectivity, major network providers are strategizing new ways to enable MIS
departments to leverage their intranets to manage enterprise networks [Ref. 20].
Called Web-based management (WBM), these strategies allow administrators to
monitor and maintain their networks using the same World Wide Web
functionalities that make intranets such effective communication tools [Ref. 20].
These functionalities permit administrators to use any Web browser on any
network node to quickly and easily configure, control, and access networks and
their individual components. WBM is a revolutionary network management
solution that will transform how users manage their networks [Ref. 20].
This section examines the emergence of WBM and its major benefits, and
explains the two main architectural approaches to WBM. It provides an overview
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of emerging standards for WBM and a brief overview of WBM and the World
Wide Web.
a. The Advent of Web-Based Management
WBM is a result of the growing popularity of intranets [Ref. 21].
Intranets are, in effect, private World Wide Webs. They are increasingly used as
a primary means for sharing information within an organization. Intranet
networks run Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and are isolated from the
external Internet by security firewalls. They are constructed with Web-enabled
servers using protocols related to the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML).
Intranet users communicate with servers using friendly, easy-to-use Web
browsers from any networked platform or location. Connectivity is simple,
inexpensive, and seamless. Secure remote intranet access is typically achieved
today using direct dial-up capabilities, although new techniques such as Point-to-
Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), pioneered by a handful of vendors, are
providing new secure intranet access options via the Internet [Ref. 20].
With intranets in place, administrators are finding other benefits of
Web technologies. Many, for example are rethinking traditional client/server
models in order to further optimize network usage and reduce development,
equipment, and support costs [Ref. 21]. Since Web browsers require only
moderately powered machines with modest disk space, administrators can shift
much of the computing and storage tasks to Web-based servers and allow clients
to rely on simple, inexpensive computing platforms to access them. This "thin
client/fat server" model lowers hardware costs and offers users greater flexibility.
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Web technologies are accelerating rapidly, in no small part because
of the competitive nature of this industry. The battles rage on many fronts.
Netscape and Microsoft, for example, are rapidly introducing new Web browser
and server capabilities in their struggle to dominate the browser, server, and
groupware software markets [Ref. 20]. A host of vendors, including Sun
Microsystems and Oracle, are aggressively promoting the thin client/fat server
model as a means to dislodge Microsoft and Intel from their dominant positions.
Another battle rages to set standards in electronic commerce for Web-traffic
encryption [Ref. 20].
Still another clash for market leadership centers on emerging
"channel" or "Web broadcasting" technologies, with combatants such as Marimba
and BackWeb competing fiercely. In the network management arena, major
players—including IBM/Tivoli, Sun, and Hewlett-Packard—are racing to offer
management platforms enabled with Web technologies [Ref. 21].
b. The Benefits of Web-Based Management
WBM merges Web functionalities with network management to
provide administrators with capabilities beyond traditional tools. Since
administrators using WBM can monitor and control enterprise networks with any
Web browser at any node, they are no longer tied down to management
workstations and can eliminate many interoperability issues that arise with
multiplatform structures [Ref. 21]. WBM provides graphical interfaces that
present information in a more visual and useful fashion than conventional,
command-driven TELNET screens. Browser operation and Web page interfaces
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are known paradigms for today's users of the World Wide Web. As a result, both
reduce the costs of training MIS personnel and enable a wider range of users to
utilize network status information.
In addition, WBM is an ideal means for distributing information
about network operation [Ref. 20]. For instance, by directing their browsers to a
designated intranet Web site, users can access network and service updates,
thereby eliminating calls to enterprise help desks or MIS staff. Moreover, since
WBM requires only the installation of a Web-based server, integrating it into
intranets is a quick and painless task.
c. Two Strategies for Implementation
There are two basic approaches to WBM [Ref. 21]. They are
evolving in parallel and are not mutually exclusive. The first is a proxy solution in
which a Web-based server is added to an intermediate station (the proxy), which
in turn communicates with end devices (Figure 6). A user at a browser
communicates with the proxy using the Web's Hypertext Transmission Protocol
(HTTP), while the proxy communicates with end devices using SNMP. Typically,
vendors develop proxy solutions by adding a Web server to an existing
management product, such as 3Com's Transcend® Enterprise Manager. This










Figure 6. The Proxy Solution for WBM. [Ref. 20]
In the second WBM mode, the embedded approach, a Web server
actually embedded in the end device. Each device has its own Web address,
and an administrator simply visits a device's address with a browser to manage











Figure 7. The Embedded Approach to WBM. [Ref. 20]
The proxy approach preserves all the advantages of today's
traditional workstation-based management systems and products, with the added
benefit of flexible access. Since the proxy communicates with all network
devices, it can provide an enterprise view of a network's physical devices and
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stations as well as its logical entities like virtual LANs. Also, because the proxy-
to-device communication remains SNMP, this solution works with SNMP-only
legacy devices. It does, however, require a workstation to operate.
The embedded server approach, on the other hand, brings
graphical management to individual devices. This promises to be a much
simpler, easier-to-use interface than today's command line or menu-based
TELNET interfaces [Ref. 21]. The Web interface will deliver easier operation
without sacrificing functionality.
In the enterprise networks of tomorrow, it is likely that both proxy-
based and embedded Web server capabilities will be used for management [Ref.
21]. Large organizations will continue to need enterprise-wide monitoring and
management available only with a proxy solution. Also, a proxy solution can
manage the large installed base of native SNMP-only devices. At the same time,
embedded Web servers will benefit enterprise networks because of their greatly
improved interface for setting up and managing new devices.
d. Emerging Standards
Open standards are essential to reducing the complexity and costs
of network management, and two WBM standards are presently under
consideration [Ref. 22]. One is the Web-Based Enterprise Management (WBEM)
standard effort launched in July 1996. WBEM is an initiative driven by Microsoft
with support from more than 60 vendors. The proposed standard is an object-
oriented means to abstract management data which today is gathered from
multiple sources (such as devices, systems, applications) using multiple
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protocols (for example, SNMP, Desktop Mangement Interface (DMI). WBEM can
consolidate the information and management capabilities and expose them
through a single protocol. WBEM is positioned as "embracing and extending"
current standards such as SNMP, DMI, and Common Management Information
Protocol (CMIP), not as a replacement.
WBEM places more emphasis on enterprise management than on
the fact that it is Web based. Although WBEM lends itself to a Web
implementation, its real goal is consolidated management of all network elements
and systems. This includes networking equipment, servers, desktops, and
applications. Key to WBEM is a new protocol, Hypermedia Management
Protocol (HMMP). This transport protocol handles such functions as retries,
packet pacing, and confirmation of delivery, and allows for a message to consist
of a stream of several packets [Ref. 22].
The other proposed WBM standard is Java-Management
Application Programming Interface (JMAPI), championed by Sun as part of its
Java Standard Extension Active Program Interface (JSEAPI) framework. More
than its name implies, JMAPI is a complete network management application
development environment that provides a comprehensive list of features that
developers had previously been forced to use together [Ref. 22]. These include
user interface classes for creating property sheets, tables, and graphs; network
APIs for SNMP; remote procedure call frameworks; database access methods;
and style guides. In theory, JMAPI-compliant applications will interoperate
smoothly using the same look and capabilities all over the Web.
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At present, these particular standards are far from adoption.
WBEM proposals today require significant additional writing and prototype "proof
of concept" work before moving forward. WBEM is looking to the Internet
Engineering Task Force for open standards support, but so far the proposals and
refinement process remain very Microsoft NT-centric [Ref. 22].
Networking vendors have expressed concerns regarding the impact
WBEM and HMMP could have on network performance and the costs of
implementing them for networking devices. JMAPI is less ambitious but also has
holes, such as a lack of specific documentation on how it is to interface with
SNMP. JMAPI so far has been very Sun-specific without being driven as a true
open standard. These concerns must be addressed before one or both are
deployed for networking devices and WBM solutions.
e. Web-Based Management and the World Wide Web
WBM solutions will fall short of their potential if they do not
transparently leverage the Internet and the World Wide Web for information and
product delivery [Ref. 22]. While vendor Web capabilities are generally
considered independent of WBM, the two are complementary and should be
tightly coupled. What better place for a network administrator to access
information on a vendor's Web site than from the vendor's browser-accessed
WBM application?
Network administrators using WBM should have "fingertip" access
to the information they need to run their networks. Such information could
include complete product documentation, release notes, operation tips,
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frequently asked questions, technology tutorials, training materials and
schedules, new product data sheets, and order status. The Web, together with
WBM, is an ideal vehicle for delivering software-based products, including new
application releases under subscription, patch releases, and new agent releases.
When combined with WBM capabilities to survey a network for out-of-release
products, such software distribution can be semi-automatic, greatly simplifying
the administrator's task.
5. Questions to Ask
As a MIS Manager, when staff or vendors concerning Network
Management approach, there are a few key questions to ask [Ref. 17].
a. How Much will the System Cost?
A salesman specifying the system to the MIS Manager dictates a
lot of systems implemented today. Salespersons typically push huge amounts of
hardware and software towards the problems at hand. Some vendors will even
say that cost is not important; it's the capability that counts. Additionally,
because a network management system must be customized to the local
environment, there are a lot of hidden costs beyond the hardware and software.
b. Will the Proposed System Integrate into and Enhance
my Current MIS Support Capabilities?
A lot of MIS Managers may be shortsighted in that they are not
demanding that the overall system be tightly integrated into the business units
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[Ref. 18]. If the system serves no business purpose, technology is being bought
for technology's sake... the system may be doomed to failure.
c. Is the proposed system modular in design?
If everything in a Network Management System is loaded on one
box, there is the potential for inefficient use of computing resources. If the
system contracts, the one box may be under-utilized; if it expands, a bigger one
may be needed... potentially losing money every time [Ref. 18].
d. Is the product proposed just an Element Management
System or is it an Integrator of Element Management Systems?
MIS Managers may be sold a product like HP Openview or IBM
Netview 6000 as a Manager of Managers System. Although, some integration
functions are capable in these systems, their ability to perform real work... like
polling and gathering information is degraded [Ref. 18].
e. What does the system monitor?
Match the capabilities of the proposed Network Management
System to the key l/T services provided. If it is not a good match now, it won't be
later.
f. Does the proposed system enhance the capabilities of
the current support staff or does it add more support staff?
Some systems will do nothing to enhance current support staff
capabilities and add five or ten more personnel to the staff and add to the budget.
Not to mention, these people are usually highly skilled specialists in Network
Management... which don't come cheap.
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The total picture of the entire enterprise should be looked at. Match
what is proposed to what's currently operational. Ask the same questions for
each site.
6. Conclusion
There are a lot of excellent products available today that provide
capabilities to manage not just hardware, but services and applications. The
ways these systems are implemented are also critical. Each management
capability installed must match a business need for such a system. Additionally,
these diverse systems must be integrated together and into the support
organizations to achieve maximum effectiveness [Ref. 18].
B. POLICY-BASED MANAGEMENT
This section will explore the basics of Policy-Based Management in
function and form. The reader should gain an appreciation for where this
management technique fits in to his or her network.
Management involves monitoring the activity of a system, making
management decisions and performing control actions to modify the behavior of
the system. Management policy guides the decision making process. Policy is
information, which influences the behavior of the components in the managed
system [Ref. 17]. The size and complexity of large networks and distributed
systems have resulted in a trend towards automating many aspects of
management into distributed components. If policies are coded into manager
components they become inflexible and cannot be reused in different
environments. There is thus a need to be able to specify, represent and
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manipulate management policies without building them into managers or
manager agents. This permits manager objects to be reused in different
environments and to be provided with the specific policies for each and enables
dynamic changing of management policies for a system without changing the
managers. [Ref. 17]
1. Definition of a Network Policy
A policy is a statement of a definite course of action, and defines the roles,
obligations, and rights of constituents; for example, Policy 1 states a course of
action:
Policy 1. Medical Records Shall Be Maintained Indefinitely
This policy asserts an obligation but does not assign this obligation to a
particular role; nor does it assign a specific right for carrying out the obligation.
Policies are intended to influence the actions of an enterprise's constituents [Ref.
17].
Different types of policies exist. For example, Black's Law Dictionary [Ref.
17] defines public policy as follows:
Public policy. That principle of law, which holds that no subject,
can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good. The principles under which the
freedom of contract or private dealings is restricted by law for the
good of the community. The term "policy, " as applied to a statute,
regulation, rule of law, course of action, or the like, refers to its
probable effect, tendency, or object, considered with reference to
the social or political well-being of the state.
In addition to classifying policies according to the type of enterprise that
promulgated them or the type of constituents they apply to, the subject matter of
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policies can also serve as a basis for differentiating between policies. For
instance, policies that treat the protection of information from unauthorized
access are generally termed security policies. According to Pfleeger [Ref. 17],
A [security] policy statement should specify the organization's goals
regarding security (for example, protect data from leakage to
outsiders, protect against loss of data due to physical disaster,
protect the integrity of data); where the responsibility for security
lies (for example, with a small computer security group, with each
employee, with relevant managers); and the organization's
commitment to security (for example, dollar expenditures,
personnel assigned to task).
This definition is congruent with that given for security policy in the
Dictionary of Computing [Ref. 17]. Policies specify the roles, obligations, and
rights of both animate and inanimate objects. Policies form a natural hierarchy;
for instance, the preceding policy could be decomposed into the following policy:
Policy 2. System administrators are responsible for assuring the
resiliency of database transactions against system and media failures.
In contrast to Policy 1, Policy 2 assigns the obligation to a specific role; in
other words, when a constituent assumes the role of system administrator, the
constituent incurs an obligation to assure the "... resiliency of database
transactions against system and media failures." Policy 2 could be further
decomposed into Policy 3.
Policy 3. Database administrators of medical record databases shall
implement logging and checkpointing procedures to protect against the
loss of database transactions due to system or media failures.
Policy 3 differs from Policy 2 in that the policy scope is explicitly stated;
that is, the policy applies only to a subclass of the class of database
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administrators: those that administer medical record databases. Policy scope
refers to the range of roles, obligations, and rights that a policy covers. Policy
domain, on the other hand, defines the animate and inanimate objects in the
environment that are constituents of an enterprise. For instance, if Policy 3 is
that of a hospital, then animate (e.g., members of the hospital's data processing
staff) and inanimate (e.g., computer processes executing logging and
checkpointing instructions) objects that perform the role of database
administrator at the hospital are ipso facto constituents of the hospital.
Moreover, policies are embedded in information systems as procedures.
Procedures implement policies and take the form of artifacts. An information
system artifact is a representation of a policy as a procedure, for example, a
requirement, design, or system prototype. Thus Policy 4 could be translated into
the procedure shown in Figure 8.
Policy 4. A "continuous" archive of all logging and check-pointing
operations shall be maintained.
Procedures consist of "... rules and the ways to make exceptions to [rules]
...". Policies are often articulated as natural language statements. These tend to
be vague; for instance, the meaning of the term "logging" in Policy 4 can be
overloaded (i.e., have more that one meaning). The procedure in Figure 8, in
contrast to Policy 4, is a more precise statement of what is meant by logging and
check-pointing operations, and implements the policy as a set of rules. The
procedure could in turn be decomposed into lower level procedures; for example,
translated into machine-executable instructions embedded in an automated
information system. Procedures thus form a hierarchy.
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jf a block, B, of the log, L, is written to secondary memory,
then write B to the archive, A.
else
if the value of the item in B has been written at least once in L since the last
checkpoint,
then write Bio A.
else
if B was in main storage at the time the current checkpoint operation
started,
then write B to A.
Figure 8. A Procedure for Continuous Archival of Logging and Check-
Pointing Data. [Ref. 17]
Similarly, the volition of an animate object to perform an action can be
embedded in an inanimate object as a procedure; for example, a computer-
based multi-level secure database management system is "unwilling" to permit a
subject (i.e., user or the computer process acting as a proxy for the user) to
access classified information in a database unless the subject has been granted
proper access rights to this data and has entered the correct password. This is a
security policy of an enterprise represented in a computer program.
Unfortunately, a programmer can create policy while coding a system. For
instance, a programmer can implement logic that locks a user out of a system if
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the user has failed to correctly enter a recognized password after four attempts;
however there may be a corporate policy that limits this to three times.
A policy differs from a requirement in that the latter is a high-level
procedure, which specifies how policies are to be implemented as procedures.
For example, the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [Ref.
17] consists of security requirements for implementing trusted information
systems. The TCSEC requires among other things that trusted systems, certified
at the B1 (or higher) level, enforce mandatory access control (MAC) policies; that
is, there is a security requirement that MAC policies be embedded as procedures
in a B1 (or higher) trusted system. The security requirements in the TCSEC
were derived from national security policies, which are a specialization of public
policy.
In summary, policies are composed and embedded in information systems
as procedures, conflicts can exist between composed policies, and policy
inconsistencies can become embedded in procedures.
Policy-based network management in the form of prioritization can control
which network users have access to network bandwidth according to
predetermined corporate policies and the amount of bandwidth provided to the
user or workgroup based on their location, the application(s) they are using, their
position, or other parameters; thereby controlling network performance in
addition to network access [Ref. 17]. This type of mechanism can prevent or
reduce congestion on a network running at near capacity levels. Today,
enterprise networks provide the foundation for business. The advent of
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networked business applications such as intranets, extranets, and electronic
commerce over the Internet has created a boom in productivity and fostered
unprecedented global commerce opportunities.
However, as more business applications are deployed over the network,
which is clearly the industry-wide trend, the business becomes dependent on an
intelligent network. As a result, enterprise network managers require the
capability to control the use of the network and to allocate and prioritize network
resources for different applications and user groups. This thesis will explore and
categorize several network policies.
2. The Need for Policy Networking
Network managers need policy control over bandwidth-hungry
applications, which consume bandwidth at the expense of performance and drive
up the cost of expensive wide-area resources [Ref. 16]. Misbehaved applications
can potentially shutdown the business. Additionally, there is an increasing need
to manage security policies, the mis-managament of which can have devastating
consequences.
The need for policy networking (see Figure 9), is being driven top-down by
business requirements dictated by market and competitive forces [Ref. 16]. The
network manager needs to be able to map these business requirements into
specific policies that link the business needs with the desired network behavior.
For example, if an organization is running an Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) application (e.g. SAP R/3, Oracle Financials, Baan, Peoplesoft), for
strategic competitive advantage, a policy can be established that gives ERP
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traffic priority to network resources. The business policy is automatically
translated into network behavior, such as Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms,
to prioritize ERP traffic ahead of other traffic.
The intelligent network provides a rich set of QoS and security
mechanisms to enable business applications. However, utilizing these features
can be a complex exercise for network managers. There is a real need to
provide dynamic and automatic configuration of features in the intelligent
network. Network devices must be dynamically tuned to support increased user
mobility and new classes of applications such as Internet webcasting and
multimedia applications that support data, voice, and video simultaneously [Ref.
16].
Policy-based networking capabilities will be the single most
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Figure 9. Policy-Based Network Management Growth Policy Networking
Building Blocks. [Ref. 12]
Policy Networking enables business users and applications to use the
intelligence that is embedded in a network. Simply put, Policy Networking makes
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it easier for a network manager to take advantage of distributed network
intelligence features.
The Policy Networking architecture is based upon four building blocks:
• Intelligent Network
Intelligent network devices—that is, routers, switches, and access servers-
-enable and enforce policy services in the network.
• Policy Services
Policy services translate business requirements into network
configurations and activate policies for quality-of-service (QoS), security, and
other network services.
• Registration and Directory Services
Registration and Directory services provide the dynamic binding between
addresses, application profiles, user names, and other information data stores.
• Policy Administration
Policy administration provides the capability to centrally configure rule-
based policies that control services within the network infrastructure.
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III. MANAGING QUALITY OF SERVICE
A. INTRODUCTION
Now that a background in management, network management and
network policy basics has been discussed, the relatively new topic of network
Quality of Service (QoS) will be explored. It should be a goal of the network
manager to select a network policy or policies that will guarantee high QoS [Ref.
18]. This chapter provides an overview of a QoS architectural framework that
explains how QoS applies in the network, and it provides details on technologies
that typical QoS software provides in each piece of the architecture. The chapter
concludes with some examples of how these pieces work together to provide
QoS services that help realize the most from scarce network resources.
Definitions of some QoS common terms are provided in the glossary.
QoS is an important aspect of the over all network management scheme.
Networking users in general span three major market segments: major
enterprises, network service providers, and the small and medium-sized
business segment [Ref. 19]. Each segment has its own QoS requirements, but
they also have many overlapping needs.
Network managers in today's enterprise networks must contend with
numerous and diverse system platforms, network architectures, and protocols
[Ref. 19]. Providing end-to-end QoS solutions across the various platforms often
requires more than just linking them together; it also requires a different
approach for each technology. Enterprises are increasingly depending on their
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networks to carry complex mission-critical applications and databases such as
SAP, PeopleSoft, and Oracle. These networks are also experiencing increased
traffic from Web and multimedia applications [Ref. 19]. QoS prioritizes this traffic
to ensure that mission-critical applications get the service they require, while
simultaneously servicing these newer multimedia applications.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) require assured scalability and
performance [Ref. 18]. The ISP marketplace is also highly competitive and
characterized by phenomenal growth. ISPs, who have traditionally offered best-
effort IP connectivity, are now planning networks to transport voice, video, and
other real-time, critical application data. ISPs need a model that will allow them
to offer differentiated services to their customers, yet allow them to remain
profitable. QoS provides the basis for a new business model by allowing ISPs to
differentiate traffic from various customers or applications [Ref. 19].
In the small and medium-sized business segment, managers are
experiencing first hand the rapid growth of business on the Internet. Not so long
ago, the "global networked business" was just a concept. Every day we witness
more and more businesses participating in the reality. Besides the increased
demands of Internet traffic, small and medium-sized business networks must
also handle increasingly complex business applications. QoS policies let the
network handle the difficult task of utilizing an expensive wide-area network
connection in the most efficient way for business applications.
Over the last 10-20 years, as global competition has increased, managers
have increasingly sought ways to improve their organizations' competitiveness
60
[Ref. 19]. Often, as a new idea appeared, it was adopted rapidly, and some
would say unquestioningly. All too often, these new ideas have ended up merely
being short-lived fads that have produced few tangible benefits. Many of these
ideas have been held up to ridicule in the popular cartoon, "Dilbert."
Managers of Information Technology organizations (IT) have proven to be
susceptible to this same phenomenon. The frequent misuse of popular
technology has been rampant [Ref. 19]. Currently, as suggested in the
Introduction to this thesis, there appears to be the beginning of a groundswell of
interest among IT managers in quality of service management (or service level
management) [Ref. 19]. The question must be asked. "Is quality of service
management another management fad, or is it a legitimate business focus?"
Many cynics would be quick to say it is a fad. However, a review of today's
situation quickly refutes such skepticism.
Traditionally, IT managers have measured the effectiveness of their
organization by looking at the various hardware and software components for
which they are responsible [Ref. 19]. The units of measure that were applied
have been varied. The most common have been such things as availability,
utilization, performance, etc. This has given IT a fragmented, misleading
perspective of its effectiveness. It is a perspective that is distorted and
misleading [Ref. 19]. It has led IT managers to believe that they have been doing
an excellent job at meeting the needs of their clients for IT services.
In recent years, while IT managers have been congratulating each other
on the ever-improving quality of service that they have been providing, their
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clients have had a radically different perspective [Ref. 21]. They have been
complaining about the inadequacy of the service and the unresponsiveness of
the IT organization to client requirements. In recent years clients of the IT
organization have become more and more dependent upon the services
provided by IT [Ref. 1 9]. The very existence of many businesses depends upon
the delivery of those services. In addition, their clients (users) have become
more technically sophisticated. This has given them a better understanding of
what they can reasonably expect IT to deliver. Together, these factors have led
IT's clients to demand a much higher quality of service from IT. In some cases, it
has also led the users to stage a coup, toppling the IT organization from its
pedestal and replacing it with an out-sourcer's organization. The clients of IT
hold the corporate power and control the corporate purse. One way or another,
they are determined to receive the level of IT services that they require [Ref. 21].
Today's interest in managing the IT organization in terms of the quality of
service it delivers has come to the forefront due to the convergence of two major
factors: Supply and Demand. The confidence of IT managers has been shaken
by the complaints of disgruntled clients and also by continuing reports of
outsourcing deals [Ref. 19]. IT, and their clients, has a need to accurately
measure and report on the quality of the service being delivered by IT. This is
the demand side of the equation. True end-to-end service level measurement
has only recently become practical. There are now tools emerging to support the
measurement of the quality of the service being delivered by IT.
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It must be remembered that not only is IT a service provider, it is also a
major consumer of services. If those providing services to IT do not deliver a
consistent level of service, IT will not be able to be consistent in the quality of
services that it delivers to its clients. Those providing services to IT include
groups internal to the company (e.g. data base administrators, application
developers, etc.) as well as some external groups (e.g., telephone company).
However, it must be realized that managing the quality of service delivered is not
limited just to IT organizations [Ref. 18]. Certainly, for most organizations the IT
function is a critical service provider, but there are many others. For example,
the telephone company that provides voice and data links to other companies, is
a major service provider. It is only reasonable to demand a guarantee of the
quality of service being provided.
Is the current desire to establish effective measurement and reporting of
the quality service being delivered a fad? Absolutely not! As will be seen in this
chapter, quality of service management (service level management) is absolutely
essential as a survival strategy for the IT organization.
B. DIVERGENT VIEWS
What has gone wrong? Why have the views of IT and their clients about
the quality of service being provided by IT become so divergent? The bottom
line answer is that the two groups do not have a common understanding of what
is an adequate level of service or even about what the key indicators are of the
level of service being provided [Ref. 19].
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Until now, most IT organizations have not been measuring the quality of
the service being delivered to their clients. Instead of measuring the quality of
the service being delivered, IT has been measuring various attributes of the
hardware and software used to deliver the service to its clients [Ref. 16].
Certainly this data is valuable for evaluating the performance of the IT employees
or planning for adequate equipment capacity in the future. Technical metrics are
also essential in assessing the quality of the service being delivered by the
external network service providers (i.e. telephone companies). However, this
technical data is not indicative of the level of service being delivered by IT to its
clients.
There have been several flaws in the traditional strategy employed by IT
[Ref. 19]. First, it has not been possible to capture equivalent information for
every component. That is, in examining the end-to-end quality of service being
delivered, there are numerous components that impact that service. There are
various sources of information about those components and about some portion
of the service being delivered. These different data sources do not capture the
same types of information, nor is their data capture synchronized. The result is
that the data available has been fragmented, scattered and disjointed.
Second, for some components, only limited data has been available [Ref.
19]. In some cases, no data relevant to quality of service has been available.
The third flaw has been the type of information captured. Certainly, Central
Processing Unit (CPU) uptime, dropped packets, network congestion, etc. will
each impact the quality of the service that is delivered. However, these factors
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can only indirectly suggest something about the quality of service being
delivered. Finally, IT has been struggling under the assumption that the whole
(of quality of service management) is equal to the sum of all of the parts. In
mathematics, this assumption is valid. In the management of IT services, it is
totally false [Ref. 19]. Consider a simple example in which a typical transaction







Local Server 99.95% 0.54
Building Hub 99.96% 0.43
Intranet router 99.99% 11.88
Remote Host 99.99% 1.08
Order Entry applic. 99.91% 9.72
Customer data base 99.92% 8.64
Inventory data base 99.96% 4.32
Average/Total 99.66% 36.94
Table 1. Availability. [Ref. 19]
Let's assume that the user group performing order entry demands 99.90%
availability for the order entry "function." (Note the term function is being used to
indicate the desired activity, such as entering a new order.) Looking at the table
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above, most IT organizations will congratulate themselves on having met the
client's requirements in all but one of the categories, and even that was very
close to the objective. However, this is probably not correct. Unless there was
the coincidence of all of the problems occurring at the same time, then the total
time that the function was unavailable to the order entry department was much
greater than the acceptable level. If the outages each occurred at a different
time, then the total amount of time that the function will unavailable to the client
was an average of 37 minutes. Also, the availability can be calculated by
multiplying together the availability of each of the components. The result is
99.66% - far less than the target of 99.99%. In truth, there may be some overlap
between the various events. This could reduce the total amount of time that the
function was not available to the order entry clerks. However, overlaps could not
conceivably reduce the minutes of outage to the target level.
From the perspective of the end user of the IT services, the availability of
individual components simply does not reflect the quality of the service being
provided [Ref. 19]. The only merit of this particular metric is it does reflect a
concept the clients can relate to, even if it is from a different perspective. If data
for individual components is all that is available, what is needed is a more
sophisticated correlation and analysis of the data to translate it into meaningful
information.
In terms of managing the quality of service to client organizations (end
users), there is absolutely no value in reporting such arcane data points as
packets dropped, network latency, repair interval for network outages, etc. With
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a few rare exceptions, the clients simply do not understand their significance
[Ref. 19]. Even if understood, these pieces of data are not measurements of the
quality of the service being provided by the IT organization. It is true that such
information may be valuable measurements for internal IT assessments. In fact,
some groups develop what are termed "Technical Service Level Agreements."
These are basically agreements that are used to look at how well the groups
within IT are fulfilling their responsibilities.
We have established that technical measurements are valuable for special
purpose assessments of quality, but in their raw form do not reflect the quality of
service that is being received by end users. However, if device availability, as
well as other detailed statistics, are not valid indicators of the quality of service
being delivered to end users, what is? Before this question can be answered it is
necessary to deal with the even more fundamental issue of defining what is
meant by the term "quality of service."
C. DEFINING QUALITY OF SERVICE
First, it is necessary to assume the perspective of the client - the
consumer of the service. The client's perspective is the only perspective that
matters in this definition [Ref. 12]. This is true regardless of the industry. It is as
valid in the fast food business as it is in the world of IT. The client is the one
utilizing the service. The client's perception of the quality of the service being
delivered will determine whether or not they are satisfied with that service and
whether or not they will want to continue to work with that service provider.
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There may be a temptation to consider the adoption of a client's
perspective to be biased and possibly even one-sided. However, IT managers
must remember that they are both providers and consumers of services [Ref. 12].
They are the clients when dealing with service providers such as the local
telephone company. They are also consumers of services from their own
organization. The IT department uses the services of various groups within IT to
provide the total package of services that they offer to a client. For example, a
typical IT department will have a group responsible for operating the corporate
Intranet. Another group may be charged with the operation of the central host
computers. Yet the IT department, or the CIO, ultimately uses these services
together to provide an end-to-end service package for other departments in the
business. In this mode, the IT department is a client for IT services [Ref. 12].
From the client perspective the quality of IT services can be thought of in
fairly simple terms. The most important point to remember is that the client is
concerned with business functionality. That is, they need to be able to use the IT
service to perform a business function. They see the ability to enter customer
orders as an IT service, not as a collection of independent services. They are
not concerned with how the service is provided, or what components make the
service possible [Ref. 12].
The concerns of the client can be classified into four broad categories







Availability focuses upon the question whether the services are available
to the client when the client wishes to use them. There is not a magic number of
days or hours that provides the right answer for this category. Rather, the
objective is to define in advance when the services will be required and meet that
requirement. There is the most obvious meaning for this facet of quality of
service - scheduled hours of operation. Even in this sense, it is important to note
that it means actually being able to successfully perform the desired function. All
of the required components must be available. Having the family car ready for
your spouse to use for a trip to the local mall is an example of this. It is highly
unlikely that your spouse will consider the car available for the trip when
everything is in perfect running order, but one tire is flat.
There are also less obvious aspects of availability [Ref. 12]. Consider the
case in which a company has a system that allows sales representatives to dial
in using their laptop computer to check product availability while they are at a
customer's office. In such a case, if a modem port is not available when a sales
representative attempts to call, then for that sales representative the service is
not available.
2. Performance
Words can hold vastly different meanings for different people. This is
certainly true of the word performance. For IT personnel performance will
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suggest such things as packets per second. However, for the client, the meaning
is simpler - do the IT services function at an acceptable speed? The question of
speed may be the question of response time in an on-line transaction system. In
another case it might be the time that it takes to move a copy of a file from one
office to another, or the time required to load an application to a desktop system
from a server.
3. Accuracy
The third part of the user perspective of service is accuracy [Ref. 12]. This
component is concerned with the question of whether or not the service performs
accurately. An example of this is the question of whether or not e-mail is
delivered to the correct recipient. Similarly, in the case of applying transactions
to a database, it is essential that the change be applied to the proper version of
the database. If services do not accurately perform their functions, high
availability and high performance are worthless.
4. Affordability
While availability, performance and accuracy, are strictly related to the
quality of service, the cost of the service cannot be ignored [Ref. 34]. There is a
saying in application development, "Fast, cheap, good - two out of three can be
obtained." This expression is true when it comes to delivering any service.
There is always a tradeoff between cost of the service and the quality of the
finished product, as well as the timeliness of the delivery. It may be possible for
a service provider to raise the quality of the service that it is providing
dramatically. However, the cost of such an improvement might be so great, that
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it, if implemented, that it would cause the bankruptcy of the corporation.
Therefore, while cost is not directly part of the quality of the service being
delivered, it is a limiting factor, and cannot be ignored. Having loosely defined
quality of service, the question of how to approach the management of that
service and the level of the service that is provided will be discussed. The
question of which specific indicators or measurements are appropriate to use will
be deferred until later in this thesis. First we must look at how they will be used.
D. APPROACHING THE QOS PROBLEM
Managing the level of service that is provided is a little bit like the physics
problem of creating a vacuum [Ref. 12]. Assume that a vacuum pump is
attached to a sealed chamber and in a cycle lasting one hour, the pump is able to
remove 50% of the air in the chamber. It is almost certain will never get to a total
vacuum (that is, no air molecules left in the chamber), at least not in a
reasonable amount of time. Likewise, service providers and their clients must
accept the fact that they will never achieve perfect service, at least not at a cost
that any business can afford. Perfect service, that is always available with
excellent performance and 100% accuracy, is simply not possible [Ref. 12].
If perfect service is not possible, then it is necessary to determine what
level of imperfection is acceptable. This determination is not something that can
be done by the service provider alone, nor is it possible for the client to do this
task. The service provider does not have adequate information about the value
of the service to the client organization. The clients do understand their own
need for the service and its value to the organization. However, the client does
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not have a good understanding of the issues facing the service provider. The
client may have enough technical expertise to realize that it is possible to
substantially increase availability, but they will probably not know the financial
and other implications of doing so.
The answer for determining the appropriate service level lies in
approaching the problem as a partnership between the service provider and the
client organization [Ref. 12]. (It must be remembered that although IT is most
often thought of as the service provider, they are also major clients for many
external organizations.) The ideal is for the two groups to come together to work
out what could be best for the company, in a "win-win" approach to the problem.
Unfortunately, not all groups or individuals are willing or able to take such
an approach. Some insist upon a win-lose approach to these discussions.
Others come to the discussions with absolutely no ability or willingness to make
concessions or adjustments of any kind. This latter case is best seen when a IT
manager attempts to negotiate a service level agreement with the local telephone
company. The IT manager might as well try to negotiate with the government's
tax collectors. Even if one party is not a willing participant, it is important that the
dialog takes place.
When discussions take place, everyone should be prepared to share as
much factual information as possible about the costs and impacts of various
service levels [Ref. 12]. This information can then make it possible to drive
decisions based upon business impacts, rather than merely emotions.
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What is the expected result from the dialogue regarding the quality of the
service to be provided? Very simply, the dialogue should produce an
understanding of what is desirable, possible and acceptable to all parties.
It must be remembered that when IT provides a service to a client or uses
the services of an outside provider, it is still entering into a business relationship.
It is easier for most people to recognize the existence of a formal business
relationship when dealing with an external supplier. However, the business
relationship is just as real when it is between two internal entities (i.e., IT and a
client group) [Ref. 12].
Whenever a business relationship is established, expectations are set. In
the case of internal IT services, the client expects that service will be delivered at
an acceptable level of quality. IT funding may not directly depend upon the level
of quality of the services that it provides. However, IT certainly has the right to
expect that if it delivers the services requested at an agreed upon level of quality,
the client will be satisfied with those services.
E. SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS
What has been discussed in this chapter is a service level agreement
(SLA). The term was discussed briefly in chapter one however has been avoided
so far in this chapter because so many managers (both client and service
provider) have had unfavorable experiences with them in the past and are
reticent about considering them as viable options today [Ref. 15]. This raises two
questions. First, why have SLAs been so notoriously unsuccessful in the past?
Second, why should managers be willing to use them at this time?
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1 . Problems of the Past
In the past there have been numerous shortcomings in the process of
creating and implementing SLAs [Ref. 15]. These shortcomings have, in many
cases, led to the ineffectiveness of the SLA process and its subsequent
abandonment. The shortcomings of the past can be divided into two very broad
categories. The first encompasses those errors described earlier in this section.
Clients and service providers have approached the process of developing an
SLA as a contest - a test of the power of their respective organizations; the
indicators chosen have not been meaningful, etc. Managers today are still
susceptible to those problems. However, these are problems that have been
identified. If two groups will agree to approach the SLA creation process using
the guidelines in this document, the problems in this category can be minimized
or avoided entirely [Ref. 15].
The second problem that dogged SLAs in the past was the lack of
effective measurement tools [Ref. 15]. Much of the data available was either
piecemeal or created manually. If the data was piecemeal, then its relevance to
the SLA was usually marginal, or it forced the SLA to be written to accommodate
what could be measured, even if it was not particularly meaningful. Data that
was created manually was subject to another problem. Often it was not reliable
due to human error, or due to deliberate manipulation of the input or the output
(i.e. reports) to achieve the desired result. In some cases, individuals have been
known to falsify reports. In recent years there has been a tremendous
proliferation of hardware and software products (tools) for the monitoring and
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control of networks and systems [Ref. 15]. These management tools have vastly
increased the amount and the quality of the data available for use in SLAs.
Furthermore, these advances in tool technology and product availability have
also led to an increase in the reliability of the data that is generated. Finally,
even when tools have been available to provide the means to capture the data
required, they have provided a very narrow time perspective. That is, the tools
do not generally serve as an archive of data. This has made it even more difficult
to generate reports covering an appropriate span of time [Ref. 15].
2. Value of SLAs
The service level agreement can be a powerful tool for both service
providers and their clients. As was noted previously in this chapter, the clients
and the service providers have significantly different perspectives regarding the
services being provided. It is, in fact, accurate to characterize these two
communities as speaking different languages. These are languages that are not
understood by the other group. This leads to frustration on the part of both
groups. There are the repeated complaints such as "They don't understand."
Or, "They just don't listen." The service level agreement offers a way to bridge
this communications gap. By creating a document through process of
negotiation, it should contain objectives that are realistic and, also, service level
indicators that are meaningful. Furthermore, the ongoing process of
administering the SLA requires regular meetings and dialog between the service
provider and client organizations. These meetings foster improved
communications. Over time, the increased amount of communication will help
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elevate the quality of the communications that take place. Another interesting
result of this process can be increased trust, as the two groups interact more
frequently and communicate more successfully.
SLAs offer a particular advantage for service providers [Ref. 15]. They
offer a tool that the service provider can use to manage client expectations. It
forces the client to think about what it means to have good service, and how
much they are willing to pay for it. Once documented, the SLA also insulates the
service provider against the gradual escalation of client expectations that can
occur in the case of undocumented service level commitments.
F. QOS SOLUTION
What characteristics does a robust QoS solution have? Consider the
following [Ref. 16]:
• End to End Policy Enforcement—QoS is not something that can be
applied in a single standalone appliance, hooked up to the network,
and left in hopes that all the traffic behaves in an orderly manner.
QoS must be applied end-to-end. Consequently, it must be
platform, device, and media independent, operating at Layer 3 and
above to ensure end-to-end functionality across multiple network
devices (such as routers, switches, firewalls, access servers, and
gateways) and link layers (for example, ATM, Frame Relay, or
Ethernet). Cisco IOS software and technologies in Cisco devices
share a related set of QoS tools or mechanisms that interoperate to
enforce QoS from the network core to the very edges (See Figure
17).
• Multiple Parameters-Policies are based on how people use the
network. Devices must have the flexibility to apply and enforce
QoS based on several parameters that can closely reflect network
managers defined policy. These parameters distinguish traffic
flows based on IP or MAC address, application, user, time of day or
location within the network. Administrators define policies using a
combination of these parameters. For instance, a simple policy
might read, "No Webcast traffic allowed across a certain 56K link
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to Branch Office A." A more sophisticated policy might read, "Allow
video conference traffic within a defined LAN segment on Mondays
between 3 and 5 p.m. for users A, B, C, and D only. At all other
times and for all other users, disallow video conference." Devices
must have the intelligence to recognize applications and apply QoS
in order to achieve business-driven policies. These devices include
Layer 3-capable devices such as routers (for example, any Cisco
router), Layer 2/3 devices such as routing- enabled switches (for
example, the Catalyst 5500, 8500 switches).
Figure 17. QoS Architecture. [Ref. 18]
Classification--By definition, administrators need the ability to set
different QoS levels for traffic as defined by the policy. In general,
there are two types of QoS that assist in prioritizing traffic flows.
They are as follows:
Guaranteed Services reserve bandwidth for specific applications
and/or users.
Differentiated Services define a class of service for specific
applications and/or users, e.g., high, medium, or low, where low
could imply best effort, where there are no QoS controls; traffic is
sent, as bandwidth becomes available.
Centralized Control-Many software developers champion the
ability of an application to signal QoS priority across the network.
This assumes a "trusted" QoS implementation. With trusted QoS
77
controls, users are responsible for conforming to company QoS
policy when they launch certain applications. The trusted QoS
model may take control away from the network manager. The
model may end up in the hands of people or applications that either
may not have a full perspective about how the network must
operate, or who do not understand or support the established
business priorities that determine QoS policy [Ref. 10]. A further
concern is whether to trust an end system to signal end-to-end
QoS, which could include a WAN component. A possible alternate,
"untrusted" approach is to centralize QoS implementation,
removing the need for end-systems to police themselves and letting
network managers set up and enforce the policy within the "trusted"
network [Ref. 11]. Some networks may use a combination of
trusted and untrusted QoS controls. As demonstrated in this
chapter, network based policy enforcement more often results in a
consistent policy deployment and enforcement. In this way,
network managers can control network traffic and deliver mission-
critical applications across the enterprise while still enabling traffic
delivery for other applications.
• Sophisticated QoS Tools-Because there are so many different
network elements and so many parameters required to successfully
deploy and implement a QoS policy end to end, the associated sets
of QoS tools are necessarily complex. They must be fully featured
to enable network managers to build the intelligent networks they
need.
G. INTERNET PROTOCOL QOS MECHANISMS
According to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), there are two
models for providing QoS [Ref. 13].
• Integrated Services (int-serv): The int-serv model is based on
reservations-based traffic engineering assumptions. It reserves
resources explicitly using a dynamic signalling protocol and
employs admission control, packet classification, and intelligent
scheduling to achieve the desired QoS.
• Differentiated Services (diff-serv): The diff-serv model is based
on reservation-less traffic engineering assumptions. It classifies
packets into a small number of service types and uses priority
mechanisms to provide adequate QoS to the traffic. No explicit
resource reservation or admission control is employed, although
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network nodes do have to use intelligent queueing mechanisms to
differentiate traffic.
1. Integrated Services Model
The following are the key characteristics of the int-serv model [Ref. 13].
(a) Flows
A flow is a stream of packets that originate from the same user
activity e.g. a single application session. A flow may be identified by a variety of
mechanisms; for example, IPv6 uses source address and flow label, and IPv4
uses source and destination address and destination port.
(b) Service Categories
int-serv defines the different service categories that are available,
based on the delay and loss requirements, specifically:
• Guaranteed Delay: provides absolute guarantees on the delay
and loss experienced by a flow (intended for non-adaptive real-time
applications). Packets that conform to the reservation will not be
lost, nor will they experience a delay exceeding the specified
bound. Firm guarantees require a high level of resource
reservation and may also result in worst-case guarantees that are
significantly worse than the average case.
• Controlled Load: provides service equivalent to that of an
unloaded network (intended for adaptive applications that perform
well under lightly loaded network conditions). Most packets will not
be lost, nor will they experience any queueing delay. No specific
quantitative guarantees are provided.
(c) Traffic Specification
A flow's traffic is characterized by a TSpec (traffic specification).
The TSpec contains the following:
• A Token-bucket specification: A token rate [r] and a token bucket
size [b]. These indicate the parameters for a token filter that can
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be used to police the flow. Roughly, they are equivalent to the
average data rate and maximum burst size for the flow.
• A Peak data rate [p]: An informational value that can be used to
provide additional information for policing the flow and for providing
appropriate bandwidth. However, its value may be set to the link
rate or positive infinity, if no better value is known. A Minimum
policed unit [m]: Used to allocate resources in the nodes as well as
to compute the link overhead (by taking the ratio of link header to
m).
• A Maximum packet size [M]: The largest packet that the
application will send on this flow. This value should be no greater
than the path MTU, since packets for flows with reserved resources
are not fragmented within the network.
(d) Requested Service Specification
A guaranteed-delay flow can be further specified with an RSpec
(requested service specification) to request a particular level of service. The
RSpec contains the following:
• Requested rate [R]: Specifies the desired rate at which traffic is to
be sent for the flow. It must be greater than r.
• Slack term [s]: Specifies the difference between the desired delay
and the delay obtained by sending at rate R. It allows the network
to adjust the allocated rate to meet the delay requirement (e.g., if it
decreases the reserved rate, the queueing delay will increase,
which reduces the available delay slack).
(e) Path Characterization
To interpret what QoS is available along a particular path, the
resource reservation mechanism also advertises some path characteristics.
These include:
• int-serv capability: Indicates whether there are any non-int-serv
capable nodes along the path.
• Number of int-serv hops: Indicates the number of int-serv
capable nodes along the path.
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• Available path bandwidth: Indicates the minimum path
bandwidth (not that for a particular flow).
• Minimum path latency: Indicates minimum delay for a packet,
comprising propagation and processing delay, but not queueing
delay.
• Path MTU: Indicates the maximum transmission unit along the
path.
• Delay parameters: Indicates the cumulative delay along the path
for a particular flow, comprising a rate-dependent term [c] and a
rate-independent term [d].
(f) Resource Reservations
Resources must be reserved for flows in order to provide the
requested QoS. This can be done via a dynamic reservation protocol, via
manual configuration, or via a network management protocol. Int-serv is not tied
to a specific mechanism and is deliberately defined to be independent of the
actual mechanism used. It does, however, specify in a generic way what traffic
and path characteristics are to be communicated [Ret. 13].
RSVP is a specific protocol designed to provide resource
reservations. It is designed to work with int-serv but can be used with other
service models as well. It has the following characteristics [Ref. 13].
• Multicast environment: RSVP was designed to work well in
multicast environments, because the applications requiring
resource reservations are multicast-oriented (e.g., conferencing).
The protocol envisions simple communication between a set of
senders and a set of receivers, with the actual communication path
using (potentially overlapping) multicast trees.
• Receiver-oriented: To scale to large multicast environments, the
protocol requires receivers to make reservations. Receivers
request resource reservations based on the sender's traffic
specification and path characteristics.
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• Receiver heterogeneity: RSVP supports heterogeneous
receivers by allowing each receiver to make its own reservation,
perhaps distinct from others, even if the traffic is to be received
from the same source. Intermediate nodes aggregate reservation
requests.
(g) Soft State
The reservation state must be periodically refreshed by receivers,
or it is timed out. This makes the protocol robust and well adapted to changing
network conditions and changing reservation requirements. It also eliminates the
need for reliable signalling mechanisms.
There are no in-built mechanisms for routing or packet scheduling:
RSVP is just a signalling protocol. It relies on normal IP routing to compute the
reservation route. Of course, it is desirable to include the resource request in the
route lookup, but no standard QoS-aware routing protocols exist today for IP.
RSVP is also not concerned with how nodes implement the reservation requests
(e.g., admission control, packet classification, packet scheduling).
The following gives a brief overview of RSVP operations [Ref. 13].
• Sender traffic specification: The sender of traffic advertises its
traffic using the Sender TSpec to construct an RSVP
SENDER_TSPEC object, which is included in the RSVP PATH
messages generated for the application. These PATH messages
are sent towards the receivers (e.g., addressed to a multicast
address). The SENDER_TSPEC object is not modified by the
network and is delivered as-is to the receivers. The sending
application also creates an initial path characteristics specification
in an RSVP ADSPEC object, which is also carried in the PATH
message. The ADSPEC object is modified by the network to reflect
the path characteristics (e.g., bandwidth, MTU) as the PATH
message propagates towards the receivers.
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Receiver reservations: Upon receiving the PATH message, the
receiver uses the SENDER_TSPEC and ADSPEC to determine the
traffic and path characteristics and then combines it with its own
requirements to generate an RSVP FLOWSPEC object. This
object contains the receiver traffic specification (TSpec) and, if
needed, the requested level of service (RSpec). This is then
transmitted in an RSVP RESERVE message that is routed along
the exact opposite path that the PATH message traversed.
Merging reservations: The network nodes are required to
maintain state information for the PATH messages they have
forwarded; they use this, along with the RESERVE message, to
actually reserve resources and to route the RESERVE message
back towards the source. In addition, nodes can merge requests
from multiple receivers as the requests travel upstream.
Reservation Styles: A receiver receiving traffic from multiple
sources can choose to aggregate the traffic at intermediate nodes,
using reservation styles. A reservation style can have explicit
sender selection, in which a reservation is established for the
senders explicitly listed in the reservation, or it can have wildcard
sender selection, in which traffic from any sender is selected.
Additionally, reservation styles can be distinct—a separate
reservation is made for each sender—or shared—multiple senders
can share the same reservation. The reservation style is specified
using a filter spec. A receiver can specify the following filters:
• Wildcard-filter: Uses wildcard sender selection and shared
reservation. Traffic from all sources will be merged into a
single flow reservation at the receiver.
• Fixed-filter: Uses explicit sender selection and distinct
reservations. Traffic from an explicitly identified set of
sources is carried, using separate reservations for each
sender.
• Shared-explicit-filter: Uses explicit sender selection and
shared reservations. Traffic from an explicitly identified set
of sources is carried, using a single reservation for all
senders. RSVP relies on regular IP routing for finding a path
for the reservation set up. A number of experimental routing
protocols are being considered for doing QoS-aware routing
(e.g., QOSPF, l-PNNI).
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• Admission Control: Int-serv relies on admission control to limit the
amount of traffic that is admitted into the network, so that adequate
resources are available to provide QoS to existing flows. Resource
reservation requests are processed by nodes to determine if the
new reservation can be accepted without adversely impacting
existing flows.
• Packet Classification and Scheduling: Packets traversing a node
need to be classified as belonging to a flow (or a class of flows) so
that they can be serviced appropriately. This classification is based
on some data being carried in the packet (e.g., in the IP or transport
headers). In IPv4, the source and destination IP addresses, as well
as transport port number, can be used. In IPv6, the source IP
address and flow label can be used. Classified packets are
assigned to some internal queueing function, which then services
the queues based on QoS criteria. Intelligent queueing
mechanisms must be used to deliver proper service.
2. Delay and Jitter
The delay experienced by the service traffic (packets) is an important
aspect of the perceived quality of service. The aspects of delay have a different
impact on different services [Ref. 11].
• End-to-end delay
• Delay variation or jitter
Interactive real-time applications (e.g., voice communication) are sensitive
to end-to-end delay and jitter. Long delays reduce the interactivity of the
communication.
Non-interactive real-time applications (e.g., one-way broadcast) are not
sensitive to end-to-end delay but are affected by jitter. Jitter is usually
accommodated by using a buffer at the receiver where received packets are
stored and then "played back" at the appropriate time offset. The time offset
(also called "playback point") is determined by maximum jitter. Applications that
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can adjust the playback point based on changes in the jitter value are called
"adaptive" applications (e.g., vat). Packets that arrive after their playback point
has passed are generally not useful to the application. Non-real-time
applications are usually not delay-sensitive. However, because these
applications may use delay measurements to control their traffic rate (e.g., TCP)
or may have to buffer data until it is acknowledged (e.g., FTP), large or variable
delays may affect the quality of these applications as well.
There are various components of end-to-end delay [Ref. 11].
• Transmission delay: the time it takes to put all the bits of a packet
onto the link.
• Propagation delay: the time it takes for a bit to traverse a link
(usually, at the speed of light).
• Processing delay: the time it takes to process a packet in a
network element (e.g., routing it to the output port).
• Queueing delay: the time a packet must wait in a queue before it
is scheduled for transmission.
At the endpoints, there may be additional delays in getting the packet from
the network interface to the application and eventually to the user (e.g., delays in
transferring the packet across the host bus, delays in copying the packet from
kernel space to user space, delays in scheduling the application).
3. Throughput
The main aspect of throughput is the amount of bandwidth available to an
application. This determines how much traffic the application can get across the
network [Ref. 11]. Other important aspects are errors (generally related to link
error rate) and losses (generally related to buffer capacity).
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Certain applications can reduce their traffic rate in response to low
throughput indications (e.g., reduce the fidelity of the encoding scheme). Such
applications are called "rate-adaptive."
Throughput depends on the following factors [Ref. 11].
• Link characteristics: bandwidth, error rate
• Node characteristics: buffer capacity, processing power. As can
be seen from the above discussion, a number of characteristics of
various network elements, such as terminals/hosts, links, and
switches/routers, determine what quality of service will be provided
to applications, in terms of delay and throughput metrics.
4. Issues with the int-serv Model
Int-serv proposes a fundamentally new model for IP networks [Ref. 1 1]. It
moves away from the best-effort model and introduces new services, such as
guaranteed delay and controlled load. It requires explicit resource reservation,
admission control, packet classification, and scheduling. It indicates how traffic
and QoS requirements can be specified. There has been significant discussion
on whether the int-serv model can scale to large backbones. Some of the
difficulties are [Ref . 11].
• The number of individual flows in a backbone network can be very
large. Maintaining state for all flows can require a lot of storage
capacity.
• The number of control messages for resource reservations for a
large number of flows can be large and may require a lot of
processing power.
• Packet classification based on packet headers can be expensive on
a high-speed data path.
• Security issues need to be resolved to ensure that unauthorized
sources do not make spurious reservations.
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• Policy issues need to be resolved to determine who can make
reservations
The common wisdom is that int-serv is an appropriate model for a small
intranet where there are a small number of flows and where security and policy
issues can be managed easily [Ref. 10]. It may also be possible to deploy int-
serv in larger networks (e.g., ISPs) for a limited number of flows (e.g., a few
multicast sessions). Beyond that, large backbone networks will need more
scalable mechanisms for differentiating traffic and providing differentiated
services to them.
H. DIFFERENTIATED SERVICES MODEL EXPLORED
The continuing demand from ISPs for scalable and practical mechanisms
to provide different levels of service to their users is primarily driven by the
commercial interest in offering premium services for premium prices [Ref. 11]. It
is also foreseen that, in the absence of some kind of service assurance,
corporations will be highly unwilling to put mission-critical data on the Internet.
The growth of such applications as voice-over-IP and virtual private networks is
tied to the ability of the network infrastructure to provide some form of
differentiated services for such applications [Ref. 11]. Due to the above-
mentioned shortcomings of the int-serv model, a number of proposals were made
to the IETF in the second half of 1997 to provide simpler, more scalable
mechanisms for differentiated services. At this time, there is no agreement on the
mechanism or even on the services that should be provided by this new model.
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However, some of the key features of the various proposals that make them
different from the int-serv model are [Ref . 47].
• Coarser Granularity of Differentiation - Backbone routers carry a
large number of individual flows (where a flow is defined as a
related stream of packets due to a single user activity such as TCP
session). Maintaining reservation state per flow is intractable,
because the Internet doubles in size every 6 months. Hence, the
diff-serv proposals do not differentiate traffic per flow. Instead,
there are a small number of well-defined classes which are
provided different services based on delay and loss sensitivity.
• No Packet Classification within the Network - RSVP envisions
that each router implements a packet classification function in order
to provide different levels of service, which means that many fields
of the packet header may need to be examined (e.g., for IPv4, the
source and destination IP address, protocol, and source and
destination port ids may need to be examined). This is a very
expensive operation. Hence, in diff-serv, the proposal is to move
packet classification to the edge of the network, where there are
fewer packets to process. Edge routers classify and mark packets
appropriately. Interior routers simply process packets based on
their markings. Note: This implies that interior routers do not
recognize individual flows, but that they deal with aggregate
classes. This makes the solution more scalable.
• Different Provisioning Models - RSVP dictates dynamic resource
reservation. This may result in a large number of control packets
and it also requires dynamic admission control in each router. The
diff-serv model moves admission control to the edge of the network.
Further, it does not require dynamic reservations. Instead, it can
use long-term, static provisioning to establish service agreements
with the users of the network, whose traffic it can police at the
ingress to the network. It can also use explicit traffic engineering to
route packets from certain sources towards pre-determined paths,
potentially bypassing congestion points in the network that may
otherwise be on the path obtained by regular (non-QoS-aware)
routing protocols.
No Absolute Service Guarantees -The Guaranteed Delay service
in int-serv provides hard bounds on the maximum delay that will be
experienced by the packets. It does so by explicitly reserving
resources along the path. In general, diff-serv will not provide hard
guarantees unless a static path is provisioned specifically for a
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particular flow. In diff-serv, interior routers do not distinguish
individual flows, but, rather, deal with aggregated classes, so they
cannot handle a particular flow preferentially.
The following description of diff-serv is based on the models proposed by
[Ref. 11] and [Ref. 13]. The basic idea is to monitor the traffic that enters the
network at the ingress node and check for compliance against some pre-defined
service profiles. Based on this, packets can be marked as being "in" or "out" of
their profiles. Inside the network, routers preferentially drop packets that are
tagged as being "out." There are variations of the basic idea in terms of how
many levels of precedence are defined for packets—two or more.
In addition to drop precedence, there can be some additional information
in the packet headers that communicates the type of service (TOS) desired by
the packet, particularly with respect to its delay sensitivity. For example, a
premium service can offer the equivalent of a CBR connection (i.e., it is allocated
according to its peak rate and is not oversubscribed, hence its bandwidth is
always available and packets do not see any delay - this is akin to a "virtual link").
Another example can be an assured service that is characterized by
bursty behavior and is provisioned using expected capacity, and hence its
bandwidth is allocated statistically [Ref. 13]. Then, of course, there is the best
effort service, which is expected to continue to form the bulk of the traffic.
Additional levels of service may be defined. The service profiles are set up at the
edge nodes based on customer subscriptions. Therefore, they are relatively
static. The decision of whether to accept a new subscription can be made
centrally, based on knowledge of network topology and capacity. Thus, a
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network provider can provision its network according to the expected demand
and subscriptions [Ref. 13].
Alternatively, it is possible to use a dynamic protocol to set up the profiles
[Ref. 11]. In this case, the user would send in a service request, perhaps using
an RSVP message. The edge node would direct the request to a bandwidth
broker, which would make some decision and inform the edge node. There may
be a need for bandwidth brokers to communicate among themselves (e.g., in a
multi-network service set up). It is envisioned that in initial deployment, static
provisioning would be used to size the network [Ref. 1 1].
To be able to provision the network appropriately, it is important to know
not only how much traffic is entering the network, but also where it is going [Ref.
11]. Depending on the destination, resources may have to be provisioned on
different paths. In the simplest case, the service profile indicates a desired
resource between two specific end-points. The network provider has to ensure
that the primary and secondary routes between the two points are adequately
provisioned.
The problem becomes harder when there are multiple recipients (as in the
case of a virtual private network) or when the recipients are not known
beforehand. In the latter case, it may not be possible to provide any assurance
of service at all, since the traffic might be taking any path in the network.
The main functional components of this architecture are as follows [Ref. 11].
• Service Profiles: A service profile indicates which traffic is to be
treated differentially and what type of service is requested. The
former may be indicated by setting a packet filter based on packet
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header fields such as IP addresses. The latter can be specified
using a token bucket filter (a rate and a burst size), along with some
delay requirements. The service profile is likely to be set up
administratively, although it is technically possible to use RSVP
messages to set up profiles as well.
• Packet Classification: The ingress router must check all received
packets against the service profiles it has to check if the packets
should receive differential treatment. It may use packet filters to
match packet headers and token filters to check conformance to
the profile. Packets that do not meet profiles can either be
discarded or sent into the network with higher drop precedence,
depending on the nature of service to be provided. Note: The
source can police and shape the traffic it is offering to the network
in order to maximize the probability that the offered traffic will meet
the service profile and receive the desire quality of service.
• Packet Marking: The ingress router must also mark the packets
as they enter the network with appropriate values so interior routers
can handle the packets differentially. The marking can use header
fields. For example, for IPv4 packets, the TOS octet can be used.
This has 3 bits for IP Precedence and 4 bits for Type of Service:
RFC 791 defines the values for IP Precedence bits as:
1 1 1 -- Network Control







It has been proposed that one or more bits of this field be used to indicate
drop precedence. If compatibility with RFC 791 is desired, higher values can
indicate lower drop precedence; otherwise, it might be desirable to reverse the
logic, since most IP packets today are sent with value 000.
RFC 1349 defines the following values for the 4-bit Type of Service field:
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1000 - Minimize delay
0100 - Maximize throughput
0010 - Maximize reliability
0001 - Minimize monetary cost
0000 - Normal service
Again, one or more bits of this field could be used to indicate the type of
service being provided. For example, higher values could indicate higher delay
sensitivity. At the other end, a single bit could be used to distinguish between
best-effort traffic and delay-sensitive traffic.
Differential Queueing: In the interior routers, differentiated packets have to be
handled differently. To do so, the router may employ multiple queues, along with
some Class Based Queueing (CBQ) service discipline or simple priority
queueing. Generally, delay-sensitive traffic will be serviced sooner, and loss-
sensitive traffic will be given larger buffers. The loss behavior can also be
controlled using various forms of Random Early Detection (RED). These
disciplines uses probabilistic methods to start dropping packets when certain
queue thresholds are crossed, in order to increase the probability that higher-
quality packets can be buffered at the expense of more dispensable packets. As
an example, packets of different service types may be put into different queues,
and, within a given service type, packets with higher drop precedence may be
discarded earlier than those with lower drop precedence.
I. INTERACTION WITH MPLS
Another effort going on in the IETF is Multi-Protocol Label Switching
(MPLS) [Ret. 21]. MPLS attempts to set up paths in a network along which
packets that carry appropriate labels can be forwarded very efficiently (i.e., the
forwarding engine would not look at the entire packet header, rather only at the
label and use that to forward the packet). Not only does this allow packets to be
forwarded more quickly, it allows the paths to be set up in a variety of ways: the
path could represent the normal destination-based routing path, it could
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represent a policy-based explicit route, or it could represent a reservation-based
flow path.
Ingress routers classify incoming packets and wrap them in an MPLS
header that carries the appropriate label for forwarding by the interior routers
[Ret. 21]. In the MPLS model, the labels are distributed by a dynamic Label
Distribution Protocol (LDP), which effectively sets up a Label Switched Path
(LSP) along the Label Switched Routers (LSR). The LDP could be driven off
destination-based routing (e.g., OSPF) or from reservation requests (e.g., RSVP)
or some other policy-based explicit route. In some sense, LDP is creating label
state in the network, but this is not so different from the normal forwarding tables
created by routing protocols. It is important to note that this label state is not per
packet or per flow, but usually represents some aggregate (e.g., between some
source-destination pair). Therefore, the state produced by MPLS is manageable
and scalable.
The MPLS model is compatible with the diff-serv model. The ingress
routers can use service profiles to assign labels to packets. The LSPs could
represent provisioned paths inside the network, and the labels carried in MPLS
headers can be used to differentiate packets [Ref. 13].
The drop precedence of the packet can also be indicated in the MPLS
header. It has also been proposed to use RSVP as the LDP so that a single
protocol can be used for setting up various types of LSPs, including destination-
based, policy-based, and reservation-based paths. There is no consensus
regarding this [Ref. 21].
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J. A NEW CHALLENGE: MANAGING QUALITY OF SERVICE (QOS)
QoS has been a critical requirement for wide-area networks for years.
Bandwidth, delay, and delay variation requirements are at a premium in the wide
area [Ref. 18]. The importance of end-to-end QoS is increasing because of the
rapid growth of intranet and extranet applications that have placed increased
demands on the entire network. QoS can protect mission critical applications
from bandwidth hungry applications such as multimedia, web casting, and real-
time video applications.
QoS provides a number of important roles [Ref. 18].
• Protects mission-critical applications such as ERP or sales
automation systems.
• Prioritizes groups of users based on business functions such as
sales and engineering.
• Enables multimedia applications such distance learning or desktop
video-conferencing
.



































Figure 18. Policy Networking Architecture. [Ref. 12]
A network manager may need to provide different service levels for
applications. For example, when a sales manager enters an order at the end of
the quarter, the network can recognize the application and can prioritize it over
other types of traffic [Ref. 12]. Today, the QoS mechanism in some software
enable networks to control and predictably service a wide variety of networked
applications and traffic types [Ref. 18]. Key QoS capabilities include router
specific policies and signaling mechanisms as follows:
1. Queuing Techniques for Congestion Management on
Outbound Traffic
A queuing technique can be set on a device's interface to manage how
packets are queued to be sent through the interface. The technique chosen
determines whether the traffic coloring characteristics of the packet are used or
ignored [Ref. 18].
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These queuing techniques are primarily used for managing traffic
congestion on an interface, that is, they determine the priority in which to send
packets when there is more data than can be sent immediately:
• First In, First Out (FIFO) Queuing
• Priority Queuing (PQ)
• Custom Queuing (CQ)
• Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ)
• Weighted Round Robin (WRR)
a. First In, First Out (FIFO) Queuing: Basic Store and
Forward
FIFO queuing is the basic queuing technique. In FIFO queuing,
packets are queued on a first come, first served basis: if packet A arrives at the
interface before packet B, packet A leaves the interface before packet B. This is
true even if packet B has a higher IP precedence than packet A: FIFO queuing
ignores packet characteristics.
FIFO queuing works well on uncongested high-capacity interfaces
that have minimal delay, or when you do not want to differentiate services for
packets traveling through the device.
The disadvantage with FIFO queuing is that when a station starts a
file transfer, it can consume all the bandwidth of a link to the detriment of
interactive sessions [Ref. 18]. The phenomenon is referred to as a packet train
because one source sends a "train" of packets to its destination and packets
from other stations get caught behind the train.
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(1) Policy Requirements for FIFO Queuing Interfaces -
There are no specific requirements for creating policies on FIFO interfaces.
Policies do not have to be defined on these interfaces. However, traffic shaping
policies or traffic limiting policies on FIFO interfaces can set the rate limit on the
bandwidth available to selected traffic. Traffic can be colored on a FIFO
interface but it cannot be used to affect FIFO queuing [Ref. 18].
(2) FIFO's Relationship to Traffic Coloring - FIFO queuing
treats all packets the same: whichever packet gets to the interface first is the first
to go through the interface. Traffic shaping and traffic limiting policy statements
can affect the bandwidth available to a packet based on its color, but FIFO does
not use the coloring value.
b. Priority Queuing (PQ): Basic Traffic Prioritization
Priority queuing is a rigid traffic prioritization scheme: if packet A
has a higher priority than packet B, packet A always goes through the interface
before packet B. When an interface's QoS property is defined as priority
queuing, four queues may be automatically created on the interface: high,
medium, normal, and low. Packets are placed in these queues based on
previously defined priorities and policies. Unclassified packets are placed in the
normal queue.
The disadvantage of priority queuing is that the higher queue is
given absolute precedence over lower queues [Ref. 18]. For example, packets in
the low queue are only sent when the high, medium, and normal queues are
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completely empty. If a queue is always full, the lower-priority queues are never
serviced. They fill up and packets are lost. Thus, one particular kind of network
traffic can come to dominate a priority queuing interface [Ref. 18].
An effective use of priority queuing would be for placing time-critical
but low-bandwidth traffic in the high queue. This ensures that this traffic is
transmitted immediately, but because of the low-bandwidth requirement, lower
queues are unlikely to be starved.
(1) Policy Requirements for Priority Queuing Interfaces - In
order for packets to be classified on a priority queuing interface, policies must be
created on that interface. These policies need to filter traffic into one of the four
priority queues. Any traffic that is not filtered into a queue is placed in the normal
queue. Traffic shaping policies or traffic limiting policies can be created to define
an upper range on the bandwidth allocated to selected traffic [Ref. 18].
(2) Priority Queuing's Relationship to Traffic Coloring -
Priority queuing interfaces do not automatically consider the IP precedence
settings of a packet. If traffic coloring policies are created on inbound interfaces,
and the coloring is desired to affect the priority queue, the priority queuing
outbound interface must be created that recognizes the color value and places
the packet in the desired queue [Ref. 18].
c. Custom Queuing (CQ): Advanced Traffic Prioritization
Custom queuing is a flexible traffic prioritization scheme that
allocates a minimum bandwidth to specified types of traffic. Up to 16 of these
custom queues can be created. For custom queue interfaces, the device
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services the queues in a round-robin fashion, sending out packets from a queue
until the byte count on the queue is met, then moving on to the next queue. This
ensures that no queue gets starved, in comparison to priority queuing [Ref. 18].
The disadvantage of custom queuing is that, like priority queuing,
policy statements must be created on the interface to classify the traffic to the
queues. An effective use of custom queuing would be to guarantee bandwidth to
a few critical applications to ensure reliable application performance.
(1) Policy Requirements for Custom Queuing Interfaces - In
order for packets to be classified on a custom queuing interface, custom queuing
policies on that interface must be created. These policies need to specify a ratio,
or percentage, of the bandwidth on the interface that should be allocated to the
queue for the filtered traffic. A queue can be as small as 5%, or as large as 95%,
in increments of 5%. The total bandwidth allocation for all policy statements
defined on a custom queuing interface cannot exceed 95% (QoS Policy System
ensures 95% is not exceeded) [Ref. 18]. Any bandwidth not allocated by a
specific policy statement is available to the traffic that does not satisfy the filters
in the policy statements. QoS Policy System uses the ratio in these policies,
along with the packet size specified when an interface is defined as a custom
queue, to determine the byte count of each queue. The queues defined
constitute a minimum bandwidth allocation for the specified flow. If more
bandwidth is available on the interface due to a light load, a queue can use the
extra bandwidth. This is handled dynamically by the device. All packets that
have not been classified for custom queuing are placed in the default queue.
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Traffic shaping policies can also be created or traffic limiting policies to define an
upper range on the bandwidth allocated to selected traffic [Ref. 18]. Thus, the
custom queue defines a minimum bandwidth, and the shaping policy or limiting
policy defines an upper limit. When defining the bandwidth upper limit, the
shaping or limiting policy must be executed before the custom queue policy, and
it must filter the same traffic as the custom queue (or a subset of the same
traffic).
(2) Custom Queuing's Relationship to Traffic Coloring -
Custom queuing interfaces do not automatically consider the IP precedence
settings of a packet. If coloring policies are created on inbound interfaces, and
the coloring to affect the custom queue is desired, a policy on the custom
queuing outbound interface must be created that recognizes the color value and
places the packet in the desired queue.
d. Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ): Intelligent Traffic
Prioritization
Weighted fair queuing acknowledges and uses a packet's priority
without starving low-priority packets for bandwidth [Ref. 18]. Weighted fair
queuing divides packets into two classes: interactive traffic is placed at the front
of the queue to reduce response time; non-interactive traffic shares the
remaining bandwidth proportionately. Because interactive traffic is typically low-
bandwidth, its higher priority does not starve the remaining traffic. A complex
algorithm is used to determine the amount of bandwidth assigned to each traffic
flow. IP precedence is considered when making this determination. Weighted
fair queuing is very efficient, and requires little configuration.
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(1) Policy Requirements for Weighted Fair Queuing
Interfaces - Weighted fair queuing interfaces automatically create queues for
each traffic flow. No specific policies are needed. However, traffic shaping
policies or traffic limiting policies can be created to affect how select traffic is
handled on the interface. A shaping policy or a limiting policy can control the
bandwidth available to the selected traffic, whereas a coloring policy can change
the relative importance of a packet and thus change how the interface queues
the traffic [Ref. 18].
(2) Weighted Fair Queuing's Relationship to Traffic Coloring
- Weighted fair queuing is sensitive to the IP precedence settings in the packets.
Weighted fair queuing automatically prioritizes the packets without the need for
the creation of policies on the weighted fair queuing interfaces. However, if a
coloring policy is created on the weighted fair queuing interface, it will affect how
the selected traffic is queued. Weighted fair queueing can improve network
performance without traffic coloring policies. When using coloring for weighted
fair queuing, or WRED, realize that traffic starting devices can set precedence
fields in their outgoing packets. Thus, it is important to set IP precedence on all
network access points in order to avoid unintended traffic receiving high priority
[Ref. 18].
e. Weighted Round Robin (WRR): Traffic Taking Turns
In Weighted Round Robin (WRR) there are four queues for each
interface. Incoming traffic is placed in one of the four queues based upon
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precedence. The system gathers IP precedence information from the service
type field of the IP header. For an incoming IP packet, the first two (most
significant) bits of the service type field determine the priority [Ref. 19].
(1) Modulo-N Hash - To select a next-hop from the list of N
next-hops, the router performs a modulo-N hash over the packet header fields
that identify a flow [Ref. 21]. This has the advantage of being fast, at the
expense of (N-1)/N of all flows changing paths whenever a next-hop is added or
removed [Ref. 18].
(2) Hash-Threshold - The router first selects a key by
performing a hash (e.g., modulo-K where K is large) over the packet header
fields that identify the flow. The N next-hops have been assigned unique regions
in the key space. By comparing the key against region boundaries the router can
determine which region the key belongs to and thus which next-hop to use. This
method has the advantage of only affecting flows near the region boundaries (or
thresholds) when next-hops are added or removed. Hash-threshold's lookup can
be done in software using a binary search yielding O(logN), or in hardware in
parallel for 0(1). When a next-hop is added or removed, between 1/4 and 1/2 of
all flows change paths [Ref. 19].
(3) Highest Random Weight (HRW) - The router uses a
simple pseudo-random number function seeded with the packet header fields
that identify a flow, as well as a next-hop identifier (address or index), to assign a
weight to each of the N next-hops. The next-hop receiving the highest weight is
chosen as the next-hop. This has the advantage of minimizing the number of
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flows affected by a next-hop addition or deletion (only1/N of them), but is
approximately N times as expensive as a modulo-N hash. The applicability of
these three alternatives depends on (at least) two factors: whether the forwarder
maintains per-flow state, and how precious CPU is to a multipath forwarder [Ref.
19].
2. Traffic Shaping or Traffic Limiting Techniques for Controlling
Bandwidth
Traffic shaping policies or traffic limiting policies can be created on a
device's interface to manage how much of the interface's bandwidth should be
allocated to a specific traffic flow [Ref. 13]. Policies can be based on a variety of
traffic characteristics, including the type of traffic, its source, its destination, and
its IP precedence settings (traffic coloring). Shaping differs from limiting in that
shaping attempts to throttle traffic when it reaches the rate limits. The router
buffers some of the traffic bursts. Only when the buffer fills are packets dropped.
Whereas, limiting policies do not drop packets until rate limits are reached, then
drop all packets that exceed the rate limit.
Unlike queuing techniques, which are part of an interface's characteristics,
generic traffic shaping or traffic limiting is done through policies, which are
defined in access control lists (ACLs). (Frame relay traffic shaping, FRTS, is
defined in interface characteristics.) Queuing techniques only affect traffic when
an interface is congested, or in the case of WRED, when traffic exceeds a certain
threshold. With traffic shaping policies, flows are affected even during times of
little congestion [Ref. 18].
103
These types of traffic shaping policies can be used [Ref. 13].
• Generic Traffic Shaping (GTS)
• Frame-Relay Traffic Shaping (FRTS)
• Limiting
a. Generic Traffic Shaping (GTS): Controlling Traffic on
Non-Frame Relay Interfaces
Generic traffic shaping allows the setting of a bandwidth limit for
specific types of traffic. For example, a policy that limits web traffic to 200
KB/sec can be created. This puts a cap on the bandwidth available to that traffic,
ensuring that the remainder of the interfaces bandwidth is available to other kinds
of traffic. In this example, if web traffic does not fill 200 KB/sec, other kinds of
traffic can use the unused bandwidth [Ref. 13].
With generic traffic shaping, a buffer to accommodate traffic bursts
can be defined, so that packets are not immediately dropped once the limit is
reached. If a buffer is not defined, once the limit is reached, packets are
dropped.
(1) Interface QoS Property Requirements for Generic Traffic
Shaping - generic traffic shaping policies can be defined on any type of interface
except those that use frame relay traffic shaping (FRTS). For custom queuing
interfaces, a shaping policy can be created to form an upper limit for the
bandwidth available to the selected traffic, and have the interface also apply a
custom queuing policy to form a lower bandwidth limit for the traffic. However,
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this is only available on selected combinations of IOS software versions and
device models [Ref. 13].
b. Frame-Relay Traffic Shaping (FRTS): Controlling Traffic
on Frame Relay Interfaces and Subinterfaces
Frame relay traffic shaping allows the specification of an average
bandwidth size for frame relay virtual circuits (VC). The bandwidth allocated for
bursty traffic can be defined, and control whether the circuit responds to
notifications from the network that the circuit is becoming congested. By using
FRTS, a minimum rate commitment can be defined for the virtual circuit, and
accommodate the occasional need for greater bandwidth [Ref. 13].
Each virtual circuit (VC) is identified by a data link connection
identifier (DLCI) and provides access to another endpoint of the frame relay (FR)
cloud. The VC can be either a switched VC (SVC) or permanent VC (PVC). In
the SVCs a connection establishment is made each time data needs to be sent
over the network (like ATM) and negotiation of parameters occurs. For PVC, the
connection is there all the time and its parameters are defined when it is ordered
from the FR carrier.
If the FR is a fully meshed network, the FR cloud is viewed by the
router like a shared media subnet, similar to an Ethernet interface in which few
other routers connect to it. There may be a few VCs on the interface connecting
to the FR network, but it will not be divided into logical subinterfaces.
It is very common that the FR interface is not fully meshed but is a
collection of virtual point-to-point links [Ref. 13]. In this case subinterfaces will be
defined on the interface connecting to the FR network and therefore only one VC
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is defined on each of the subinterfaces. QoS Policy System applies FRTS
definitions to all VCs defined on an interface or subinterface. Multiple VCs on a
single interface or subinterface cannot be treated differently.
(1) Interface QoS Property Requirements for Frame-Relay
Traffic Shaping - FIFO can be used, priority queuing, or custom queuing on
frame relay subinterfaces. If priority queuing or custom queuing is used, policies
on the interfaces or subinterfaces must be created that create the required
queues. On a FR interface WRED can be used and weighted fair queuing
(WFQ). By creating custom or priority queues, the automatic rate-limiting
features of FRTS can be further modified. Parameters can be controlled through
QoS are Rate (CIR), burst size (BC), excess burst size (BE) and adaptive rate
(response to BECN notifications). Generic traffic shaping policies on an FRTS
interface cannot be created. Traffic coloring policies on the interface can be
created, however [Ref. 13].
c. Limiting: Limiting Bandwidth and Optionally Coloring Traffic
Limiting allows the setting of a bandwidth limit for specific types of
traffic. For example, a policy can be created that limits web traffic to 200 KB/sec.
This puts a cap on the bandwidth available to that traffic, ensuring that the
remainder of the interface's bandwidth is available to other kinds of traffic. In this
example, if web traffic does not fill 200 KB/sec, other kinds of traffic can use the
unused bandwidth. Packets are dropped if traffic bursts exceed the limit [Ref.
13].
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(1) Interface QoS Property Requirements for Rate Limited
Traffic - limiting policies can be defined on any type of interface. For custom
queuing interfaces, a limiting policy can be created to form an upper limit for the
bandwidth available to the selected traffic, and have the interface also apply a
custom queuing policy to form a lower bandwidth limit for the traffic. However,
this is only available on selected combinations of IOS software versions and
device models [Ref. 13].
(2) QoS Policy - Historically, configuration of QoS has been
complex and error-prone due to its static nature, thus limiting its application to the
wide-area network edge [Ref. 12]. QoS mechanisms had to be manually
configured on each device. Now through Policy Networking, policy configuration
is simplified to enable active policies in the network and deployment of QoS end-
to-end. Policy Networking enables QoS policies based on application type, user
group identity, and other classifications such as time of day, day of week, or
even physical port information derived from the topology of the network itself
[Ref. 19]. These identity classifications take advantage of policies in force and
registration services as well as other important network information services like
management systems that provide topology and device information. To set up a
QoS policy, the network manager could use a "drag and drop" Policy
Administration graphical-user-interface (GUI) to specify a policy based on
business rules. A QoS policy binding is then created and activated by QoS
Policy Servers (see Figure 19). The Common Open Policy Service (COPS)
protocol provides policy exchange between the policy servers and the elected
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policy software embedded in the intelligent network devices. The software will
translates the policy binding into local QoS enforcement mechanisms such as
Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ) or Weighted Random Early Discard (WRED).
After the policy is activated, specific policy-aware network devices identify and
classify traffic and execute the appropriate policy dynamically without requiring
manual intervention. As a result, the network manager can focus on specifying
business policies and leveraging the intelligent network to recognize and enforce
the policies automatically [Ref. 19].
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Figure 19. QoS Policy Binding. [Ref. 21]
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IV. NETWORK POLICY: SECURITY
A. Overview of Network Security
The role of a security policy is to ensure that each of the four fundamental
components that make up computer security, Authentication, Access Control,
Integrity and Confidentiality are adequately addressed. Typical questions that
need to be answered when developing a network security policy are [Ref. 23]:
What resources are we trying to protect ?
Which people do we need to protect the resources from ?
How likely are the threats ?
How important is the resource ?
What measures can be implemented to protect the resource ?
How cost effectively and in what time frame can these be
implemented ?
Who authorizes users ?
These questions should be revisited periodically, as the network
environment is very dynamic. The security policy identifies the threats that need
to be protected against and defines the level of protection required. The security
policy will itself contain several different policies, for example a Network Service
Access Policy and System Specific Policies and will be based on a security
strategy [Ref. 23].
An outsider can gain a complete understanding of an organization's
business direction-its strategies and plans-through its internal communications.
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Email, customer databases, supplier information, documents, spreadsheets,
accounting files, customer orders, operation procedures, quality policies, the
telephone system, if available to the public would tell anyone all they would need
to know about a company. If in the wrong hands or compromised, it could be
disastrous. The corporate jewels are indeed found in the bits. Ensuring the
authenticity, accessibility, integrity, and confidentiality of corporate information
should be a chief concern of those in the upper levels of management [Ref. 23].
B. A GROWING NEED FOR PROTECTION
Recent audit from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) evidence
indicates that serious and widespread weaknesses in information security are
jeopardizing government and civilian agencies ability to adequately protect the
following: (1) assets from fraud and misuse; (2) sensitive information from
inappropriate disclosure; and (3) critical operations, including some affecting
public safety, from disruption. Significant information security weaknesses were
reported in each of the 24 largest federal agencies, with inadequately restricted
access to sensitive data being the most commonly cited problem [Ref. 23]. In a
recent survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute in cooperation with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 64 percent of the 520 respondents, which
were from both the private and public sectors, reported computer security
breaches within the last 12 months--a 16 percent increase in security breaches
over those reported in a similar survey in 1997. While many of the survey
respondents did not quantify their losses, those that did cited losses totaling $136
million [Ref. 23]. In an October 1997 report entitled "Critical Foundations:
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Protecting America's Infrastructures", the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection described the potentially damaging implications of poor
information security from a national perspective, noting that computerized
interaction within and among infrastructures has become so complex that it may
be possible to do harm in ways that cannot yet be fully conceived.
In September 1996, GAO reported that a broad array of federal and
private operations was at risk due to information security weaknesses and that a
common underlying cause was inadequate security program management. In
that report GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) play a more proactive role in leading federal improvement efforts, in part
through its role as chair of the Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council.
Subsequently, in a February 1997 series of reports to the Congress, GAO
designated information security as a new government wide high-risk area [Ref.
24]. More recently, in its March 31, 1998, report on the federal government's
consolidated financial statements, GAO reported that widespread computer
control deficiencies also contribute to problems in federal financial management
because they diminish confidence in the reliability of financial management data
[Ref. 25].
The need to safeguard information has been around since the beginning
of modern time. Throughout history, certain types of information have been
classified and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis. From secret passwords
and battlefield messages to firewalls and cryptography, the technology may be
111
different but the purpose is the same. So why worry about information security?
Answer: Internet, Intranet, and Extranet applications [Ref. 23].
The Internet's greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: openness.
The Internet is an excellent vehicle for providing cost-effective communications.
Almost every business uses and benefits from the Internet's primary applications:
electronic mail and the worldwide web [Ref. 26]. Taken a step further, the
Internet can serve as a backbone for Intranet and Extranet applications including
tele-conferencing. The Intranet is a private, internal network, typically based on
web/browser-like user interfaces, that often uses the Internet for connecting
remote users. It privatizes the Internet for internal communications. An Extranet
uses the Intranet concept but instead of connecting internal users, it connects an
organization's customers, suppliers, and business partners. All have become
essential tools for business communications. All are inherently insecure [Ref.
26]. Securing these applications requires the creation and implementation of
security policies that address the authenticity, accessibility, integrity, and
confidentiality of the network's users and its information [Ref. 26]. (An excellent
document to reference when setting computer security policies and procedures
for Internet-based communications is RFC 2196 -- the Site Security Handbook.)
C. SECURITY STRATEGIES
1. Least Privilege
The principle of least privilege is to grant only those privileges that are
required.
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Systems that allow permission to be granted or revoked by operation
providing fine-grain control are well suited to this [Ref. 26]. There is generally an
overhead in terms of increased system maintenance. Adopting a least privilege
strategy limits exposure to attacks and importantly limits the damage that can be
done when an attack is successful. Many of the common security problems on
the Internet can be viewed as failures to follow the principle of least privilege
[Ref. 26].
2. Defence In Depth
The defence in depth strategy is summed up by the term "Belt and
Braces", i.e. use as many security mechanisms as possible and arrange them so
that they back each other up. One of the problems with firewall systems is that
they provide an all or nothing solution to security. If the firewall is breached the
internal network is a soft target. This was noted by Bellovin who coined the term
"Hard on the outside, soft and chewy on the inside" [Ref. 26] to describe it.
Some firewalls however do implement the principle of defence in depth using
techniques such as Type Enforcement.
An important aspect of defence in depth that is often overlooked is the
need to avoid common mode failures. For example if an attacker can exploit a
security weakness in brand X's router then there is little point in having two of
them. However, brand Y's router may not have the same weakness and
therefore the principle of defence in depth is met. This principle is important in
the context of firewalls as many of the products commercially available are
variations of Trusted Information Systems Gauntlet or their tool kit.
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3. Choke Point
A choke point is a single point through which all incoming and outgoing
network traffic is funneled [Ref. 26]. As all traffic passes through a choke point it
is the natural place to focus monitoring and control efforts such as Internet
firewalls. It is also the natural place at which to break the connection with the
external network if necessary.
Choke points are often criticized as an all-eggs-in-one-basket solution.
This concern can be addressed by building some redundancy into the choke
point. The key point is that the choke point provides control [Ref. 26].
The largest threat to a choke point strategy is if an attacker is able to
bypass the choke point. As Firewalls generally act as choke points this is a
significant issue, especially given the ease with which SLIP or PPP connections
to Internet Service providers can be established.
As choke points can experience high levels of network traffic it is important
to ensure that there is sufficient bandwidth available at the choke point to prevent
a network traffic bottleneck. Any monitoring and logging software should also be
able to cope with the level of network traffic [Ref. 26].
4. Fail Safe Stance
If a system is going to fail, it should be designed to fail into a safe state
[Ref. 26]. This principle is particularly important in the design of Internet firewalls.
Packet filters and application level gateways, both of which are discussed in the
next chapter, should fail in such a way that traffic to and from the Internet is
stopped.
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5. Security Through Obscurity
This strategy is based on the hope that if you keep a low profile, would be
attackers won't find you, and if they do, they will pass you by. Many companies
do not publish the telephone numbers of their dial-in modems, only divulging the
numbers on a need to know basis [Ref. 24]. Whilst this is a sensible precaution it
is a poor basis for long term security. Information tends to leak out, and
attackers are often skilled at eliciting information from staff using social
engineering techniques.
Many organizations assume that an attacker won't be interested in them,
and that they are therefore unlikely to be the target of an attack. The rationale
behind this stance assumes that a site is targeted because the attacker is
interested in the information stored on it [Ref. 24].
Such assumptions are, at best, naive [Ref. 24]. Some attackers regard
themselves as electronic freedom fighters battling against the commercialization
of the Internet, others wish to sell the information they glean, others are
motivated by the power and control they wield over the lives of the system
administrators they affect, and many attacks are motivated by revenge.
Attacks generally involve several computers and a multitude of accounts.
An attacker may capture accounts and gain unauthorized access to several
systems before reaching his real target. A site can be compromised for no other
reason than to provide a staging post for attacks on other sites, and to the
attacker, it means little more than another IP address [Ref. 24].
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6. Simplicity
Software is complex. As the size of a piece of software grows it becomes
increasingly difficult to test all eventualities. Complex code will probably have
unknown loopholes that an attacker can exploit. These loopholes may be
convoluted but that will not prevent an attacker from trying to exploit them, some
of the exploit attacks against sendmail have been extremely intricate.
Simplicity is an important factor in sound network defences. Application
level gateway network Security systems should have all extraneous functionality
removed and should be kept as small and simple as possible [Ref. 26].
7. Host Based Security
Host based security is probably the most common computer security
model in current use [Ref. 26]. The major problem with the host based security
model is that it does not scale well. The major impediment to effective host
security in modern computing environments is the complexity and diversity of
those environments. Even if all hosts are identical, the sheer number of them at
some sites makes securing each of them difficult. Effectively implementing and
maintaining host security takes a significant amount of time and effort, and is a
complex task.
While the host security model might be appropriate for small sites, and
whilst all sites should implement some level of host security, it is not cost
effective for larger sites, requiring too many restrictions, and too many people
[Ref. 26].
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8. Network Based Security
Network security is designed to address the problems identified with host
security. The network security model concentrates on controlling network access
to hosts and services rather than on securing the hosts themselves [Ref. 27].
Network security approaches include building firewalls to protect trusted
networks from untrusted networks, utilizing strong authentication techniques, and
using encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data as it passed
across the network [Ref. 27].
D. SECURITY POLICY
RFC 1244 - The Site Security Handbook presents a useful guide to
developing a site security policy. It is currently being revised and is due to be re-
issued shortly. The guide lists and discusses issues and factors that a site must
consider when setting their own policies and makes some recommendations.
Useful guidance on some of the higher level requirements necessary for network
security policy to be effective can be found in [NIST95].
To be effective, policy requires visibility [Ref. 28]. Visibility aids
implementation of policy by helping to ensure policy is fully communicated
throughout the organization. Management presentations, videos, panel
discussions, guest speakers, question/answer forums, and newsletters increase
visibility. The organization's computer security training and awareness program
can effectively notify users of new policies. It also can be used to familiarize new
employees with the organization's policies.
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Computer security policies should be introduced in a manner that ensures
that management's unqualified support is clear, especially in environments where
employees feel inundated with policies, directives, guidelines, and procedures
[Ref. 28]. The organization's policy is the vehicle for emphasizing management's
commitment to computer security and making clear their expectations for
employee performance, behavior, and accountability.
To be effective, policy should be consistent with other existing directives,
laws, organizational culture, guidelines, procedures, and the organization's
overall mission [Ref. 28]. It should also be integrated into and consistent with
other organizational policies (e.g., personnel policies). One way to help ensure
this is to co-ordinate policies during development with other organizational
offices.
1. Site Security Policy
The Site Security Policy is an overall policy regarding the protection of the
organization's information resources [Ref. 30]. This includes everything from
document shredders to virus scanners, and remote access to floppy disk
tracking. At the highest level, the overall organizational policy might state:
Information is vital to the economic well-being of the organization.
Every cost-effective effort will be made to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, availability and utility of information.
Protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information resources is a priority for all employees at all levels of
the company [Ref. 30].
Below this come site-specific policies covering physical access to the
property, general access to information systems, and specific access to services
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on those systems. The firewall's network service-access policy is formulated at
this level.
2. Network Service Access Policy
The Network Service Access Policy is a higher-level, issue-specific policy
which defines those services that will be allowed or explicitly denied from the
restricted network, plus the way in which these services will be used, and the
conditions for exceptions to this policy [Ref. 31].
While focusing on the restriction and use of internetwork services, the
network service access policy should also include all other outside network
access such as dial-in and SLIP/PPP connections. This is important because
restrictions on one network service access can lead users to try others. For
example, if restricting access to the Internet via a gateway prevents Web
browsing, users are likely to create dial-up PPP connections in order to obtain
this service. Since these are non-sanctioned, ad hoc connections, they are likely
to be improperly secured while at the same time opening the network to attack.
For a firewall to be successful, the network service access policy should
be drafted before the firewall is implemented [Ref. 31]. The policy must be
realistic and sound. A realistic policy is one that provides a balance between
protecting the network from known risks while still providing users reasonable
access to network resources. If a firewall system denies or restricts services, it
usually requires the strength of the network service access policy to prevent the
firewall's access controls from being modified or circumvented on an ad hoc
basis. Only a sound, management-backed policy can provide this defence
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against internal resistance. Here are the typical network service access policies
that a firewall implements:
Allow no access to a site from the Internet, but allow access from
the site to the Internet; or, in contrast,
Allow some access from the Internet, but only to selected systems
such as information servers and e-mail servers [Ref. 31].
Firewalls often implement network service-access policies that allow some
users access from the Internet to selected internal hosts. This access should be
granted only if necessary and only if it could be combined with advanced
authentication [Ref. 31].
3. Firewall Design Policy
The Firewall Design Policy is a lower-level policy which describes how the
firewall will actually go about restricting the access and filtering the services as
defined in the network service access policy [Ref. 32].
The firewall design policy is specific to the firewall. It defines the rules
used to implement the network service access policy. This policy must be
designed in relation to, and with full awareness of, issues such as firewall
capabilities and limitations, and the threats and vulnerabilities associated with
TCP/IP. Firewalls generally implement one of two basic design policies:
Permit any service unless it is expressly denied;
or
Deny any service unless it is expressly permitted [Ref. 32].
A firewall that implements the first policy allows all services to pass into
the site by default, with the exception of those services that the network service
access policy has identified as disallowed. A firewall that implements the second
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policy denies all services by default, but then passes those services that have
been identified as allowed. This second policy follows the classic access model
used in all areas of information security [Ref. 32].
The first policy is less desirable, since it offers more avenues for getting
around the firewall. For example, users could access new services currently not
denied by the policy (or even addressed by the policy). For example, they could
run denied services at non-standard TCP/UDP ports that are not specifically
denied by the policy. However, certain services, such as X Windows, FTP,
Archie, and RPC are difficult to filter. For this reason, they may be better
accommodated by a firewall that implements the first policy. Also, while the
second policy is stronger and safer, it is more restrictive for users; services such
as those just mentioned may have to be blocked or heavily curtailed. Certain
firewalls can implement either design policy but one particular design, the dual-
homed gateway, is inherently a "deny all" firewall. Systems which require
services that should not be passed through the firewall could be located on
screened subnets separate from other site systems.
In other words, depending on security and flexibility requirements, certain
types of firewalls are more appropriate than others, making it extremely important
that policy is considered before implementing a firewall [Ref. 32]. Failure to do
so could result in the firewall failing to meet expectations. Specifics on firewall
design are discussed later in this chapter.
4. System Specific Policies
System-specific policy is often implemented through the use of access
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controls. For example, it may be a policy decision that only two individuals in an
organization are authorized to run a particular program. Access controls are
used by the system to implement (or enforce) this policy [Ref. 33].
5. Incident Handling
When a site that is not protected comes under sustained attack one of two
things can happen. The site can rapidly develop a policy and defences or it can
withdraw from the Internet [Ref. 31]. Internet security incidents, such as break-
ins and service disruptions, have caused significant harm to several
organizations' computing capabilities. Many organizations have an ad hoc
response when initially confronted with an attack which can exacerbate the
damage caused by the attack. For this reason it is often cost-effective to develop
an in-house capability for the quick discovery of, and controlled response to,
network security incidents.
The primary benefits of an incident handling capability are the ability to
contain and repair damage resulting from network attacks. An incident handling
capability also assists an organization to prevent, or at least to minimize, damage
from future incidents. Incidents can be studied internally to gain a better
understanding of the organization's vulnerabilities so that more effective
safeguards can be implemented [Ref. 31].
6. Disaster Recovery
It is prudent to assume that an attack may fundamentally compromise an
organization, for example deleting large amounts of data. It is for such
eventualities that organizations develop disaster recovery plans. The basic steps
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in establishing a disaster recovery plan are [Ref. 33]:
Identify the mission or business critical functions.
Identify the resources that support the critical functions.
Anticipate potential contingencies or disasters.
Select contingency planning strategies.
Implement the contingency strategies.
Test and revise the strategy.
E. THE KEY ELEMENTS OF SECURITY
1. Authenticity
Authenticity is the way in which a user or device proves its identity. The
simplest form of user authentication is a user ID and password. More secure
methods involve one-time passwords or some form of two-factor identification:
something you know and something you possess [Ref. 29].
Anyone with a bank ATM card uses this type of authentication: your
memorized PIN and the actual card. More elaborate systems include electronic
tokens based on some type of time synchronization scheme or some type of
challenge and response method. Extremely sophisticated schemes are based
on biometrics in which a part or characteristic of one's body, fingerprint, hand,
retina, face, voice is used to identify an individual. Device authentication is an
electronic method of allowing a specific device to participate on a network. This
is done by assigning devices to a specific switch port; allowing predetermined
MAC addresses; restricted access to specific network addresses (IP address) or
network protocol types (IP, IPX, etc.); or some combination of all four [Ref. 29].
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2 Access Control
Access control is an extension of authenticity. It determines who or what
has access to which network object or service. This is the category in which
firewalls are placed. Through network addressing schemes, specific devices,
applications, protocols, users or user groups (subnetworks), and regulate rights
and privileges can be identified. Implementation of these is subjective. Ideally,
they are implemented according to well-defined security policies that coincide
with the nature of the business, the industry, company goals and objectives, and
the culture and work environment [Ref. 29].
3 Integrity
Integrity deals with the condition of the received data and how it relates to
the original sent data. It is essential that the sender and the receiver are working
with the exact same data. Data packets can be captured while in route,
manipulated by adding, removing, or changing data, and sent on to the target
destination as if it came directly from the originator. Digital signatures and
message integrity checks are technologies used to provide assurance that a
messages arrives as intended [Ref. 29].
4. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is how privacy of information is guaranteed. The bulk of
our Internet communication; e.g., email, is sent in clear text, similar to a typical
postcard. Anyone who so desires has the ability to read what is sent. We accept
this without much concern. However, some information is more valuable. We
would rather conceal its identity. We do so by placing it in envelopes. Data
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envelopes involve the actual "scrambling" of the data. The content can be
unscrambled only by those who have the unscramble keys. Encryption is the
area within the data security realm that handles this scrambling/unscrambling.
Encryption is the foundation of a virtual private data network (VPN): a private
network created over a public one [Ref. 29].
5. Security Must be Implemented in the Network
Many security policies can be implemented on switches. Switches are the
foundation of today's modern networks [Ref. 30]. All data running over the
network traverses the switches. End-user commands, server communications,
other shared device communications, all occur over or through switches.
Switches are ideal platforms for implementing access, firewall, authentication,
authorization, and logging security services [Ref. 30]. Many security policies are
ideally suited to be deployed throughout the network-into the workgroups,
across the backbone, and at both the network ingress and egress points. As
companies begin to move away from shared media-based networks, and toward
switched-based networks with integrated layer-two and layer-three capabilities,
the switch becomes a ubiquitous device. Because security is an organizational
issue, implementing it on a broad basis requires security-sawy network devices.
And switches, because of their abundance within most networks, are ideal places
for security implementations [Ref. 30].
6. Authentication Services
Most organizations employ re-useable password schemes: a user ID and
password used over and over. Although they are convenient, they are very
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insecure. Because most passwords are sent from the client to the host/server in
clear text (not encrypted), stealing passwords directly off of the wire are easy
[Ref. 28]. Additionally, most passwords are easily guessed. Users may find they
will use more than one password throughout a typical workday. Most network
operating systems and administrators force users to change their passwords
every month or so. To simplify their life, they often write their passwords down in
an easily accessible location: on a Post-It note placed under the keyboard or
phone, inside a daily planner or calendar, or on a whiteboard. Not the ideal way
to ensure network security. There are better methods offering greater security
and easier use. One-time password schemes are proving to be the better
methods [Ref. 28]. They typically leverage more than one authentication factor.
These factors include:
• Something you are (human uniqueness)
• Something you know (user ID, password, PIN)
• Something you possess (tokens and smart cards)
The most popular and affordable schemes are two-factor: something you
know and something you possess. Authentication schemes that involve multiple
factors prove identity with greater confidence than single factors. Whatever
method is used, the process must be fast, secure, and easy to use. Popular
schemes include [Ref. 28]:
• S/Key (an Request For Change (RFC)-based one-time password
scheme)
• Time-Based (synchronized client/server system; i.e., SecurlD)
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• Challenge & response (client/server system leveraging portable
devices; i.e., Defender)
• Smart cards (intelligent devices; i.e., card readers)
• Kerberos (client/server software system based on a ticketing
mechanism)
• Fortezza (NSA-defined credit-card-size security device that
authenticates and encrypts)
• Remote Access Dial In User Service (RFC-based using
challenge/response options) [Ref. 23].
a. Secure Access to Layer-Two Groups
A growing trend in authentication is to segment the network into
privileged zones or groups. A user, once authenticated, gains access to one or
more pre-authorized user groups. Switch, router, and/or firewall rules regulate
communications between groups. This method provides a higher level of
security than traditional network sign-ons. Instead of signing on to the entire
network, the authenticated user only gains access to one or more layer-two
broadcast domains [Ref. 23].
Historically, access to these layer-two domains has been tied to a
single characteristic of the user's device: a switch port, Media/Medium Access
Control (MAC) address, protocol type, or network address [Ref. 23]. Additional
security can be realized if multiple characteristics are used (device
authentication). In addition, some organizations have mobile users within a
campus environment. Tying a device to a user is not always possible. Instead of
granting layer-two authorization based on the user's device, there's a way now to
base layer-two access on whom the user is (user authentication) [Ref. 23].
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This user authentication service leverages modern authentication
techniques--one-time password schemes like S/key, time synchronization,
challenge and response, and Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS). RADIUS is a protocol by which users can have access to secure
networks through a centrally managed server. RADIUS provides authentication
for a variety of services, such as login, dialback, SLIP, and PPP [Ref. 24].
In a RADIUS query, Media Access Exchange (MAX) provides a
user ID and password to the server. The server sends back a complete profile,
which specifies routing, packet filtering, destination-specific static routes, and
usage restrictions specific to the user. In addition, the MAX can use the data in
the RADIUS database to create and advertise static routes and to place
outbound calls. MAX is a system-level network access unit, with a cage and
backplane into which Multiband or Pipeline cards can be inserted to configure it
for various application requirements. It supports up to 32 host ports or direct
Ethernet connection and up to 8 Mbit/s to the network. It supports multiple
applications, including remote LAN access, leased line backup and individual
video-conferencing units, as well as connecting video-conference Multiple Chip
Units (MCUs) to the digital dial-up network.
User Datagram Protocol/Internet Protocol (UDP/IP) provides the
communications channel between a RADIUS client and server, with messages
acknowledged. The primary advantage in using RADIUS to authenticate
incoming calls is that you can maintain all user information off-line on a separate
UNIX-based server. You store virtually all Connection Profile information on the
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RADIUS server in a flat American Standard Code (ASCII) database. This server
can accept authentication requests from many machines, which makes swapping
out one dial-in network server for another much easier. (For more information,
refer to RFC 2058 and 2059.) These services intemperate with existing IP
management schemes like Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [Ref.
24].
b. Device Authentication
Device authentication is the binding of a switch port to specific MAC
address and/or a network protocol or network address. This mechanism is ideal
for non-mobile systems, like printers, servers and certain types of workstations
[Ref. 26]. If the device moves from its allocated port location, it will not be
allowed to communicate over the network. If the network address or protocol
does not match the port number and MAC address, it will not be authorized to
participate on the network. This is an anti-spoofing mechanism.
An example is found by contrasting security of data center devices
to non-data center devices. Data centers are physically secured, often with
"keyed" entries. Work areas are typically less secured than data centers.
Because more people come and go in the non-data center work area, additional
security may be required on some devices. Device authentication provides an
added level of security by electronically locking a device to a specific port.




User authentication is the process or service offered by the switch
and an associated authentication management server that gives users
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Figure 20. Device Authentication. [Ref. 28]
Networks (VLANs). This mechanism ties layer-two access to the individual user,
not to the user's device. This couples the need for secure access to the need to
accommodate user mobility. See Figure 21. There are three elements to the























Figure 21. User Authentication. [Ref. 28]
1. Authentication Server. Known as the Authentication
Management Console (AMC) is a software application from Check Point
Corporation that is supported on Windows NT (and soon on UNIX platforms). At
least one authentication server is required per network. A network administrator
uses the server to maintain the information needed for user authentication. The
authentication server provides a graphical interface that enables network
administrators to manage the information for each user or user group [Ref. 28].
The AMC maintains a secure communication path with the agent in the switch
(based on S/key). The authentication agent sends the user ID, physical location
(switch port), and challenge/response of the user attempting to log in to the
server over this communication path. The server sends the appropriate login
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challenge and the VLAN authorization information to the authentication agent.
The AMC uses the user ID response to the challenge and the time-of-day to
determine if the user is allowed to connect to the network. The AMC maintains a
log with the following information on every authentication attempt [Ref. 28]. The
authentication server supports the following native authentication methods.
• S/key
• Firewall password
• Operating system password
If a third-party authentication method is used, the
authentication server maintains an additional connection to the third-party server.
The challenge and validation necessary to perform authentication is generated
by the third-party server and sent transparently by the authentication server to
the user attempting to log in. The authentication server supports the following
third-party authentication mechanisms [Ref. 28].
• Security Dynamics' SecurelD
• Axent's Defender
RADIUS
All user authentication and network service access
information is located on the authentication or third party server. This information
is contained in a variety of formats suitable to the customer's requirements. The
switches operate as clients to the authentication(s). The client sends
authentication requests to the server and acts on responses sent back by the
server [Ref. 28].
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2. Authentication Agent. It is a software loadable module
that resides on the switch. The authentication agent communicates with the
authentication client, the authentication server, and special switch software
known as AutoTracker to support the authentication process [Ref. 28]. The
agent supports a MAC-based flow and a TELNET-based flow to the
authentication client. The client sends the user ID, password, and any additional
challenge response over this flow. The agent supplies the login prompt and any
additional challenge supplied by the authentication server to the client over this
interface. The agent also conveys the successful or unsuccessful results of the
login process for display by the client. When the agent is initialized, it establishes
an authenticated Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session with the AMC.
When the agent receives the list of authorized group names for the user, the
agent forwards the list to the switch's AutoTracker management software.
AutoTracker uses this list to authorize the GroupA/LANs for the source MAC
address into the filtering database. When the authenticated group is configured,
the administrator can define the group as being the default for the protocol family
that is assigned to the group; e.g., IP, IPX, AppleTalk or DECnet.
3. Authentication Client. It is any end-user device
connected to a switch's switch port. The switch must be able to see the end-user
device's MAC address. Hence, there cannot be a router or other gateway
between the end user and the switch port. The user, either via MAC-client
software file for Windows 95/NT end stations or via TELNET, issues a login
request. The switch's agent software forwards the request to the authentication
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server. If successful, the user device's MAC address is moved into the group or
groups that the user is authorized to participate in. The user can log out, move to
another device, log on again, and those same privileges will be granted. The
only difference will be that there will be a different MAC address in the switch's
registry [Ref. 28].
F. FIREWALL SERVICES
Much of the literature on firewalls concentrates on diagramming the
numerous possible configurations of routers, host systems, interfaces, and sub-
nets. It is imperative, however, not to lose sight of the broad definition of a
firewall as a part of security policy [Ref. 16].
A firewall is a component or set of components that restrict access
between a protected network and the Internet, or between other sets of networks
[Ref. 27]. The typical application is to regulate the ingress to the private network
from the public one (Internet). Intranet and extranet applications raise new
issues traditional security measures do not address-protection from "trusted" or
"pseudo-trusted" users.
A firewall can do the following [Ref. 27]:
• Be a focal point for security decisions (choke point)
• Enforce security policy (traffic cop)
• Log activity (misuse record)
• Limit your exposure (keep intrusions from spreading)
A firewall cannot do the following [Ref. 27]:
• Protect against every malicious insider (many yes, not all)
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• Protect against connections that do not go through it (some go
around it)
• Protect against completely new threats (known threats only)
• Protect against viruses (though they can work with products which
do [Ref. 27]
1 . Types of Firewalls




• Stateful inspection engines
a. Packet Filtering Firewalls
Allow or block packets based on IP source and destination
addresses, protocol (TCP, UDP), and TCP and/or UDP source/destination ports.
Because this capability is included as part of a router's base software, this is the
most widely implemented firewall type. These products offer decent performance
and good scalability but have limitations on their depth of security and
manageability. They deal with well-known ports, are susceptible to spoofing and
common attacks, and use an error-prone implementation process [Ref. 28].
b. Application Gateways
Also known as bastion hosts or proxy servers; use special
programs written for specific services (TELNET, ftp, http, etc.) to forward or deny
packets based on security policies. The programs, or proxies, are implemented
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on a host which typically has a hardened operating system (except for NT
machines, but that's a different story) in order to remove bugs and holes. Instead
of the user and applications talking directly with each other, they communicate
through the specific proxy for that service request. They are very secure and
easy to manage but have poor performance and do not scale. They perform
poorly because the proxy process has tremendous latency: packet goes to the
OS, then to the proxy, and back to the OS, with processing done at each step
[Ref. 28].
c. Circuit-level Gateways
Relay TCP/UDP connections. They do not run proxies. Instead,
users connect to TCP ports on the gateway that connects to a destination on the
other side. The gateway program(s) copy bytes back and forth. The gateway
acts as a wire [Ref. 27]. Circuit gateways are fast. However, they are
troublesome to implement and require client software. Uncooperative insiders
through the advertisement of unauthorized services can compromise them.
d. Stateful Inspection
It is a firewall technology invented by Check Point [Ref. 28]. Its
inspection module analyzes all packet communication layers, and extracts the
relevant communication and application state information. The inspection
module understands and can learn any protocol and application. It resides in the
operating system kernel, below the network layer. By inspecting communications
at this level, it intercepts and analyzes all packets before they reach the
operating systems. No packet is processed by any of the higher protocol layers
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unless it verifies that it complies with the enterprise security policy. The
inspection module has access to the "raw message," and can examine data from
all packet layers. It analyzes state information from previous communications
and other applications. It examines IP addresses, port numbers, and any other
information required determining whether packets comply with the enterprise
security policy. It stores and updates state and context information in dynamic
connection tables [Ref. 28]. The advantages of stateful inspection are speed,
ease of management, security depth, and scalability.
2. Switch-based Firewalls
Switches offer an attractive platform to deploy a firewall solution for many
external applications and most internal applications [Ref. 29]. The strength of a
switch-based firewall implementation lies in the ability to leverage an installed
networking device, its higher port count, built-in redundancy, higher performance
potential, and its class/quality of service capabilities.
a. Port Count
Server-based solutions are typically limited to 8-16 ports -a
limitation of the server hardware platform. A switch can offer 12-24 at the low-
end to hundreds at the high-end. This is important in applications where a large
range of key resources needs to be protected; i.e., web server farm [Ref. 28].
b. Performance
Most firewalls are implemented based on an "us vs. them" scenario
[Ref. 29]. In most cases, they sit between the WAN-connected external,
untrusted world (Internet) and the LAN-oriented internal, trusted world. The
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bottleneck is the WAN link-rarely over T1/E1. The need for access control is
inside the network-on the LANs. Internal security devices must be able to keep
up with LAN speeds-100Mb Ethernet. Widely deployed, wire-speed switches,
already providing the network building blocks, are ideal platforms to implement
these internal security control measures.
c. Redundancy
Rarely are firewalls implemented in redundant fashion. Most are
dual-homed-based on internal-to-external paradigm [Ref. 29]. A switch can
have hundreds of dedicated ports. Layer-three switches, which support Routing
Information Protocol [Novell] (RIP) and Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), will
provide route redundancy. Redundant interface cards and redundant chassis
can be configured to provide a fail-safe backup scenario. Dual-power supplies
will minimize other outage potential. Switches are built from the ground up with
redundancy in mind.
d. Management
The few must manage the many. Therefore a more centralized
policy administration is better [Ref. 29]. Security control measures that can be
controlled from a central station simplify enterprise-wide security because
policies are created centrally and distributed to wherever they are needed.
Switches' running internal security control measures, though physically
distributed, are centrally managed. With the new Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) v3 RFCs (2271-2275), secure network management based on
authentication and encryption is not far away [Ref. 29].
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e. QoS
All users and all traffic types are not equal in priority. Higher
intelligence can segregate them. As distributed directory services begin to
emerge, switches are ideally positioned to implement security policy once the
user or application is identified. Smart businesses will see the value of putting
first things first. The Oracle, SAP, or PeopleSoft databases are key business
applications. These run the business-take the orders, move the inventory,
collect the revenue and pay the expenses. Users getting a regular update on
their stock portfolio should not be treated on the same level as a user running a
business application [Ref. 23]. Incumbent switches are able to open these
secure channels for the users and applications in real-time, at high speeds. See
Table 2.
3. External Firewalls
External firewalls are positioned to control access in and out of a private
network to a public network, namely the Internet [Ref. 30]. They regulate
interactions between the trusted and untrusted networks. In a switch-based
implementation, on one side, the firewall is connected via a WAN interface
directly to the service provider (or sometimes a dedicated router is between the
switch and the service provider). On the other side, the firewall is connected via
a LAN interface to the private corporate network, often the backbone. Off to the
side, for those hosting their own Internet applications, there will be a networking
de-militarized zone (DMZ). The DMZ will typically contain one or more web
servers, ftp servers, etc. The bandwidth requirement is mandated by the speed
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of the Internet connection, typically one T1/E1 between networks.
20-30 Mbps NT; 70-80 Mbps
Unix
25 Mbps today; 150 Mbps 1989, 1 Gbps 1999
Minimal -redundant NIC's Hardware & routes, paths
Some -bandwidth
management
Much -bandwidth management, RSVP,
VLANs, applications, ATM
Dedicated host system -
processing unit, memory/disk,
monitor, keyboard, NICs
Integrated into existing platform which is
providing other switch functionality
Internet (WAN-oriented)
Internet & Extranet (WAN-oriented); Intranet
(LAN-oriented)
Table 2. A Switch-Based Firewall Has Two Primary Applications: as an
External Firewall and as an Internal Firewall. [Ref. 30].
External firewalls are useful at securing main campus networks as well as remote






4jp IF Firewall software
Figure 22. External Firewall. [Ref. 28]
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4. Internal Firewalls
The firewall architecture in this section (Figure 23) is comprised of two
primary modules: the Control Module and the Firewall Module, both explained
later in this section. This firewall architecture example is used because it allows
the definition of security policy in a central location and the distribution of it to all
enforcement points. Multiple user access control allows different people across
the organization to manage the security policy, based upon their authorization
levels [Ref. 30]. Internal firewalls are deployed in locations inside organizations
to protect key resources from internal threats. Internal firewalls are Intranet-
oriented. Because statistics show that 60-80% of all security breeches resulting
in financial loss are launched by insiders, protecting key resources from pseudo-
trusted individuals is becoming critical [Ref. 30]. These insiders can be contract
employees, disgruntled workers, or hackers that circumvented the
Internet/external firewall and entered the network via a backdoor (modem, etc.).
(Criminal hacking has a direct analogy with violent crime: the victims usually
know their attackers.) Ideal locations for internal firewalls are between
departments, between VLANs, at branch offices, in front of key physical
resources, like a server farm [Ref. 30]. Internal firewalls are useful when
isolating test labs, less secure/public corporate facilities, or "secret" subnetworks.
Bandwidth requirements are much higher compared to external firewalls.
Typically, they must be able to support Ethernet-to-Ethernet (10 or 100 Mbps,




Figure 23. Internal Firewall. [Ref. 28]
5. Firewall Architecture
The Control Module includes the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and the
Management Server. The GUI is the front-end to the Management Server, which
manages the Firewall database-rule base, network objects, services, users, etc.
The Control Module can be deployed in a client/server configuration. As an
example of architectures, the client can run Windows 95, NT, or X/Motif GUI. It
controls a Management Server running on Windows NT, SunOS, Solaris, HP-UX
and AIX [Ref. 29].
The Firewall Module implements the security policy as defined by the
Control Module. The Firewall Module communicates with the Control Module via
daemons. See Figure 24. The components necessary to operate a switch-
based firewall are [Ref. 29]:
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• Management Server-known as the Enterprise Management
Console (one Control Module can manage anywhere from 12-24
Inspection Modules, depending on the volume of traffic and the
amount of logging required).
• GUI client (more than one GUI client can exist)
• Inspection Module-code that runs on each switch acting as a
firewall.
6. Switch-embedded Firewall Features
A switch-embedded firewall packages the firewall in many different
ways. Most of the packages are oriented towards standalone server-based
implementations [Ref. 27]. An embedded firewall can be ported to run in a
true networking device. (A true networking device is one that is built from the
ground up for networking: optimized for large port counts, able to support
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Figure 24. Firewall Architecture. [Ref. 27]
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PC stuffed with interface cards would not be considered by most to be a true
networking device.)
The package created for the embedded code is known as an Inspection
Module. An Inspection Module is licensed per network device (switch). Each






Access control is the main role a firewall performs: enforcement of
security policy for traffic that is routed through it. Policy rules are created to
accept, reject, and log packet flows based on source, destination and service
type. When implementing security policies on a firewall, the administrator must
perform the following actions:
• Define the network objects to be used in the rule base
• Define any proprietary services used in the network
• Define the rule base for accepting, rejecting, and logging sessions
• Install the rule base on the gateways; i.e., switches
The network objects are the devices or networks to be secured.
Policy rules are created based on the communication attempts: source,
destination, service, and time (day, week). A service is the type of
communication (TELNET, ftp, lotus notes, RealAudio, etc.). Check Point has
144
predefined over 160 different services. If a desired service is undefined, the
firewall administrator must manually define it. Once the first four rule elements
are bound, the system next must understand what to do with the packet(s):
action (accept, drop, etc.) and track (whether or not to log the communication,
generate an alert, etc.). Finally, the rule must state which network object; e.g.,
gateway/switch, will enforce the rule.
The firewall in Figure 23 follows the security principle of "all
communications are denied unless expressly permitted [Ref. 29]." By default,
this firewall drops traffic that is not explicitly allowed by the security policy and
generates real-time security alerts, providing the system manager with complete
network status. Each rule opens holes through the firewall for specific networks,
devices, users, and services.
Common attacks are easily stopped by the Figure 23 firewall [Ref.
29]:
• IP Spoofing-an intruder attempts to gain unauthorized access by
altering a packet's IP address to make it appear as though the
packet originated in a part of the network with higher access
privileges.
• Ping of Death-PING (ICMP) packets larger than 65508 are not
handled well by kernels, making some systems crash or reboot.
Access to the firewall for management is distributed. Access levels
are defined as follows:
• Read/Write: access to all functionality of the firewall's management
tools.
• User Edit: modify user information only; access to all other
functionality is read-only.
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• Read Only: read-only access to the Security Policy Editor.
• Monitor Only: read-only access limited to the Log Viewer and the
System Status tools.
(1) Authenticity-Firewall Authentication. Figure 23 firewall
provides customers, including remote users and telecommuters, with secure,
authenticated access to enterprise resources using multiple authentication
schemes. The firewall's authentication securely validates that the users
attempting to make a connection are who they say they are before the
communication is allowed [Ref. 29]. Modifications to local servers or client
applications are not required. All authentication sessions can be monitored and
tracked through the Log Viewer. The demonstrated firewall provides three
authentication methods: user, client, and transparent session.
(2) User Authentication. Provides access privileges on a
per user basis for FTP, TELNET, HTTP, and RLOGIN, regardless of the user's IP
address. Inspection Modules, such as Xylan's switch-based firewall
implementation, do not support user authentication.
(3) Client Authentication. Enables an administrator to grant
access privileges to a specific user at a specific IP address. In contrast to user
authentication, client authentication is not restricted to specific services, but
provides a mechanism for authenticating any application. It does not require any
additional software or modifications on the client or server. The administrator
determines how each user is authenticated, which servers/applications are
accessible, what times/days, and how many sessions are permitted [Ref. 29].
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(4) Transparent Session Authentication. It is used to
authenticate any service on a per-session basis. After the user initiates a
connection directly to the server, the firewall gateway, located between the user
and the destination, intercepts the connection, recognizes that it requires user-
level authentication, and initiates a connection with a Session Authentication
Agent. The Agent performs the required authentication, after which the firewall
allows the connection to continue to the requested server if permitted. This
firewall supports the following authentication schemes [Ref. 30]:
SecurelD-The user is challenged to enter the number displayed on
the SecureID card.
S/Key-The user is challenged to enter the value of requested
S/Key iteration.
OS Password-The user is challenged to enter his or her OS
password.
Internal-The user is challenged to enter his or her internal firewall
password on the gateway.
Defender-The user is challenged for the response.
RADIUS-The user is challenged for a response, as defined by the
RADIUS server [31].
b. Logging
Figure 23 firewall allows the security manager to monitor
accounting data on selected connections. For each connection handled by the
rule, an accounting log entry is generated which includes a dozen or so fields
including the connection's duration, the number of bytes and the number of
packets transferred. Log records are generated when the monitored connection
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ends, so they can be viewed in the Log Viewer. The Active Connections View
can be used to monitor ongoing connections. The live connections are stored
and handled in the same way as ordinary log records, but are kept in a special
file that is continuously updated as connections start and end. All the standard
Log Viewer features, such as selection, search engine, etc., can be used to
monitor current network activity. When using the accounting option, the
connection accounting data (time elapsed, bytes and packets transferred) is
continuously updated, so the security manager can monitor not only the fact of
the connection but also its activity [Ref. 30].
The firewall provides integration of multiple alert options
including email notification and SNMP traps for integration with SNMP-based
network management systems such as HP OpenView, SunNet Manager, or
IBM's NetView 6000 [Ref. 30]. A User Defined alerting mechanism is available to
integrate with paging, trouble ticketing and help desk systems providing
additional flexibility [Ref. 32].
c. Address Translation
The firewall's Network Address Translation feature conceals
internal network addresses from the Internet, avoiding their disclosure as public
information. This feature overcomes IP addressing limitations, including
restricted IP address allocation and unregistered internal addressing schemes
[Ref. 32]. The firewall maintains the integrity of an organization's internal
addressing scheme by mapping unregistered IP addresses with valid ones for full
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Internet access. There are two modes of operation -- dynamic mode and static
mode.
(1) Dynamic Mode. Provides users access to the Internet
while conserving registered IP addresses and hiding the actual IP addresses of
network resources. Dynamic mode uses a single IP address to map all
connections through the protected access point. Since the IP address used in
dynamic mode is used only for outbound communication and not by any
resource, there is nothing to hack or spoof. The firewall allows an unlimited
number of addresses to be dynamically mapped to a single IP address [Ref. 32].
(2) Static Mode. Provides a one-to-one assignment
between the published IP address and the real IP address. Static mode would
typically be implemented when administrators did not wish to expose the real IP
addresses of the network servers, or if a network IP address had been assigned
historically and they needed to provide "real" addresses so that people on the
Internet can access them [Ref. 32].
There are two methods for specifying address translation [Ref. 32].
The first is to specify automated address translation during the object definition
process. This will automatically generate the appropriate translation rule. The
second is to specify the address translation specifications using the address
translation rules editor. All network objects can be used to specify address
translation rules. The Figure 23 firewall has the ability to validate the specified
address translation rules, helping to avoid configuration mistakes [Ref. 33].
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G. LOOKING AHEAD-DIRECTORY INTEGRATION
Organizations will begin to move to an enterprise-wide directory structure
for providing policy-based control of network resources. Through secure
authentication techniques, the network will begin to provide users and
applications a certain quality of service. Users will sign on once, regardless of
their location, and be able to access all of their authorized network resources.
The network infrastructure-the intelligent multi-layer switches-will integrate
directory-enabled applications. The distributed architecture will be able to
dynamically modify the available network resources based on a user's identity
[Ref. 33].
H. TYPES OF COMPUTER SECURITY POLICY
This section will discuss four types of computer security policy, their
components, and aspects of policy implementation. Program-level policy is used
to create an organization's computer security program. Program-framework
policy establishes the organization's overall approach to computer security (i.e.,
its computer security framework). Issue-specific policies address specific issues
of concern to the organization. Lastly, system-specific policies focus on policy
issues which management has decided for a specific system. Comparison of an
organization's computer security policies to the types described frt this bulletin
will assist managers in determining if their policies are comprehensive and
appropriate [Ref. 26].
1. Program-level Policies
Organizations need program-level policy to establish the security program,
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assign program management responsibilities, state organization-wide computer
security purpose and objectives, and provide a basis for compliance. Program-
level policy is typically issued by the head of the organization or another senior
official, such as the top management officer [Ref. 26].
2. Program-framework Policies
These policies provide organization-wide direction on broad areas of
program implementation. For example, they may be issued to assure that all
components of an organization address contingency planning or risk analysis.
They are appropriate when an organization can yield benefits from a consistent
approach. Program-framework policies are issued by a manager with sufficient
authority to direct all organization components on computer security issues. This
may be the organizations management official or the head of the computer
security program [Ref. 26].
3. Issue-specific Policies
These identify and define specific areas of concern and state the
organizations position. Depending upon the issue and attendant controversy, as
well as potential impact, issue-specific policy may come from the head of the
organization, the top management official, the Chief Information Officer, or the
computer security program manager [Ref. 26].
4. System-specific Policies
State the security objectives of a specific system, define how the system
should be operated to achieve the security objectives, and specify how the
protections and features of the technology will be used to support or enforce the
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security objectives. A system refers to the entire collection of processes, both
automated and manual. System-specific policy is normally issued by the
manager or owner of the system (which could be a network or application), but
may originate from a high official, particularly if all impacted organizational
elements do not agree with the new policy [Ref. 26].
I. EXAMPLES OF SECURITY POLICY
1. Program-level Policy
Program-level policy establishes the computer security program and its
basic framework. This high-level policy defines the purpose of the program and
its scope within the organization, assigns responsibilities for direct program
implementation (to the computer security organization) as well as responsibilities
to related offices (such as the IRM organization), and addresses compliance
issues. Components of program-level policy should include [Ref. 26]:
• Purpose: Clearly states the purpose of the program. This includes
defining the goals of the computer security program as well as its
management structure. Security-related needs, such as integrity,
availability, and confidentiality, can form the basis of organizational
goals established in policy. For instance, in an organization
responsible for maintaining large mission-critical databases,
reduction in errors, data loss, or data corruption might be
specifically stressed. In an organization responsible for maintaining
confidential personal data, however, goals might emphasize
stronger protection against unauthorized disclosure. The program
management structure should be organized to best address the
goals of the program and respond to the particular operating and
risk environment of the organization. Important issues for the
structure of the central computer security program include
management and coordination of security-related resources,
interaction with diverse communities, and the ability to relay issues
of concern to upper management. The policy could also establish
operational security offices for major systems, particularly those at
high risk or most critical to organizational operations.
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• Scope: Specifies which resources (including facilities, hardware,
and software), information, and personnel the program covers. In
many cases, the program will cover all systems and agency
personnel, but this is not always true. In some instances, a policy
may name specific assets, such as major sites and large systems.
Often tough management decisions arise when defining the scope
of a program, such as determining the extent to which the program
applies to contractors and outside organizations utilizing or
connected to the organization's systems. The Computer Security
Act of 1987 requires federal agencies to address the security of all
federal interest systems.
• Responsibilities: Addresses the responsibilities of officials and
offices throughout the organization, including the role of line
managers, applications owners, users, and the data processing or
IRM organization. The policy statement should distinguish between
the responsibilities of computer services providers and the
managers of applications utilizing the computer services. It can
also serve as the basis for establishing employee accountability.
Overall, the program-level assignment of responsibilities should
cover those activities and personnel who will be integral to the
implementation and continuity of the computer security policy.
• Compliance: Authorizes the use of specified penalties and
disciplinary actions for individuals who fail to comply with the
organization's computer security policies. Since the security policy
is a high-level document, penalties for various infractions are
normally not detailed here. However, the policy may authorize the
creation of compliance structures which include violations and
specific penalties. Infractions and associated penalties are usually
defined in issue-specific and system-specific policies. When
establishing compliance structures, consider that violations of policy
can be unintentional on the part of employees. For example,
nonconformance can be due to a lack of knowledge or training.
a. An Example of a Program Level Policy
The information residing on the XYZ Agency local area network
(LAN) is mission critical. The size and complexity of the LAN within XYZ has
increased and now processes sensitive information. Because of this specific
security measures and procedures must be implemented to protect the
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information being processed on the XYZ LAN. The XYZ LAN facilitates sharing
of information and programs by multiple users. This environment increases
security risk and requires more stringent protection mechanisms than would be
needed for a standalone microcomputer (PC) operation. These expanding
security requirements in the XYZ computing environment are recognized by this
policy which addresses the use of the XYZ LAN.
This policy statement has two purposes. This first is to emphasize
for all XYZ employees the importance of security in the XYZ LAN environment
and their role in maintaining that security. The second is to assign specific
responsibilities for the provision of data and information security, and for the
security of the XYZ LAN itself.
2. Program-Framework Policy
Program-framework policy defines the organization's security program
elements which form the framework for the computer security program and
reflect decisions about priorities for protection, resource allocation, and
assignment of responsibilities [Ref. 26]. Criteria for the types of areas to be
addressed as computer security program elements include, but are not limited to
[Ref. 26]:
Areas for which there is an advantage to the organization by having
the issue addressed in a common manner;
Areas which need to be addressed for the entire organization;
areas for which organization-wide oversight is necessary;
Areas which, through organization-wide implementation, can yield
significant economies of scale.
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The types of areas addressed by program-framework policy vary within
each organization as does the way in which the policy is expressed. Some
organizations issue policy directives, while others issue handbooks which
combine policy, regulations, standards, and guidance. Many organizations issue
policy on key areas of computer security, such as life cycle management,
contingency planning, and network security.
Keep in mind the criteria stated above for the types of areas that should
be addressed in program-framework policy. If the policy (and its implementing
standards and guidance) is too rigid, cost-effective implementations and
innovation could be stifled.
a. Program-Framework Policy Example
As an example of program-framework policy, consider a typical
organization policy on contingency planning. The organization might require that
all contingency plans categorize criticality of processing according to a standard
scale. This will assist the organization in the preparation of a master plan (for
use if the organization's physical plant is destroyed) by facilitating prioritization
across intra-organizational boundaries. Policy in these areas normally applies
throughout the organization and is usually independent of technology and the
system or application. Program-framework policies may be comprised of
components similar to those contained in program-level policy—but may be in a
very different format (e.g., in organizational handbook directives).
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3. Issue-Specific Policy
Issue-specific policies focus on areas of current relevance and concern
(and sometimes controversy). Program-level policy is usually broad enough that
it requires little modification overtime. Conversely, issue-specific policies require
more frequent revision due to changes in technology and related factors. As new
technologies develop, some issues diminish in importance while new ones
continually appear [Ref. 26].
It may be appropriate, for example, to issue a policy on the proper use of a
cutting-edge technology or problem, the security vulnerabilities of which are still
largely unknown. A useful structure for issue-specific policy is to break the policy
into its basic components: statement of an issue, statement of the organization's
position, applicability, roles and responsibilities, compliance, and points of
contact. Other topic areas may be added as needed.
• Issue Statement: Defines the issue, with any relevant terms,
distinctions, and conditions. For example, an organization might
want to develop an issue-specific policy on the use of unapproved
software, which might be defined to mean any software not
approved, purchased, screened, managed, and owned by the
organization. Additionally, applicable distinctions and conditions
might need to be included, for instance, software privately owned
by employees but approved for use at work and for software owned
and used by other businesses under contract to the organization.
• Statement of the Organization's Position: Clearly states the
organization's position on the issue. To continue the example of
unapproved software, the policy would state whether use of
unapproved software is prohibited in all or some cases, whether or
not there are further guidelines for approval and use, or whether
case-by-case exceptions will be granted, by whom, and on what
basis.
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• Applicability: Clearly states where, how, when, to whom, and to
what a particular policy applies. For example, the hypothetical
policy on unapproved software may apply only to the organization's
own on-site resources and employees and not to contractor
organizations with offices at other locations. Additionally, the
policy's applicability to employees travelling among different sites or
working at home who will transport and use disks at multiple sites
might require clarification.
• Roles and Responsibilities: Assigns roles and responsibilities.
To continue the software example, if the policy permits unapproved
software privately owned by employees to be used at work with
appropriate approvals, then the approving authority would be
identified. An office responsible for compliance could also be
named.
• Compliance: Gives descriptions of the infractions which are
unacceptable and states the corresponding penalties. Penalties
must be consistent with organizational personnel policies and
practices and need to be coordinated with appropriate officials,
offices and, perhaps, employee bargaining units.
• Points of Contact and Supplementary Information: Gives the
name of the appropriate individuals to contact for further
information and lists any applicable standards or guidelines. For
some issues the point of contact might be a line manager; for other
issues it might be a facility manager, technical support person, or
system administrator. For yet other issues, the point-of-contact
might be a security program representative. Using the software
example, employees need to know whether the point of contact for
questions and procedural information would be the immediate
superior, a system administrator, or a computer security official.
a. Issue-Specific Policy Example
All new Products purchases, including software purchased to adapt
present applications to Year 2000 compliance, and all other Products installed in
this information system must comply with the provisions of the following "Year
2000 Warranty" [Ref. 23]:
• Seller or Licensor (which term shall also include all persons
designing, developing or installing software or other Products with
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•or without an express agreement with the organization) represents
and warrants that the Products are designed to be used prior to,
during, and after the calendar year 2000 A.D., and that the
Products will operate during each such time period without error
relating to date data, specifically including any error relating to, or
the product of, date data which represents or references different
centuries or more than one century
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Seller or
Licensor further represents and warrants: That the Products will
not abnormally end or provide invalid or incorrect results as a result
of date data, specifically including date data which represents or
references different centuries or more than one century
That the Products have been designed to ensure year 2000
compatibility, including, but not limited to, date data century
recognition, calculations which accommodate same century and
multi-century formulas and date values, and date data interface
value that reflect the century
That the Products include "year 2000 capabilities" which means
they:
• will manage and manipulate data involving dates, including
single century formulas and multi-century formulas, and will
not cause an abnormally ending scenario within the
application or generate incorrect values or invalid results
involving such dates.
• will provide that all date-related user interface functionalities
and data fields include the indication of century
will provide that all date-related data interface functionalities
include the indication of century
will provide for accurate processing of date/time data
(including, but not limited to, calculating, comparing, and
sequencing) from, into, and between centuries, i.e. the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
when used in combination with other information technology,
shall accurately process date/time data if the other
information technology properly exchanges date/time data
with the Products.
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This organization shall not enter into any Products agreement with
provisions which tend to limit or eliminate the liability of any party with respect to
the Year 2000 Warranty above. Remedies providing for reasonable liquidated
damages for failure of the Year 2000 Warranty shall be acceptable. Any
purchase or other use of Products not in compliance with this policy shall not be
permitted without the express consent of the administrative unit's director of
information systems.
4. System-Specific Policy
Program-level policy and issue-specific policy both address policy from a
broad level, usually encompassing the entire organization. System-specific
policy, on the other hand, is much more focused, since it addresses only one
system. Many security policy decisions apply only at the system level [Ref. 26].
Some examples include:
• User X may or may not be allowed to read or modify data in the
system.
• User X may or may not depending on the conditions read or modify
data.
• User X may or may not be allowed to dial into the computer system
from home or while on travel.
To develop a comprehensive set of system security policies, use a
management process which derives security rules from security goals. A
hypothetical company, ABC Sales, has a headquarters office in San Francisco
and 100 branch offices around the U.S. ABC also has traveling sales
representatives who use portable computers. Employees within the company
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have Internet access for Web browsing, e-mail, and other uses. There's also a
public Web site, hosted at the main office. Vendors and customers exchange e-
mail and sometimes even large files with the company.
For ABC, mobility is one of the big requirements. If the CEO travels to the
Los Angeles sales office, he or she might want to print a document using a
laptop. This means giving the CEO temporary printer access on the Los Angeles
network. Typically, there might be a guest cubicle in the sales office,
preconfigured with a guest account and network connection. But this isn't the
best setup since it allows network access (however limited) to anyone who can
reach the guest cubicle. So the CEO might instead use a smart card that
ensures the same access rules apply wherever they plug in. Of course, the use
of smart cards requires a unified policy database—and devices that implement
the unified policy.
Meanwhile, back in San Francisco, employees should be blocked from
using the CEO's desktop PC to surf the Web. Centralized policy can help here
as well. For example, the network might employ IPsec's user certificates to
control access to an external network proxy server. In this scenario, a policy
could grant multiple levels of access, like giving full access to executives and
more limited, job-related access to other employees. Consider a three-level






First, define security objectives. While this process may start with
an analysis of the need for integrity, availability, and confidentiality, it cannot stop
there. A security objective must be more specific, concrete, and well-defined. It
also should be stated so that it is clear that the objective is achievable. The
security objectives should consist of a series of statements which describe
meaningful actions about specific resources. These objectives should be based
on system functional or mission requirements, but should state the security
actions which support the requirements.
b. Operational Security
Next lay out the operational policy which gives the rules for
operating a system. Following the same integrity example, the operational policy
would define authorized and unauthorized modification: who, (by job category,
by organization placement, or by name) can do what (modify, delete, etc.) to
which pieces of data (specific fields or records) and under what conditions.
Managers need to make decisions in developing this policy since it is unlikely
that all security objectives will be fully met. Cost, operational, technical, and
other constraints will intervene. Consider the degree of granularity needed for
operational security policies. Granularity refers to how specific the policy is with
regard to resources or rules. The more granular the policies, the easier to
enforce and to detect violations. A policy violation may indicate a security
problem. In addition, the more granular the policy, the easier to automate policy
enforcement. Consider the degree of formality you want in documenting the
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policy. Once again, the more formal the documentation, the easier to enforce
and to follow policy. Formal policy is published as a distinct policy document;
less formal policy may be written in memos. Informal policy may not be written at
all. Unwritten policy is extremely difficult to follow or enforce. On the other hand,
very granular and formal policy at the system level can also be an administrative
burden. In general, good practice suggests a granular formal statement of the
access privileges for a system due to its complexity and importance.
Documenting access controls policy makes it substantially easier to
follow and to enforce. Another area that normally requires a granular and formal
statement is the assignment of security responsibilities. Some less formal policy
decisions may be recorded in other types of computer security documents such
as risk analyses, accreditation statements, or procedural manuals. However, any
controversial, atypical, or uncommon policies may need formal policy statements.
Atypical policies would include any areas where the system policy is different
from organization policy or from normal practice within the organization, either
more or less stringent. They should also contain a statement explaining the
reason for deviation from the organization's standard policy.
c. Policy Implementation
Determine the role technology will play in enforcing or supporting
the policy. Security is normally enforced through a combination of technical and
traditional management methods. While technical means are likely to include the
use of access control technology, there are other automated means of enforcing
or supporting security policy. For example, technology can be used to block
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telephone systems users from calling certain numbers. Intrusion detection
software can alert system administrators to suspicious activity or take action to
stop the activity. Personal computers can be configured to prevent booting from
a floppy disk.
Automated security enforcement has advantages and
disadvantages. A computer system, properly designed, programmed, and
installed, consistently enforces policy, although no computer can force users to
follow all procedures. In addition, deviations from the policy may sometimes be
necessary and appropriate. This situation occurs frequently if the security policy
is too rigid.
J. THE SECURITY CHALLENGE
Formulating viable computer security policies is a challenge for an
organization and requires communication and understanding of the
organizational goals and potential benefits to be derived from policies. Through
a carefully structured approach to policy development, which includes the
delegation of program management responsibility and an understanding of
program-level, program-framework, issue-specific, and system-specific policy
components, your organization can achieve a coherent set of policies. These will
help produce a framework for a successful computer security program [Ref. 26].
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V. NETWORK COST MANAGEMENT POLICY: (A CASE
STUDY)
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There is an abundance of new vendor solutions vying for today's
networking business [Ref. 16]. Typically those who oversee their organization's
network are skeptical at best. It is not that they are unimpressed with ATM,
Layer 3 switching, IP Multicast, Gigabit Ethernet and other next-generation
solutions; it is more that they are too busy trying to justify the hefty price tag to
keep the present network up and running [Ref. 34]. And while many new
products bring desirable features like increased bandwidth, per-port RMON and
broadcast control to evolving infrastructures, do they really remedy the problems
associated with the bottom-line success?
After researching the subject of cost policy, it is the the author's opinion
that the real concern heading into the future is not necessarily migrating to high-
speed intranets and extranets, but reducing the spiraling costs associated with
supporting and operating the current network [Ref. 34].
It may be concluded that the network is a business entity that must be
preserved. There are strategies that can be implemented to reduce the
complexity of the enterprise and lower overall costs [Ref. 34]. The only problem
facing senior managers is choosing which path to follow to reap such rewards
[Ref. 34]. In this chapter, the author will address some of the major factors that
drive network costs up, and then provide a working example of how to best
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overcome these factors while still building a productive, profitable IT
infrastructure.
In developing this chapter, it was found that there are two distinct
strategies available to organizations: a primary vendor strategy that essentially
relies on a single source for all networking components, and a multi-vendor
strategy that draws from the expertise of several leaders in their respective fields.
Both schools of thought have their merits, but it is believed here that by adopting
a best-of-breed approach where one can leverage the strengths of different
vendors, one can better reduce network costs as the foundation is laid for a truly
integrated enterprise that will accommodate all converging resources.
B. NETWORK COST PROBLEM DEFINED
When addressing the costs of running a corporate network, most analysts
or research groups tend to break down the costs into three distinct categories:
capital equipment, support staff and facilities [Ref. 34]. Strategic Networks
Consulting (SNC), in its paper "Operating Today's Corporate Network," reports
that in an average three-year span, a company's IT budget will devote 29% for
capital equipment, 37% for staff and 34% for facilities. Facilities are generally
defined as those services that maintain the physical and logical well-being of the
network. For instance a facility cost associated with the infrastructure could
include leased line services or operational health services such as hardware,
software and circuit maintenance.
Most organizations tend to spend more on the day-to-day maintenance of
the network than capital equipment or support staff [Ref. 34]. But when looking
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even closer at these categories, one finds that there may be some other
variables that account for the associated costs.
C. BANDWIDTH ISSUES
The outlay for network equipment is substantial but at least it is
quantifiable. That is, it used to be, until bandwidth demands dictated replacing
devices with faster, smarter solutions [Ref. 34].
Network bandwidth is a precious commodity for the individual user. It is
what enables the user to access various applications, download selected images,
and exchange information with their neighbor next door or across the world. But
as the applications have evolved and grown much larger and much more
impressive, the need for bigger pipes to deliver them has also grown [Ref. 1].
Three years ago, shared 10 Mbps to the desktop was more than adequate
for the average user. Now with the prevalence of multimedia networked
applications, streaming video, 3D CAD/CAM programs and such, end users are
requiring a significant increase in their allotted bandwidth. It is not uncommon to
see some engineering departments relying on a dedicated 100 Mbps or higher
Full Duplex connection to the desktop to run these heavy applications [Ref. 1].
Even your typical Web surfers who need to go out on the Internet for
valuable company research need faster transmission to download images and
clips. You certainly can not deny the work-force the freedom and flexibility to run
these applications and browsers; but many organizations are asking when the
demand is going to stop [Ref. 34]. Does it mean having to replace equipment
every one or two years? And what about consolidating information resources
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such as voice, video and data? Managers must ask is their present infrastructure
capable of such integration. It would be nice to know that once invested in a
solution, it would stick around for at least the next five years. Unfortunately, this
expense never seems to stop coming back to haunt organizations [Ref. 34].
D. CONFIGURATION ISSUES
In a survey conducted by SNC, seven enterprise customers were asked
which tasks consumed most of their time and, not surprisingly, the number one
operational task mentioned was configuration [Ref. 35]. SNC defined
configuration as the re-configuring of devices as a result of user moves, adds
and changes including setting router filters to govern the flow of user traffic or
changing the way a router handles a particular protocol.
The report went on to say that "because configuration accounts for so
much support staff time, and people costs incurred during the operational life
cycle phase account for the greatest percentage of overall cost of network
ownership, configuration tasks are extremely expensive... specifically,
configuration tasks account for eight to nine percent of the typical users' total cost
of network ownership over a three year period [Ref. 35]."
In dollar amounts, Strategic Networks estimates that configuration can
cost a company an average of $250,000 to $300,000 per year based on an
annual network budget of $2.9 million. These figures were then broken down to
a per-move basis and it was determined that each move cost between $250 and
$400. If companies are going to remain profitable, they certainly can't afford to
stand still. Unfortunately, there is a price to be paid for all this moving around.
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E. DOWNTIME DILEMMA
Interestingly, the second most mentioned operational task mentioned in
SNC's survey was fault management, including resolving problems that arise
from network equipment malfunctions. This is usually performed in direct
response to user complaints or network management system alarms. As
covered in Chapter III while earlier network implementations were relatively easy
to troubleshoot, today's more complex infrastructures make pinpointing errors a
challenging and, more importantly from a cost standpoint, a time consuming task.
This presents a two-fold cost problem. First, the MIS staff is too busy
putting out fires instead of dealing with plans and strategies that would create a
smoother running infrastructure. If they are spending all this time performing
mundane tasks, does this require the hiring of more people with high salaries to
help out? If not, how can one expect to migrate the network to a more cost-
effective enterprise when there is no one available to lead the charge [Ref. 34]?
What also must be considered is what downtime does to the network
users and customers. Now more than ever, companies simply cannot afford
even the slightest disruption to the network. Some estimates put lost revenue in
the millions of dollars for every minute of network downtime. This of course
depends on the exact outage and the number of users affected, but suffice it to
say, regardless of how large or small your organization is, any delay in service is
one too many [Ref. 35].
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F. SECURITY ISSUES
While not always considered a direct cost in terms of dollars and cents,
network security is still an important issue when it comes to cost of ownership
[Ref. 23]. After all, any breach of network security can have a profound effect on
the future of an organization. In addition, the lack of policies within a corporate
network opens the door for abuse of bandwidth. Maybe the horror stories of
departments playing Doom over the network for endless hours on company time
bring the story home even more [Ref. 23].
But while security is necessary, it too does not come cheaply. Most of the
cost is buried in the configuration and integration of security features into the
network [Ref. 34]. The capital costs are minimal compared to the manpower
needed to design and implement an enterprise-wide network security program.
We have already covered how much time and money is spent when stretching an
MIS staff too thin.
A recent study conducted by the Registry, Inc. was able to put a dollar
amount on security stating that mid-range companies with disparate, non-
integrated network security systems spend nearly $250 per year per networked
desktop in support costs [Ref. 34]. Such costs should be addressed if a
company is really committed to reducing the cost of running a tight, all-
encompassing enterprise [Ref. 36].
G. AN ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION
Without the help of a crystal ball, organizations are hoping that their
existing infrastructure will be able to support all the applications and services
170
they will require in the years ahead. If not, it is safe to say that capital expenses
will give the day-to-day operational costs a run for the money in terms of which
costs a company more [Ref. 34].
Already organizations are anticipating the need to consolidate voice, video
and data on their enterprise. But how easily this integration will be is still tough to
judge since vendors are still posturing on the subject without a clear, proven
winner leading the charge. Needless to say, however, most companies are
going to have to brace for some upgrade. How much depends on their vendor or
vendors of choice.
The spiraling costs associated with running an enterprise network apply to
everyone, even those companies that are in the business of building networks.
Cabletron Systems, for instance, was experiencing many of the same growing
pains on its own corporate net [Ref. 34]. There was not enough bandwidth to go
around. Support staff was too busy performing day-to-day configuration tasks.
Network delays were costing departments critical access to resources.
Fortunately, the company did not have to look far for a viable solution. By
going to a full scale switched infrastructure (where routing functions would be
used only when necessary) and implementing a unique set of performance-
enhancing applications to complement a distributed management platform,
Cabletron has been able to dramatically reduce costs as it increases reliability
and productivity company-wide. The company's approach to the problem can be
applied to many customers' infrastructures. Starting at the single-site migration
and then moving to a multi-site, cross-country solution:
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1. A Single-Site Solution
Since 1994, Cabletron has implemented a switch-based network solution
at several of its key offices, but if the evolution of its corporate headquarters in
Rochester, NH is targeted, we can better gauge the results of migrating to this
type of solution, see Figure 25, [Ref. 34]. This case study may also be more
applicable to customers since a good percentage of existing LAN environments
are similar to Cabletron's infrastructure in terms of topologies, number and types
of users, and capital equipment.
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Figure 25. Corporate Enterprise 1994. [Ref. 34]
Cabletron's earlier network, with a router at the core, used a collapsed
routed backbone topology to support two FDDI rings, 24 Ethernet subnets, and
eight serial interfaces. This rather standard configuration served Cabletron well
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in the days of shared access. But as user demands grew, Cabletron's Network
Management group began integrating switching products into the existing
network [Ref. 34].
In September 1994, the first MMAC-Plus SmartSwitch chassis (now called
the SmartSwitch 9000), with an FDDI switching module, was installed in the main
building's wiring closet, delivering 100 Mbps of unimpeded performance to the
backbone. But that was just the beginning.
Through January 1995, Cabletron's Network Management group gradually
integrated more and more switching products into the building's existing
infrastructure including several of the wiring closets. Based around a switched
FDDI backbone, the new MMAC-Plus switched network implemented all new
products, with the exception of a traditional shared access hub in each wiring
closet to support legacy equipment.
Tom Dunigan, Cabletron's corporate network manager, explained that as
the switched network continued to grow, the core router became saddled more
and more with heavy network traffic.
As the company's sub-networks expanded, particularly those
groups within Engineering, the router couldn't handle the busy flow
of traffic. More and more engineers were using their workstations
as file servers, thereby putting stress on the router to filter and
forward large amounts of data. Consequently, the router's
performance decreased, as broadcasts and bottlenecks became
commonplace [Ref. 34].
In other words, some of the main factors that helped drive up the cost of
owning the network (i.e. inadequate throughput and network downtime) still
existed. The idea of removing the router was a radical idea at the time due to the
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router's essential but complicated role. Before you could even think about such a
measure, several issues had to be resolved. Cabletron's Network Management
group had to research the many side-effects that would inevitably emerge upon
displacing the core router. One such issue was how to handle subnet masking.
As John Smart, senior engineer, explained,
There are two major protocols that our network uses -- TCP/IP and
Novell's IPX. Within these protocols, you have subnet numbers,
subnet masks, default gateways and network numbers to deal with.
Before we could replace our router with switched-based products,
we needed to aggregate various subnets - which up to this point
had relied on the router to filter and forward data - and place those
subnets onto switching boards within the MMAC-Plus switches
[Ref. 34].
To accomplish this, however, every workstation must use the same
number of bytes in their IP subnet masks. All Cabletron workstations use two-
byte subnet masks, so placing those workstations on switching boards didn't
present a problem to the Network Management group.
Dunigan said the most important element to successfully removing routers
from the centers of networks is to have a strong knowledge of what the router
can and can't do in a network.
There is tremendous physical and administrative work required with
routed networks. Our department spent most of its time
troubleshooting protocol-related problems and subnet issues [Ref.
34].
Smart agreed.
Highly-skilled technicians are needed to keep the routers going.
You can easily collapse large segments of a network with one
router-related mistake, affecting the entire operation of a company
[Ref. 34].
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As the migration continued, the network's reliance on the router steadily
decreased. The MMAC-Plus hubs, with their switching management boards,
assumed total responsibility for filtering and forwarding data. In January 1995,
the router was completely removed from the network. According to Dave
Dickson, network systems engineer,
We shut the router down for good. It was a gigantic step for us,
and the company as a whole. We were making the final leap to a
completely switch-based network [Ref. 34].
Running 200 Mbps of bandwidth, high-end Auspex file servers transfer
network data across FDDI rings. Although strictly an FDDI-switched network,
there is one ATM link between Cabletron's data center and an MMAC-Plus
switch in a nearby facility. Fourteen FDDI interfaces run a total of 1.4 Gbps of
data throughput across the MMAC-Plus' backplanes. Routers still remain at the
outer edges of the network to connect Cabletron to the Internet and other remote
networks. This solution provides more than enough bandwidth to selected
departments and users.
High throughput aside, Cabletron's switched network has something else
working in its favor. Every SmartSwitch supports the company's innovative
SecureFast, a standards- based strategic architecture for building private and
public networking infrastructures [Ref. 34]. Drawing from Cabletron's expertise in
switching and enterprise management, SecureFast not only enables
SmartSwitches to bypass the core router, but provides advanced tools and
functionality that help create a cohesive, utility-like network that is consistent with
the long-term goals of Cabletron's business [Ref. 34].
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With the ability to deliver critical end-user information to those in charge of
specific departments within Cabletron, SecureFast helps strip away many of the
technical, complicated aspects associated with the network. Sure, the
technology behind the hubs, switches and management system remains
complex, but with SecureFast implemented, no one within Cabletron except MIS
or network administrators needs to think about the bits and bytes (although
SecureFast can significantly ease their jobs as well). Non-technical people
simply have confidence the system works and can access these business-
oriented applications right from their desktop [Ref. 34].
SecureFast is tightly integrated with Cabletron's SPECTRUM enterprise-
wide management platform, and together they oversee the performance of the
entire network. SPECTRUM'S industry-leading, client/server architecture allows
for the distribution of management tasks throughout the network, while also
providing redundancy and minimizing expensive WAN bandwidth usage. This
three-pronged solution, including SmartSwitches, SecureFast and SPECTRUM,
has led to some immediate and long-term improvements in cost of ownership
[Ref. 34].
Since the implementation of the new infrastructure and similar network
upgrades at other sites, Cabletron's Network Management department has
received positive feedback from employees and department heads alike. In
terms of cost of ownership, the network has realized these benefits [Ref. 34]:
Increased bandwidth, increased productivity. "Bandwidth utilization has
improved dramatically," John Smart said. "And we now get unsolicited phone
176
calls from many of our engineers and managers about how fast the network is.
"As Cabletron continues to grow, the network will no longer feel the strain of
adding more users." "Bottlenecks have been completely eliminated at the center
of our switch-based network," Dunigan said [Ref. 34].
Smart adds,
Larger impact on our available bandwidth was inevitable.
Engineers were using more powerful workstations to compile their
source code, CAD developers were eating up bandwidth with their
mechanical and component designs, and even word processing
jobs were taxing the network due to the large number of new users
hooking into our network on a weekly basis [Ref. 34].
Cabletron's upgraded switched network now provides an average of 10
Mbps per user with some departments and workgroups getting up to 100 Mbps
Full Duplex piped to the desktop. This increase not only eliminates any delays in
using bandwidth-heavy programs like 3D CAD/CAM drawing but it enables these
engineers to crank out work at a much faster pace, greatly improving productivity
department-wide, see Figure 26.
As far as future bandwidth requirements are concerned, Cabletron's
network has that covered too, see Figure 27. The distributed switching
architecture of the SmartSwitches enables the company to add bandwidth as it
adds modules. This not only protects the long-term investment in the switching
chassis, but gives the company the flexibility to mix and match technologies as
its growing needs dictate. For instance, if Cabletron wants to increase wide area
access for certain departments within the corporate net, it simply can add a
frame relay switch module to the SmartSwitch 9000. Or if the engineering group
decides it requires even bigger pipes to support essential applications, a Gigabit
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Ethernet switch can be installed. This kind of flexibility keeps capital investment
costs down, even when integrating voice and video.
Cabletron'* Corporate Enterprise 1997
Remote Srtes m3 *
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Figure 26. Corporate Enterprise 1997. [Ref. 34]
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Figure 27. Bandwidth Graphs. [Ref. 34]
As emphasized in the Strategic Networks Consulting study, configuring
the network is a number one concern for network administrators, accounting for
almost $350 per move when you factor in time and lost productivity. Cabletron's
switched network with SecureFast and its support of the 802. 1q VLAN industry
standard has all but eliminated this issue [Ref. 34].
With SecureFast in place, most adds, moves and changes can take place
automatically, with others being performed quickly through a simple point-and-
click interface, even across different protocols. The Network Management Group
can also group users based on application, MAC address or geography using the
same easy-to-use application.
Support for DHCP is also provided through SecureFast, allowing for the
automatic assignment of user IP addresses. This is a benefit-rich feature for
many organizations, not just Cabletron, with more and more workforces requiring
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Web access to perform their jobs. (In the past, duplicate addresses have often
resulted in lengthy delays and lost production not only for those users affected by
the error but the MIS staff that has to fix the problem and re-assign new
addresses.)
"We used to perform an average of four to five moves a day before the
switch over," notes Smart.
And today, Cabletron is still growing at the same pace so we have
the same number of moves. But what used to take at least an hour
or two before-including tireless visits to the wiring closet, and re-
configuring router codes- now takes less than five minutes each
[Ref. 34].
If you put that in man hours and what it could cost a company to pay
someone to do all this re-configu ration, it's clear that Cabletron is getting much
more done in less time. Needless to say, the cost savings are dramatic.
As part of Cabletron's migration to a switch-based network, the company
also continued to rely on its SPECTRUM enterprise management platform to
oversee the network. This platform is critical in a switched environment because
it pinpoints faults to ensure a better running network top to bottom. In addition,
SPECTRUM also has new features like Web-based management applications
and systems management applications to efficiently streamline the time it takes
to oversee an enterprise network. Even if a Cabletron network manager is on the
road, he can resolve a problem within a few minutes. Considering that every
minute of downtime can cost a company upwards of a $1,000 or more, this also
goes to great lengths to reduce costs [Ref. 34].
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Because network security is such an important issue these days,
SecureFast provides MIS and business managers with policy-based
management tools. "With SecureFast, you can secure certain segments on the
network from other users," Dunigan explained.
SecureFast will allow us to determine if a user has the rights to
traverse a particular segment of the network. If the user does not
have privileges, he will automatically be denied access to, for
example, certain file servers on a particular network segment. You
can deploy as much security in a switch-based network as you
want, and still not impact the overall performance [Ref. 34].
For business managers at Cabletron who have been concerned with how
networked resources are being used, they now have a simple way to maintain
security, not to mention their own peace of mind.
What about those hidden costs associated with networked users who may
be abusing the network, even within their assigned privileges? SecureFast helps
with a Call Accounting application which stores information for each connection
on the network, including the duration of a call, the type of service (e-mail, video
conferencing, etc.), amount of bandwidth it consumed, when it took place and the
identity of the connected users. You can liken it to the same service provided by
the telephone company [Ref. 34].
With Call Accounting, this detailed information can be made available to
whomever needs it within Cabletron: accounting, personnel, department heads,
just about anyone. The point-and-click SecureFast application even allows users
to format and export the data to a spreadsheet or billing application. The costs
associated with the day-to-day operation of the enterprise are provided in plain
black-and-white. Now that's cost justification.
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As mentioned earlier, the way many enterprise networks operate there is
too much time spent with daily operational tasks. When the network grows, this
often requires adding more and more support staff just to keep up with this
constant workload. The ongoing hiring of highly paid staff does nothing but
significantly drive up the cost of ownership.
Cabletron, on the other hand, has grown exponentially as a company,
going from 3,000 to more than 7,000 employees worldwide, but the network
management staff has only increased to 13 people in all. Just 13 people to
manage a worldwide enterprise network with over 20,000 nodes [Ref. 34].
2. The Multiple-Site Solution
The work completed at Cabletron's campus serves as an ideal model for
single-site corporate networks. However, like most organizations, Cabletron is
not merely a local entity with a need for a single pipe to the outside world. It is a
global corporation with more than 200 offices all over the world. And with an
enterprise that large, the costs associated with running it can be staggering [Ref.
34]. Especially when you factor in the use of voice and video services being
piped into the enterprise.
Since this extends outside the LAN environment and requires the
expertise of voice and data communication leaders, Cabletron has looked to
team up with other vendors to bring a best-of-breed approach to the cost-
effective consolidation of voice, video and data resources.
By pooling talent and technology with the likes of Nortel and MCI,
Cabletron can expand its corporate enterprise to build a robust, all-
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encompassing network that works to reduce costs as it improves performance
and productivity company-wide, see Figure 28.
Support Staff Ratio
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Figure 28. Support Staff Ratio. [Ref. 34]
Nortel and Cabletron share very complementary visions for building next-
generation switched networks. Through Nortel's leadership in voice technology
and Cabletron's role in data networking, the two companies are able to deliver an
integrated solution, capable of supporting critical business applications such as
voice, multicast, video on demand, and multimedia. Nortel refer to this
consolidated enterprise as a "Power Network"-an architecture created by Nortel
to deliver strategic business solutions that satisfy customer requirements for
implementing new data and voice services [Ref. 34]. Cabletron provides a
similar foundation for enabling enhanced data services across an ever-growing
switch-based networking infrastructure. By partnering in technology and
business focus, Cabletron and Nortel are uniquely positioned to deliver real
business solutions to customers and provide a seamless enterprise that is
scalable, simple to implement and maintain, highly distributed and flexible, and
able to accommodate growing application demands [Ref. 34].
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Cabletron put this partnership right to work in early 1997 by implementing
a nationwide LAN/WAN environment, see Figure 29. Leveraging each
company's strength in ATM technology, Cabletron has combined its SmartSwitch
9000 (formerly the MMAC-Plus) and SmartSwitch 6000 for LAN connectivity, with
Nortel's Meridian 1 Communications System switch for voice connectivity and
Magellan Passport ATM enterprise network switch for multimedia transport
through the WAN. All of the devices are managed by Cabletron's SPECTRUM
Enterprise Manager [Ref. 34].
This "Power Network" has unified over 200 offices around the world
comprised of approximately 20,000 nodes. Now the existing voice network and
LAN services are located on the same ATM backbone. By using Cabletron's
SecureFast architecture, Cabletron employees can receive the same Quality of
Service (QoS) in the LAN and WAN that customers have come to expect from
their phone service.
According to Smart, this new solution has already resulted in significant
cost-savings. "Not only have we reduced complexity by consolidating our voice,
video and data on one system, but we've been able to lower WAN costs by about
40 percent [Ref. 34]." The future is even more promising with this new solution.
Cabletron plans to merge the LAN and WAN concepts into one paradigm that
will stretch across the world see Figure 29 and Figure 30. This new system will
simultaneously support all of Cabletron's necessary business applications
including multimedia, desktop computer telephony integration (CTI),
videoconferencing, video on demand, and more. Key goals include [Ref. 34]:
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• Savings of approximately $27,000 per month over former
divided network operations
• Cost per user actually decreases as new users are added
• On-net video links eliminate bandwidth costs
• Dynamic bandwidth allocation for more efficient voice, video and
data transmission
While reducing costs, this consolidated ATM network will provide the following
benefits [Ref. 34]:
• Provide more accurate information to customers and employees
• Provide faster service to customers
Catletron/Nortel "Power Nerwx>rk" 1997
To Europe
Passport 160 ATM Swrtch Passport 50 SmartSwitcti 9000 PBX
Figure 29. "Power Network 1997". [Ref. 34]
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Figure 30. "Power Network 1998". [Ref. 34]
H.
• Savings on telecommunications usage can be passed on to
customer or other areas to improve the business
A PLAN TO FOLLOW
Now that Cabletron's new enterprise is in place, the Network Management
group believes customers will want to emulate this switched-based solution.
Customers who currently have routers at the center of their
networks are prime for a network migration similar to Cabletron's.
Their networks, like the earlier referenced router-based network,
are probably pushing the routers' CPU capacity. Their routers will
eventually choke on all the traffic like ours did, Dickson explained.
They don't have to get rid of the router; they simply need to re-
deploy it and put more of the traffic burden on the switches which
can handle the load much more efficiently [Ref. 34].
Smart added,
Software development houses for example, with their massive data
transfer needs, demand the bandwidth that our network prototype
can provide. Now they can look at our new infrastructure and see
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firsthand that by flattening out the network with switch-based
products, you remove the administrative nightmare of figuring out
subnets [Ref. 34].
Additionally, it removes the tediousness of constant adds, moves and
changes. Within a switch-based network, MIS departments no longer have to
decide what subnet to put new employees on, or what servers specific groups
need to get to, or even what hub to cross-patch employees to when there are ten
hubs in one wiring closet.
Companies that can benefit from a switched-based network are not limited
to traditional networking industry businesses either. Investment houses, for
example, need high-speed backbone and redundancy features in their networks
to be able to trade on the fast-paced, bandwidth-hungry stock market. An
important point to remember is that regardless of where a customer is with their
network migration-whether they're starting from the ground up or simply looking
to increase performance within a few departments-they have the flexibility to
build the enterprise according to their specific needs and at their own pace.
If the company is only concerned about improving the data throughput of
the network, a Fast Ethernet board in the SmartSwitch 9000 may fit the bill. If the
company wants to consolidate voice and data in a regional office for a lower
bottom line, the SmartSwitch 6000/Passport solution will suffice. And if a router
is required to handle a significant amount of Layer 3 and 4 processing, a new
hardware-based switch/router device could be the answer. (Unlike traditional
software-driven routers, these innovative multi-layer, switch/router devices do all
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processing through dedicated ASIC engines, resulting in Gigabit throughput
that's nearly 15 times faster at just a fraction of the cost.) [Ref. 33]
Either way, customers who place a substantial investment to follow
Cabletron (and its strategic partners) in this network direction will have
confidence knowing that it was done for the same reasons: to improve overall
network performance and to lower ownership costs.
Dunigan best summarized Cabletron's migration path as putting network
control back into the hands of business managers.
Because it is the business managers who are essentially
responsible for operating the company, they should have the final
say on how the network is utilized. As for myself and other network
management administrators, because of our new network
infrastructure we have moved from the role of constantly fighting
fires to truly managing and enhancing overall network performance
[Ref. 34].
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VI. CONCLUSION: HIGH-PERFORMANCE NETWORKING
INITIATIVES
A. NEXT GENERATION INTERNET NETWORK POLICY APPLICATIONS
AT NASA
We must build the second generation of the Internet so that our
leading universities and national laboratories can communicate in
speeds 1,000 times faster than today, to develop new medical
treatments, new sources of energy, new ways of working together.
But we cannot stop there. As the Internet becomes our new town
square, a computer in every home - a teacher of all subjects, a
connection to all cultures - this will no longer be a dream, but a
necessity. And over the next decade, that must be our goal.
President Clinton
1997 State of the Union Address
On September 10, 1997 Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI),
chairman of the House Science Committee, upbraided representatives of the
Clinton Administration for their slowness in putting together a detailed plan for
implementing the proposed Next Generation Internet (NGI).
In his fiscal year 1998 budget request, the President asked for $100
million dollars to fund the NGI initiative. The funding was to come out of the
budgets of five different federal agencies, primarily the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA, initiator of the original Internet), the
Department of Energy (DOE), the National Science Foundation, and NASA. The
other contributors are the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and
the National Library of Medicine/National Institutes of Health.
The President's original proposal first ran into trouble with Congress in
Spring 1998. Despite congressional support for the principles underlying the NGI
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proposal, many committees withheld funding for the initiative at that time in order
to secure a more detailed implementation plan from the Administration. Many
members also expressed concern that the original plan provided only a few
select locations with enhanced connectivity. This would have meant that some
areas of the country, like Alaska and parts of the Midwest, would be left behind
as infrastructural improvements were made. Some also questioned the role of
the federal government in improving the Internet, asserting that taxpayer dollars
should not be spent on something that industry would do anyway.
In order to more thoroughly address congressional concerns, the
Administration revised the NGI proposal, releasing a new draft implementation
plan in July 1998. The new plan identifies NGI as a research initiative, rather
than a deployment initiative, more clearly than the original proposal. Its first
stated goal is to conduct experimental research to develop advanced network
technologies, with DARPA as the leading federal agency. Goal number two is to
implement a high-speed "network fabric" which will provide the means to test
new technologies. This fabric will provide connectivity about 100 times faster
than the current Internet to at least 100 universities and federal research sites.
Goal three is to come up with "revolutionary applications," new ways of using the
technologies that will emerge from the NGI research. Hopes are high for this
aspect of the initiative which has the potential to allow unimaginable means of
communicating, collaborating, and creating. Based on these three goals. The
Next Generation Internet will attempt to [Ref. 38]:
• Promote experimentation with the next generation of networking
technologies.
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• Develop a next generation network testbed to connect universities
and Federal research institutions at rates that demonstrate new
networking technologies and support future research.
• Demonstrate new applications that support important national goals
and missions such as scientific research, national security, distance
education, environmental monitoring and health care.
To achieve these goals, NGI will be built on the base of current R&D
activities and programs in the participating Federal agencies. Furthermore, it will
call on substantial matching funds from its private sector partners and collaborate
with academia. These three goals are explained further in section 3.
Since the language of the new NGI Draft Implementation Plan is focused
on research and development, the door is left wide open for private interests to
actually implement the technologies that emerge. This may help assuage the
concerns of members of Congress who detected possible "corporate welfare" in
the initial version of the plan. In addition, the revised plan's Administration
proponents are specifically addressing the concerns of members of Congress
from areas that would have a tough time participating in NGI.
The Presidential Advisory Committee [on NGI] is very concerned
about this problem because we believe that networking should
bring all parts of the Nation together rather than amplify any
geographical disadvantages,
stated Dr. John Gibbons, director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
on September 10, 1998. Dr. Gibbons went on to explain that some areas, like
Alaska, would require far more money than NGI had to offer to bring them up to
full speed for the test network. However, the federal agencies involved in NGI
are being encouraged to provide increased funding to disadvantaged locations.
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However, despite these efforts to assuage congressional concerns, it may
be too late to save funding for NGI in 1998 according to Rep. Sensenbrenner.
"The trains going to leave the station," he said at a hearing on September 10,
1998.
1. The Results of the Game Plan: NASA Participation in NGI
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, is
participating in the Next Generation Internet (NGI) initiative, a multiagency effort
that also includes the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Commerce, and the
National Science Foundation. NASA's NGI focus is on prototyping NGI
applications [Ref. 47].
a. Technologies
NASA will deploy an appropriate suite of advanced networking
services to enable high performance applications. NASA-sponsored research
will focus on important issues such as network performance measurement,
network interoperability, quality of service and network security. NASA will fund
and manage research in advanced network technologies that are richer in
features, higher in performance, and deliverable at a reasonable cost [Ref. 38].
For example, they will enable real-time networking, group collaborations, remote
access to the network, and a seamless interface for space-to-ground
communications.
NASA will continue to be an early adopter of emerging networking
technologies that chart a course for a robust, scaleable, shared infrastructure
supporting lead users from NASA, other government agencies, and the research
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community, as well as large numbers of ordinary commercial users [Ref. 47].
NASA's program goal relevant to NGI's goal 1 is to sponsor R&D in
new networking technologies and services in support of the high performance
applications requirements. NASA will partner with industry and academia on
R&D in internetworking technologies to achieve an interoperable high
performance network testbed. By doing so, NASA will deliver advanced
networking technologies to the aerospace community and ultimately to the public.
b. Testbeds
NASA will provide both a high performance network application
testbed and a network research testbed for the NASA community and its
partners. NREN is the NASA NGI testbed and will enable NASA to focus on
delivering a leading-edge application environment to its community. Therefore,
NASA will [Ref. 38]:
• Enable next-generation application demonstrations across the
network. Internetwork with other Federal agencies and academic
and industry partners at both the IP and ATM service level.
• Deploy advanced networking services such as IPv6, multicast,
QoS, security and network management tools.
• The research effort supports such advanced capabilities as remote
interactive graphics, international digital libraries, and network-
based high-definition displays for science, manufacturing and
education.
Among the features to be packed into the NGI program will be new
switching systems, network protocols, high-speed interconnections to
workstations and supercomputers, as well as new forms of interconnection and
hybrid networking to reach remote and mobile users. NGI will highly leverage
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industry developments and any ongoing Federal research to provide a hybrid
networking demonstration platform. NASA will leverage its experience in high-
speed satellite data communications from the Advanced Communications
Technology Satellite program and attempt to make use of existing NASA satellite
resources as well as seeking out satellite services from commercial sources.
The high-speed satellite links mentioned above could provide a means of
connecting international testbeds to the NGI (e.g., GIBN, the Global
Interoperability Broadband Network) [Ref. 39].
Managing the dynamics of these activities will be a major
challenge, but the payoff for success will be enormous in terms of national
capabilities, research productivity, and new commercial products and services
[Ref. 39]. This initiative is important to NASA because NASA missions require
the interconnection and integration of its unique resources that include user
facilities, databases, and supercomputers, as well as geographically distributed
researchers and scientists located at universities, federal research institutions
and in industry [Ref. 38].
The NASA-funded research and engineering community consists of
over 180 universities, 30 industry partners, and 5 science and research centers
where NASA has significant research programs in place [Ref. 47]. The
importance to NASA of coupling resources at different sites to solve critical
problems is underlined by the research challenges in the fields of advanced
aerospace design, Earth sciences, astrobiology, astrophysics, telemedicine,
multicast network technology and space exploration [Ref. 47].
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NASA has already embarked on a number of applications which will
require the network technology acceleration of the Next Generation Internet to be
successful. Sample revolutionary applications include [Ref. 38]:
Advanced Aerospace Design and Test Tools - NASA wind tunnels
on-line, virtual flight simulation laboratories on-line.
Telemedicine - Interactive consultations, remote protocols and
procedures modeling distant health care delivery in space.
Earth Sciences - Advanced science investigations for Mission to
Planet Earth.
Astrobiology - Remote scientific analysis of Martian rock, virtual
aerospace environments for distributed collaborations.
Astrophysics - Remote operations of space telescopes located in
isolated areas such as the Keck Observatory in Hawaii.
Space Exploration - Remote interactive visualizations for command
and control of robotic explorers such as the Mars Pathfinder.
Unfortunately, the current Internet is too unreliable, too primitive,
too geographically limited, and has too low a capacity to provide strong support
for these requirements. NASA and other agencies have been working on
technologies in concert with private industry to explore new networking
technologies. The NGI will address not only accessible but also remote sites and
rural states. NASA experiments are anticipated to assist research in reaching
beyond the current Internet infrastructure to accelerate technology development
and deployment to remote locations. This initiative provides the critical mass and
leverage to unite this work and bring it to rapid fruition [Ref. 39].
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2. Naval Postgraduate School Contribution: Server and Agent
Based Active Management (SAAM) Architechture
Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School are developing a SAAM
system for the NGI. The SAAM project is currently sponsored by DARPA and
NASA Research and Education Network (NREN) under the NGI initiative. One
major objective of the NGI is to support all types of data using a single network.
This integrated services requirement poses a significant new challenge to
network management: namely, Quality of Service (QoS) path management.
Specifically in the NGI, the capacity of each link will be shared by a set of logical
service pipes, each of which provides a particular level of packet performance
measured by a set of QoS parameters [Ref. 40]. Typical QoS parameters
include the bound on packet delay and the rate of packet loss. For a data flow
(e.g., a video flow) that requires end-to-end QoS guarantees to its packets, the
source will invoke a resource reservation protocol such as RSVP [Ref. 40] to
establish a QoS path to the destination. The path is composed of a sequence of
service pipes whose composite QoS meets the flow's requirement. In summary,
in addition to maintaining connectivity, the NGI must dynamically allocate and
maintain QoS paths. SAAM servers and the routers will use a real-time transport
protocol for data and agent communications. Therefore in SAAM, most
management and control tasks will be performed by the servers in an automated
and timely fashion. Only a small number of planning tasks will require human
interaction, and in such cases, the management station will need to communicate
with a high level SAAM server most of the time. SAAM will also have built-in
mechanisms to interact with the reservation protocol and provide it useful path
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information when requested. SAAM will also support Diff-serv and MPLS in
addition to per-flow reservation for real-time data [Ref. 40].
3. Other High-Performance Networking Initiatives
The two major U.S. initiatives in high-performance networking are the Next
Generation Internet (NGI), and Internet2 (12), [Ref. 46]. Internet2 is a collection
of 135 universities and businesses, including Stanford, the University of
California at Berkeley, Harvard, Cornell, Yale and the University of Virginia. They
are trying to create a sort of virtual university for students and professors to
access books from libraries thousands of miles apart, to take classes at other
campuses and to collaborate on research projects.
Formed last October, its ultimate goal is to connect campuses at speeds
so fast that a 30-volume encyclopedia could be transmitted in less than a second
[Ref. 39].
Although separate projects, NGI and Internet2 share many things in
common. Both have limited links to the commercial Web, and both will depend
on the Internet for e-mail, low-level research and other day-to-day uses; both are
being built simultaneously; and some elements of Internet2 are being integrated
into NGI [Ref. 47].
Although the new Nets at first will be devoted to research, both may
become available for electronic commerce - which quickly is becoming a major
focus of the Internet.
The National Science Foundation (NSF) Very High-Speed Backbone
Network Service (vBNS) [Ref. 45] plays a key role in both the NGI and 12. The
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goals and strategies of NGI and 12 have striking similarities:
• Both seek to develop mechanisms for differentiating among the
services that the Internet provides to a variety of application types;
this ability to differentiate is often called Quality of Service or QoS
• Both have developed private industry-government-academia
partnerships
• Both seek to transfer their results to widespread practice in the
commercial Internet as soon as possible (as neither initiative seeks
to develop and maintain its own networks for long periods of time)
Several other countries have commissioned similar initiatives with similar
objectives. Canada has an initiative called the Canadian Network for the
Advancement of Research, Industry, and Education (CANARIE) [Ref. 46].
CANARIE is also an industry-government-academia partnership. CANARIE
commissioned CA*net II to develop advanced Internet capabilities and to transfer
them into the private sector. Singapore carved out of its commercial backbone
the Singapore Internet Next Generation Advanced Research and Education
Network (SINGAREN). Taiwan has TANet. [Ref. 46] France is readying its
Renater-2. NORDUnet, the academic backbone network for the Nordic
countries, is approaching a NORDUnet-2 initiative. Germany is commissioning
an advanced high-performance network. The Asia-Pacific Advanced Network
forum (APAN) is a cooperation of several countries, including Japan, Korea,
Singapore, and Australia (founding members), joined by Hong Kong, Indonesia,
and Thailand.
The vBNS, CA*net II, and SINGAREN are already connected to STAR
TAP. The US National Science Foundation (NSF) sponsored Science,
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Technology, and Research Transit Access Point (STAR TAP) initiative provides
an international exchange point for high-performance networked applications.
STAR TAP will be one of the exchange points for the Next-Generation Internet
(NGI). Also, STAR TAP is housed in the same facility as one of the emerging
Internet 2 gigapops.
TANet will soon connect, and APAN is seeking a way to connect its
members' advanced networks. Several European advanced networks,
mentioned above, are pursuing connections. In addition to NSF, other U.S.
government agencies that participate in NGI are connected at the STAR TAP;
these include the Department of Energy's Energy Sciences Network (ESnet)
[Ref. 46] and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's NASA
Research and Education Network (NREN) [Ref. 44].
4. Networking Policy Considerations For Next-Generation
Applications
Ideally, application requirements drive advanced network design. A
number of advanced research networks are being established around the world
to help develop the NGI network testbeds and applications [Ref. 45]. These
networks support trial activities that are not practical using the regular Internet.
These activities include QoS, IPv6, some forms of multicasting, etc. More
importantly, these advanced networks support high-performance applications
that will not work properly, if at all, on the big "I" Internet-applications such as
medical imaging, tele-immersion, collaboratoriums, distributed genome
sequencing, etc.
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It has been long recognized that most high-performance applications
development occurs at leading university and research institutes. As in the early
days of the Internet, the research community pushes the envelope in terms of
high-performance applications. Funding and infrastructure support enables not
only these applications, but basic research as well. A "tertiary" benefit of
applications development is that network requirements and design are driven by
user "needs" rather than network designers' perceptions of what is required.
Satisfying the real needs of researchers will allow the development of
applications and services that can easily migrate into the commercial sector [Ref.
45].
A classic example of this "tertiary" benefit is the development of the World
Wide Web. It was originally developed to serve the needs of high energy
researchers. It is expected that today's next-generation networks will lead to
similar application developments and spin-offs [Ref. 45].
According to NREN project researchers at the NASA AMES Research
Center, the next-generation of Internet networks being deployed worldwide
generally have restrictive Authorized User Policies (AUP) that limit connectivity to
a subset of institutions carrying out high-performance meritorious applications
[Ref. 47]. Currently, in order to interconnect "cooperating" NGI network testbeds,
network operators enter into peering agreements where they identify specific
institutions that are permitted to communicate with each other across a common
interconnect point, like STAR TAP. The routes for these institutions are then
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advertised by each respective network to their member institutions.
The use of community attributes is, however, only a partial solution and
only works properly if the foreign network has implemented an "explicit" routing
architecture.
a. Specific Policies
• Quality of Service
• Security
• Policy Architecture: Large Network Requirements
(1) QoS. There is wide-spread agreement that the Internet
needs some sort of "Quality of Service" (QOS) capability [Ref. 41]. Congestion
associated with the phenomenal growth of the Internet and World Wide Web has
made the Internet essentially useless for "production" or mission-critical work.
QOS offers the potential of ensuring bandwidth availability for critical needs while
still offering the current, best-effort service for non-critical traffic. In the longer
term, economic theory suggests that some sort of service differentiation (and
associated price differences) is necessary to make the Internet a viable, self-
sustaining, commercial enterprise. For long term sustainability, a competitive
entity needs money both to support its operating costs and to fund its expansion
[Ref. 41]. A collection of such entities need the spectrum of services to create
"market niches" that help prevent the largest entity from using its size to create a
monopoly. QOS could provide the different services and prices needed to meet
these needs. In this research the author found that providing QOS, a QOS that
"fits" the Internet, seems to be the single most important, and most difficult,
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challenge to its long-term survival. However, while there is agreement on the
need for QOS, there is none on how QOS should be added to the Internet/IP
communication model. Currently, NASA AMES NGI network researchers are
experimenting with a Differential Services QoS model emphasizing different
queueing mechanisms [Ref. 47].
(2) Security. There is no doubt that a next generation
Internet will need to have security designed in from the beginning. It should be
noted, though, that for the most part, the problem today is not with the design of
the protocols or the net. The Next Generation Internet should be designed so
that cryptography is ubiquitous, largely transparent, and used universally where
appropriate for authentication and/or privacy [Ref. 42]. Even at a more abstract
level, it is not clear that today's cryptographic devices are adequate. If nothing
else, encryption, hashing, and authentication algorithms are quite expensive.
Given the limited line speeds in today's long-haul nets, client hosts can easily
keep up; as line speeds increase, the load will become more of a burden,
especially for servers. But cryptography cannot solve "the" Internet security
problem. An analysis of the CERT advisories for the last 18 months shows that
two or three, out of about 30, would be moot if cryptography were universally
deployed. Most of the problems are due to buggy software, bad administration,
or both. There are several possible approaches. One approach is a Next
Generation Orange Book. While not a bad idea, the philosophical approach
should be re-visited [Ref. 42]. The Orange Book is predicated on the idea that
there is one central security model and one security kernel whose job is to
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enforce the model. That approach doesn't scale well to today's Internet.
Consider the case of a service bureau machine running Web servers on behalf of
several mutually suspicious companies. The isolation between companies -- an
administratively-decreed structure - can probably be accommodated within the
constraints of the traditional model. The network interface, however, is open to
all; there is no barrier to sending anything out, or receiving anything. The
individual server programs have their own trust structure. Credit cards numbers -
- data that is only a few bytes long -- must be rigorously protected [Ref. 42]. But
the card number verification process may require that the numbers be sent to a
bank. Some merchants even store credit card numbers in a long-term database,
so that they need not be entered each time. How can this fine-grained protection
be implemented? Another consequence of buggy code is that firewalls will
continue to be needed. However, in an interview NASA AMES NREN network
engineers stressed that their nature will change [Ref. 47]. First, the big corporate
design won't work. Better policy controls are needed on what can pass through a
firewall. This may imply more application proxies, but they have to be much
faster and much more flexible. Second, there are some firewall-hostile protocols
out there. To give just one example, TCP is much more easily passed by a
firewall, because header bits can differentiate, in a context-independent fashion,
between incoming and outgoing calls. This doesn't work with UDP. But in
reality, despite its datagram nature, most of the useful applications built on top of
UDP use a query-response protocol. A different design would have permitted
easy firewall filtering of such messages [Ref. 42].
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(3) Policy Architecture. Scaling a large network is a
principal concern, especially at high speeds, and an issue which needs to be
carefully examined in the conceptual design and planning stages [Ref. 43].
Striking the right hierarchical balance can make the difference between a high-
performance network and one which is on the verge of congestion collapse. This
section discusses the architectural concepts of applying policy control in a large
network to minimize the performance overhead associated with different
mechanisms that provide traffic and route filtering, bandwidth control (rate-
limiting), routing policy, congestion management, and differentiated classes of
service (CoS).
• Architectural Concepts - The key to scaling very large networks is
to maintain strict levels of hierarchy, commonly referred to as "core,
distribution, and access" levels, which limits the degree of meshing
between nodes. The "core" portion of the hierarchy is generally
considered the central portion, or backbone, of the network; the
"access" level represents the outer-most portion of the hierarchy,
and the "distribution" level represents the aggregation points and
transit portions which lie between the core and access levels of the
hierarchy [Figure 31].
A high degree of meshing affects the ability to maintain
stability in the routing system and degrades overall performance as the network
grows larger [Ref. 43]. A distinction should be made between full-meshing and
partial meshing; it stands to reason that partially-meshed networks scale better
than fully-meshed networks, and for redundancy considerations, a partially-
meshed network has acceptable scaling properties (in most instances).
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Figure 31. Access Levels of Hierarchy. [Ref. 43]
It is important to understand, however, the impact of applying policy at various
locations with the network hierarchy. Depending upon where these policies are
applied, it can have varying effects on the performance of the network. It is
commonly accepted that the network core should never become the point of
network congestion, but in reality, this is not always the case [Ref. 43]. The
purpose of the network core is to forward traffic as quickly as possible to its
destination, therefore any type of policy which may affect forwarding performance
should not be implemented in the network core. Types of policies which may fall
into this category are traffic and route filtering. It is worthwhile to consider
"pushing" these types of policy implementations to the lower portions of the
hierarchy to avoid performance degradations which affect the entire network,
instead of a smaller subset of the overall topology. If traffic congestion is a
concern in the distribution and core levels of the network hierarchy, then one
should consider the implementation of Random Early Detection (RED) as a
congestion management mechanism in these portions of the network topology
[Ref. 43]. Implementation of policy lower in the hierarchy has a nominal impact
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on the overall performance of the network for several reasons. Some
mechanisms, such as traffic filtering, have less of an impact on forwarding
performance on lower speed lines. Since the speed of the inter-node
connectivity generally gets faster as one goes higher in the network hierarchy,
the impact of implementing policy in the higher levels of the network hierarchy
increases. The same principal holds true for traffic accounting, access control,
bandwidth management, preference routing, and other types of policy
implementations. These mechanisms are more appropriately applied to nodes
which reside in the lower portions of the network hierarchy, where processor and
memory budgets are less critical. Another compelling reason to push policy out
towards the network periphery is to maintain stability in the core network. Since
high speed traffic forwarding is usually found in the network core, and
conversely, lower speed forwarding is generally found lower in the network
hierarchy, there can be varying degrees of performance impact depending on
where these types of policies are implemented. In most cases, there is a much
larger percentage of traffic which transits the network core than transits any one
particular access point, so implementing policy in the network core has a higher
degree of impact on a larger percentage of the traffic [Ref. 43]. By the same
token, any adverse performance impact due to such policy implementations in
the higher levels of the network hierarchy has a broader impact on a larger
percentage of the overall network. Policy implementation in large networks
should be done at the lowest portions of the hierarchy as possible, in order to
avoid performance degradations which impact the entire network [Ref. 43].
206
B. RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES AND
RESEARCH TOPICS
1. Gemini, an Example of the Need for Research Collaboration
Linkages
Today's high-performance applications have increasing requirements to
establish network topologies that follow research collaboration linkages rather
than network topologies [Ref. 44]. For example, there is a joint project among
Canada, the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), United Kingdom,
Chile, Argentina, and Brazil called Gemini, for two very powerful next-generation
"twin" telescopes to be built in Chile and Hawaii. The telescopes will use
atmosphere-correcting lenses, which should result in images almost as good as
those produced from the Hubble space telescope. Also, these telescopes will
use electronic imaging systems rather than film. Images could be transmitted
over high-performance networks to a researcher's desk. In time, it should be
possible for researchers to operate the telescope remotely in real time [Ref. 44].
These images cannot use any lossy compression technique, as very faint
star images may be lost in the process; hence, image files will be several
megabytes, if not gigabytes, in size. These images will be exchanged back and
forth among a small set of researchers located primarily in the participating
countries. This application requires high-performance connectivity among sites,
yet currently each site is connected to separate research networks [Ref. 44].
With the existing interconnection agreement, collaboration linkages among
researchers are driven by the somewhat arbitrary designation of approved
207
institutions in respective networks [Ref. 45]. In an ideal world, it would be
advantageous to set up "wide-area virtual high-bandwidth networks" among
collaborating institutions. These virtual high-performance networks would span a
number of underlying research networks. The analogy that is commonly used is
a set of overlapping Venn diagrams of virtual private networks (VPNs). These
are somewhat different in concept from today's commercial l-VPNs in that an
institution can be a member of a number of different communities of interest.
More important, users are not isolated from the Internet as they would be with I-
VPNs. In fact, the Internet could be considered the global "community of
interest" of which every Internet user is a member [Ref. 45].
Using the Gemini project as an example, Canada's University of Toronto,
the U.S.'s NASA GSFC, Chile's National University of Chile, and select
institutions in the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Brazil could be part of one
virtual private network that is dedicated to one specific collaborative application
[Ref. 46]. Using what are commonly referred to as "explicit routing" technologies,
such as MPLS, these communities of interest could be assigned their own QoS
mechanisms where not only the advertised routes but other parameters, such as
bandwidth and delay, could also be configured dynamically.
Another important feature of the "communities of interest" concept is that
they are layer 2 independent. There is strong likelihood that next-generation
networks, including SONET, Giga-ethernet, Optical IP, and ATM, will use a
number of layer 2 transport services. A community-of-interest or VPN strategy
that is layer 2 independent is very attractive to many network operators [Ref. 47].
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The need for virtual high-performance networks will be increasingly
important for funding agencies as well. In the next few years, it will be
increasingly difficult for funding agencies to continue to fund "generic" backbone
networks for the research community, even if those networks have restrictive
AUPs [Ref. 46]. On the other hand, it is recognized that many advanced
institutions and applications need high-performance networks to carry out their
fundamental missions. Virtual networks that are clearly identified with a specific
research objective or even a specific application will be much easier to support
from public funds [Ref. 45].
2. IPV6
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) adopted Internet Protocol,
Version 6 (IPv6) [RFC 1883] as a replacement for Internet Protocol, Version 4
(IPv4). Research could be conducted to provide a brief technical assessment of
IPv6 and specifically cover such major aspects of IPv6 as routing and
addressing, address autoconfiguration, neighbor discovery, and transitioning
networks from IPv4 to IPv6. Other aspects of IPv6, such as support for mobility,
support for resource reservations, and security should also be addressed in the
research [Ref. 46].
The ability to sustain continuous and uninterrupted growth of the Internet
could be viewed as the major driving factor behind IPv6. IP address space
depletion and the Internet routing system overload are some of the major
obstacles that could preclude the growth of the Internet.
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One of the fundamental requirements of the current IP routing and
addressing architecture is the requirement that within a single internet, such as
the Internet, IP unicast addresses must be unambiguous (unique). In other
words, within an internet, only one node could have a given IP unicast address.
Combined with the fact that an IPv4 address is 32 bits wide, this means that the
theoretical upper bound on the size of the Internet is 232 nodes, consisting of
hosts and routers. By extending the size of the address field in the network layer
header from 32 to 128 bits, IPv6 raised this theoretical limit to 2 128 nodes.
Therefore, IPv6 could solve the IP address space depletion problem for the
foreseeable future [Ref. 46].
Although IPv6 significantly increases the total size of the available IP
address space, the question remains: Is this sufficient to enable the continuous
growth of the Internet? Within the current IP routing and addressing architecture,
IP addresses must be unambiguous, but this is not sufficient to guarantee IP-
level reachability within an internet [Ref. 46]. Within the current architecture, the
primary role of IP addresses is not just to enumerate all the nodes (hosts and
routers) within an internet, but to provide routing (IP-level reachability) to all the
nodes within the internet. Therefore, in order to support an uninterrupted growth
of the Internet while maintaining the current IP routing and addressing
architecture, not only is a larger IP address space needed, but the assignment of
addresses must also enable scalable routing [Ref. 46].
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